

Miami Today – The U.S. Tomorrow

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Preface

“Miami Today — the U.S. Tomorrow” was written in 1982 as an analysis of certain aspects and implications of the immigration situation at the time and in the immediate future, assuming the situation to be ongoing and accelerating.

Rereading the analysis in 1988, it seems still timely and comprehensive, and I cannot find anything which needs to be deleted or changed.

The 1982 trends have continued and expanded, and the future predicted then is, if anything, ahead of schedule.

I am, however, persuaded that some points should now be explained in greater detail, especially those dealing with the dynamics of culture. Since 1982, the all-out effort to justify unchecked Hispanic-Asian immigration — by claiming that such immigrants are “enriching” the native “culture(s)” with their own — has escalated dramatically. This claim is not confined to any particular resident-American social, economic, intellectual or ethnic groups. It is made — always using “enrich” in some form — by both liberal and conservative politicians, pundits and educators, by the rich and the poor, by brahmins and arrivistes, by public figures as diverse as George Bush and Joan Didion. It has become a key article of American faith and, like so many such articles, is rarely if ever examined or defined closely. Although we pride ourselves on being “scientific,” especially in comparison with primitive societies, the spirit of impartial inquiry seems just as absent in our world as in theirs where important taboos are concerned.

The claimants of cultural “enrichment” are careful never to define the term except in wishful superficiality, nor to probe key questions on cultural dynamics and on the very nature of culture itself.

The word “culture” has a number of meanings. In this context, two are significant. In the first, according to Webster, culture is “a particular stage of advancement in civilization or the characteristic features of such a stage or state; as, primitive or Greek *culture*.” In the second, culture is “the enlightenment and refinement of taste acquired by intellectual and esthetic training.” In the first, culture is environment, and in that sense everyone on earth belongs to some culture because no one lives in a non-environmental vacuum. Popularly, there are high cultures (ancient Greeks, etc.) and low cultures (aboriginal societies), but the high cultures were — and are — invariably carried on by a tiny minority inside a large low culture, and many of the aboriginal cultures were remarkably sophisticated (“high”) throughout the whole.

In the United States, all the inhabitants belong to one environmental (low) culture or another, but American high culture is preserved (if, today, not extended!) by a very small group of people. And the people in

that small group have more in common with the preservers of high cultures in other societies, especially in western Europe, than they have with their fellow Americans with whom they also, perforce, share membership in a generic low culture.

The first settlers in New England and the South belonged primarily to a British (low) culture, but were rarely cultured in the high sense. The imported flame of high British and, later, European culture was eventually transformed into high American culture by a handful of American men and women. Ninety-nine-plus percent of the American population never had any part in this process and doesn't today.

In fact, environmental or E-culture is usually at odds with high or H-culture because E-culture is usually ignorant, naive and insistent compared with H-culture. In cultural dynamics, E-culture "contains" H-culture, but rarely understands or appreciates it, and often threatens and even attacks it. In such an attack, American E-culture does not necessarily realize what it is attacking because in the United States — in contrast to most societies in the world — the native H-culture is not respected as being the crowning achievement and possession of E-culture. In other societies, this respect is not natural but artificial and enforced. In the United States, the machinery of enforcement — the H-cultural priesthood, in one form or another — does not exist, having been eliminated in order to avoid letting H-culture interfere with all-out produce-and-consume.

When it is claimed that Hispanic (usually Mexican) and Asian immigrants are "enriching American culture by adding their own cultures," the picture being officially painted is one of poor, ignorant peasants who have nothing to do with such H-culture as may (or may not) exist in their own societies, but who are, nevertheless, bringing such H-culture(s) with them. This deliberately misleading picture, given form in a wide variety of pervasive ways, is designed to persuade us that each and every Mexican immigrant is carrying Ortega y Gasset and Cervantes in his knapsack, and is ready, able and anxious to share them.

This picture should be clearly and immediately preposterous — it would be remarkable if one Mexican peon in a hundred thousand were a carrier of (an assumed) Mexican H-culture. So the claim of H-culture "enrichment" from Mexican — or Vietnamese, or Korean — peasants is nonsense.

(In reality, the flow of H-culture goes on constantly all over the world through books, recordings, paintings, social intercourse between cultivated people, etc. This flow is supranational, has existed since the dawn of civilization(s), and is quite independent of the migration of peons.)

The Mexican, etc., peasant does bring his own E-culture; that is, the primitive habits, notions and appetites of the crude (if picturesque) environment he has escaped. But does a close and impartial examination of this pathetic baggage justify it being called an "enrichment," even by resident-American E-culture standards?

American E-cultures may themselves be nothing more than pathetic

baggage in other forms, but can they be “enriched” by equally or even more pathetic Hispanic-Asian E-cultures? Are already dreadful American slums “enriched” by pumping imported peons into them? It is impossible to see how.

(Conversely, would Japan be “enriched” by allowing poor, ignorant Americans to immigrate in great numbers? Would any country in western Europe? Would Israel? Would even Third-World countries? Would Mexico itself? Wouldn’t the result be an increase in social and cultural problems rather than a decrease? Isn’t that why Japan, for example, doesn’t want foreigners? And if our poor and ignorant are not “enriching” for Mexico, how can the Mexican poor and ignorant possibly be “enriching” for the United States?)

Of course, a case can be and is being made, in the official, Orwellian, Ministry-of-Truth format. See, for example, the July 11, 1988, issue of *Time*. In a cover story written primarily by Hispanic staffers, *Time* argues that the increasing presence of Mexican music, art, food, etc., signifies “enrichment” and finishes with these directives:

“Maybe convergence is the key. This is not just a box-office phenomenon, after all, but an episode in an on-going cultural revolution, one in which Americans of all kinds learn to see a bit of Latino within themselves. In that process, a Spanish term might help. The word is *coràzon*, meaning heart. Let it stand for what is necessary in all relations between the Americans who are not Hispanics and the Americans who are. Their shared history, full of frictions and resentments, marked by episodes of bigotry, exploitation and even bloodshed, might yet become a comedy of reconciliation, but that would take real heart and plenty of it. Not the valentine of pop crooning, not the thumping bag inflated for election years, but the experienced heart — tread marked, willing, unconditional. The one that listens. Because, as they cross over into the American imagination, Hispanics are sending one irresistible message: we come bearing gifts.”

Even if the gifts seem nothing more than imported Hispanic E-culture trivia, they are to be taken gratefully and made much of. The “experienced heart . . . willing, unconditional. The one that listens. . . .” is to be a wholly non-Hispanic heart — Hispanics as historical victims of “Anglos” are not expected to show such fabulous and unreciprocated generosity. “Americans who are not Hispanics” (surely a Ministry-of-Truth touch) will need plenty of *coràzon* to excise their lamentable record of bigotry and exploitation (faults from which Hispanics are free) and to prepare for the reconciliation they are obligated to offer; Hispanic acceptance of the offer does not require reciprocity, for they are free of historical fault, etc. “Americans who are not Hispanics” should also note that Hispanic wishes are “irresistible” and should “learn to see a bit of Latino within themselves.” This directive might be seen as impossible to fulfil — what is not there cannot be found — if paralleled with a comparable order to “Americans who are Hispanics” to learn to see a bit of North Europe within themselves. But the comparable directive is

carefully omitted, and all the “Americans who are not Hispanics” go willingly — even enthusiastically — off on the treasure hunt within themselves from which they must return empty-handed. But from which they must pretend to return richly rewarded.

With such antics in plain view, can it be that the desired “comedy of reconciliation” lies not in the future but in the present? And not, naturally, in the form imagined and desired by *Time*’s Hispanics, but as the full flowering of Mencken’s American boobs, with those boobs led into believing and acting out fantasies which even Mencken would have found incredible? On the other hand, he was the man who said, “No one ever went broke underestimating the intelligence of the American people,” and if he really believed that, nothing could surprise him.

(Of course, Mencken was pre-Orwell, and could hardly have conceived a world beyond and immune to wit. His boobs were comic in relation to other Americans — in large numbers — of (relative) intelligence and sanity; today’s boobs are a norm from which there seems to be no deviation or escape. His boobs could not have obeyed an order to accept Mexican peons “unconditionally” as the bearers of “irresistible” gifts; today’s boobs obey any such order without hesitation or demur. They make Hitler’s mindless followers seem a mere stage on the way to themselves. In terms of inevitable progressions, was it inevitable that Menckonian boobs end as zombies? Could such a progression indicate a devolutionary “law” within nature itself? If so, variable or immutable?

(Also, can one imagine such a misreading of reality taking place in Japan? In Israel? Is it possible that Mencken’s *Boobus Americanus* is precisely limited to a North American habitat? Does the fully developed species exist anywhere else in the world? And, perhaps more important, do engineered cultural fantasies require advanced boobs to carry them out? Considered from another angle, can such fantasies be earned out except by such boobs? If so, does not the “American story” become a tale of the developing boob, descending from credulity to cruder credulity until he achieves total belief in total unreality?)

It may be of interest to note that the enrichment theory in regard to immigrant Mexicans, who are at least half Indian — and usually more — is at variance with resident-American theory and practice regarding North American Indians. We have long since given up any hope of assimilating “our” Indians culturally or in any other way. We dismiss the notion that they might “enrich” us culturally. We make it plain that they don’t fit in by keeping them on reservations. But at the same time — and how Mencken would have relished this contradiction — we insist that mestizo Indians from south of the border will be different; the Rio Grande is a miracle-worker and Mexican Indians can “enrich” and be assimilated where their northern relatives cannot do either. D. H. Lawrence put the actual reality succinctly in *Mornings in Mexico*: The Indian way of consciousness is different from and fatal to our way of consciousness. Our way of consciousness is different from and fatal to

the Indian. The two ways, the two streams are never to be united. They are not even to be reconciled. There is no bridge, no canal of connection.

The sentimental manipulator abridges this quote to convince the boob that he should feel guilty about Indians; the realist is warned against the possibility of reconciliation from either party's standpoint.

With Lawrence in mind, can not massive immigration of poor, ignorant Hispanic mestizos be accurately appraised as cultural impoverishment (even enfeeblement!) rather than cultural enrichment? At the best, isn't it the simple addition of imported Mexican primitiveness to resident-American boobdom?

Certainly, anyone not a boob could not avoid seeing that poor, ignorant Hispanic mestizos have no thought of enriching anyone or anything *del norte*. Their only desire — perfectly normal — is to lift themselves from the Stone Age to rampant materialism. That's what everyone else on earth wants; why should they be any different? They don't come to the United States to contribute what they don't have — a competitive E-culture — or what is beyond their comprehension — an H-culture of any kind — but to make money and watch television. Barely hanging onto life, they want to be enriched, in the most basic sense of the word, and would be the first to deny their ability to do any enriching on any level. The notion would seem ludicrous to them. They come to take, and have nothing to give. They realize — if we do not—that they are all need, and they would not find exclusion for that reason at all unreasonable. But if North Americans want to take them in, and care for them, and tell them they bring “irresistible” gifts of incalculable value, of “enrichment” beyond measure, why should they refuse such fabulous madness?

One might think that such an elementary example of the realities of cultural dynamics would be obvious to some small percentage of resident Americans, but all evidence indicates otherwise; the Orwellian structure is omnipotent.

Exploring the place of ignorance in cultural dynamics a bit further, the question might be put as to whether an imported ignorance can be a greater threat to an indigenous culture (especially an indigenous E-culture) than the native, rooted variety.

In a first answer, it can be claimed that in North America even the most ignorant “native” — the full boob — can be affected, no matter how slightly, under certain conditions by certain items of high North European/American culture. He may well insist he is not so affected, but he cannot help himself. Certain melodies from Mozart, certain passages from Shakespeare — to cite the most obvious examples — call to what may be termed his cultural memory, and he cannot resist response. He may not leap for joy, or entertain for a moment the idea of giving up country-and-western for *Don Giovanni*, but he recognizes, however subconsciously, however Jungianly, a musical affinity and intelligibility which he would not recognize, for example, in Arab or Chinese music.

To a Mexican mestizo, Mozart cannot have the same appeal. The

inescapable connection — in Lawrence’s sense — to North European! American culture simply isn’t there. Mozart is as unintelligible and as non-affinitive to the mestizo as Arab or Chinese music.

So the defender (or “carrier”) of high American culture may be pardoned for saying, “The American boob is an ignoramus, but he is *our* ignoramus, and thus bound to our culture in ways he cannot escape. The Hispanic/Asian ignoramus is some other culture’s cretin, and so a greater liability for and threat to our culture.”

(A low- or middle-brow American may say, “Gee, I like mariachi music and burritos, so the Mexicans have enriched my life, and American culture in general.” A more careful analyst might reply, “Mexicans have Mexicanized Southern European (Spanish) music, thus creating only another E-culture — pop — phenomenon which has nothing to do with H-culture. Your life has been given a new titillation, but the core of American culture has been given nothing. The same distinction applies to all Mexican pop imports. Burritos need no comment.”)

In a second answer, it can be claimed that the American boob has sunk so low that even Mexican mestizos would lift the national ignorance level. In this argument, the resident boob is a greater threat to native H-culture than any imported ignoramus.

If the correct cultural-dynamic picture of the result of all-out Hispanic! Asian immigration is impoverishment rather than “enrichment,” is it then unreasonable to ask if a force for impoverishment is not an enemy force? Hispanic and Asian peons may not think of themselves as destructive invaders, but from the standpoint of the indigenous high culture, how can they be anything else?

In any objective study of cultural dynamics, is not cultural co-existence a myth? Does not one culture or the other triumph, or merge in a synthesis in which neither (or none) survives intact? In real life, is there any such thing as cultural “integration” in which disparate cultures maintain their distinct identities? Is not the choice Hobbesian — that is, will not one absorb the other or both dissolve in synthesis? If a culture is not to be so absorbed or synthesized — to be controlled — must it not control, one way or another? If it does not control other cultures, will not they inevitably control it? Is there any other dynamic possible? Do not people as different as the Japanese and the Israelis have in common their clear understanding of this matter and their ability to act accordingly? Is it not true that all distinct peoples and cultures on earth are so because they understand and act in the same way? And do not peoples and cultures fade out when they do not understand and act in this way? Is not a people’s belief in its culture “healthy”? And does not that belief lead to this ultimate battlecry in one form or another: “Even if everything is a lie, better our lie than yours! We shall fight for what we have because if we don’t we shall cease to exist! We fight for our souls! We can do no less!” Is there any such thing as a culture-less society? If one culture fails and fades, does not another always, always supplant it? Is not this process

what we call history, and what Toynbee and Spengler analyzed so exhaustively? And if it is “healthy” to believe in and defend a culture, is not disbelief in and lack of defense of a culture indicative of “sickness”? And is not such “sickness” found as a later stage in all dying cultures?

A few years ago, an English author named Paul Scott wrote a series of books about India called collectively *The Raj Quartet*. They were set in the India of World War II and the post-war struggle for Indian independence. They were widely read, and ultimately reached an even larger audience through a meticulously produced television series which was seen by millions of Americans.

In *Quartet*, Pandit Baba, a dignified, middle-aged Indian leader, says: “English people are not mass-produced. They do not come off a factory line all looking, speaking, thinking, acting the same. Neither do we. But we are Indians and they are English. True intimacy is not possible. It is not even desirable. Only it is desirable that there should be peace between us, and this is not possible while the English retain possession of what belongs to us, because to get it back we must fight them. In fighting them we do not have to hate them. But also when we have got back from them what they have taken from us and are at peace with them this does not mean that we should love them. We can never be friends with the English, or they with us, but we need not be enemies. Men are not born equal, nor are they born brothers. The lion does not lie down with the tiger, nor the crow nest with the swallow. The world is created in a diversity of phenomena and each phenomenon has its own diversity. Between mankind there may be common truth and justice and common wisdom to lead to amity. But between men there are divisions and love cannot be felt truly except by like and like. Between like and unlike there can only be tolerance, and absence of enmity — which is not at all the same thing as friendship.

It should be reasonable to assume that, with few exceptions, the average American reader/viewer understood (and sympathized with) the right of Indians to reclaim their country from British control. By extension, they did not find Pandit Baba’s philosophy unusual or unreasonable. But how many of them would give themselves a right to hold to the same philosophy? Evidently none.

Pandit Baba is not, of course, following the sentimental American line. He sees limits to “tolerance” and “understanding,” and a foreign culture as a threat rather than a blessing. It can be argued that while this attitude is permissible in a dark-skinned revolutionary on the other side of the world, it is *infra dig* “at home.” This would indicate that the American sees one law for others and another for himself.

Certainly, every effort is made to deny that “love cannot be felt truly except by like and like” and that “between men there are divisions” and soon. Can it be that the resident American’s inability to face facts, fight for a culture and resist aliens stems from a suspicion that his title to America itself is shaky? Even worthless?

Pandit Baba had no doubt that he and his fellow Indians had clear title

to India and that the British were interlopers without a legal leg to stand on. His behavior and opinions were normal for a man who felt his home invaded.

Does the absence of such behavior and feelings in the resident American mean that he does not feel his home invaded? Does he believe that America isn't — wasn't — his home in the first place, but merely a temporary domicile, like a motel room, which actually belongs to someone else? Such a belief is certainly implicit in the way he behaves.

And it is certainly the way he is encouraged to behave by his controllers, who teach and administer a program directly counter to Pandit Baba's, one in which the grossest, silliest and most sentimental twists on "love," "equality" and "enrichment" are presented as eternal truths. The bedrock on which these truths rest is the discovery that as far as boobs are concerned, the weak, the ignorant, the botched and bungled are infinitely preferable to the strong, the intelligent and the healthy.

Among other items, this program chips away at the resident American's title by steady promotion of the Mexican title. In this chain, the Mexican (mestizo) title to much of California, the Southwest and Florida, is validated because of his prior occupancy and intermarriage with the Indians. The Mexicans were dispossessed, but now they are returning to repossess. (This argument is aired in the *Time* article cited above. Carlos Fuentes, the noted Mexican writer, echoed it in an interview with Bill Moyers.)

The endorsement achieves comedy in *Miami*, a book about the Hispanics in that city by Joan Didion, published in 1987. Didion, once a gifted writer with a sharply objective eye, wrote *Miami* along strict, party-hack lines, yet another illustration of just how omnipotent the system is. Like so many others, Didion evidently found that it's toe the line or . . . become unread and unpublished.

In *Miami*, all "Anglos" are dense, awkward and insensitive, especially around Hispanics (these are the best "Anglos" — the worst are vicious racists, etc.), and all Hispanics are fairly intelligent, fairly graceful and quite sensitive, especially to slights from "Anglos." The book implies rather than states (although corrupted, Didion retains her gifts) the wonders of Hispanic culture, particularly when contrasted with the crudities of what passes for "Anglo" culture. A further implication is that while an ignorance of and indifference to any facet of Hispanic culture (the importance of the maternal family name, for instance) is an "Anglo" failing, Hispanic ignorance of and indifference to any facet of "Anglo" culture is not a failing. If anything, it is a strength, because — again implied — the Hispanic culture, vibrant and healthy (because aggressive?!) is on the upgrade, and the "Anglo" culture, decadent and dull, is headed for oblivion.

In her picture, the "Anglos" realize, however subconsciously, that they are up against a superior people and a superior culture, a realization they betray in petty ways, the death throes of what she calls several times

“the beleaguered raj.”

“Raj” is a Hindu word meaning “reign” or “rule.” The British raj was rule by an invading power, the British, over a resident people, the Indians. In Didion’s analogy, the “beleaguered raj” casts the “Anglos” as an invading power ruling a resident people . . . the Hispanics. But in reality, the “Anglos” are the residents and the Hispanics are the invaders.

The easy proposal and acceptance of such inversions of reality is a fair indication of just how advanced the situation is. If a gifted and independent writer like Didion can be induced to make such a glaring error, it is very late, indeed.

It is even later if no “Anglo” notices or cares.

Still later if true that, even if Didion recognized the error, she would ignore — or defend — it. That if she woke in the middle of the night to believe that all she had written was nonsense, she would write more of the same the next day. That if she was offered incontrovertible “proof” of a falsity, she would nevertheless support it. That she is not alone, but only one among those who control American thought and behavior. That this is what Orwell meant by horror, and what should be meant by “Orwelhan”; and that we have reached the point where the definitive resident-American slogan is: “Everyone is equal, but all are more equal than I am.”

The official program teaches that anyone who holds technical citizenship, from George Washington to the latest Hispanic arrival (non-English-speaking, of course) is an American, and that there are no degrees of differentiation. Or title, in any sense of that word, to America. This teaching rests on the “We were all immigrants once . . .” premise. (One cannot quite imagine Israelis taking the view of their title as immigrants versus the title of Arab immigrants.)

This program has been successful in that the resident-American boobs have lost, as noted earlier, the belief that America is theirs.

Now, it is perfectly true that North Europeans have at best a dozen generations of possession of a vast land which they grabbed in a greedy land rush, and that they first dispossessed the native Indians and, later, Spanish/Indian settlers in the Southwest. And fought off the French and cut the formal British tie.

What is not true is that any of this invalidates the North European! American title. If all property is theft, as Proudhon said, then all titles everywhere are suspect. England has seen many title changes, and so has the rest of Europe. So have Asia and Africa.

Title is intimately bound up with self-esteem and cultural esteem. It cannot exist without these qualities, and if these qualities exist then possession of land must result. And if these qualities do not exist, possession of land will not result. And if these qualities are fading, so will the possession of land fade.

Rightly or wrongly, fairly or unfairly, one has to believe that oneself and one’s kind are more deserving and have more right to land than others

or . . . one and one's kind will be dispossessed by those who do so believe. A culture, to extend Chesterton's definition of the family, is a fighting thing, like a ship. And when it ceases to fight, it dies.

Whether it would have been possible — psychologically as well as physically — for North Europeans to have held North America is another question altogether, quite separate from the general aspects of cultural dynamics.

If we studied cultural dynamics with the same dedication and ingenuity we devote to trivia, we should be able to create comprehensive and elegant computer models of what is happening. We could refine such models until they could give a value to the dilution/destruction caused by each arriving (and arrived) Hispanic or Asian, the (comparatively) tiny change triggering wonderful rearrangements of figures. Such computer models could even, after sifting the enormous mounds of data, come up with suitably terrifying prophecies.

We could also work backwards, mapping the birth, high points and demise of American E- and H-culture. British in origin and thrust, these bracketing cultures created the American type, American history and American art. From massive set pieces like the Revolution down to tiny details like the presence of Katharine Hepburn and the poetry of T.S. Eliot and the casual ability of Babe Ruth, American culture was all of a piece. It could absorb non-North Europeans up to a point, but not beyond that point. The Ministry of Truth says that American culture was always in flux, which is true, but the Ministry does not add that the flux was contained within a general form. Day may fade into night, and twilight, as Chekhov shows, can seem to go on forever, but there is finally a definite difference between noon and midnight. And between the elastic form filled to capacity and the ruptured form. Finite numbers of certain immigrants were containable within the old, indigenous culture; an endless flow of Hispanics and Asians is not, so the old culture must fight or disappear.

If the reality is so simple and so true, why don't people see it? One might answer by asking when in human history people have ever seen the simple and the true?

In this American case, the obvious answer would be: Those at the bottom don't see because they're boobs, and thus suffering from stupidity and deadened sensibilities. Those at the top don't see because of scoundrelism and greed.

In this explanation, the American boob has reached his zombie-ized nadir and lies helplessly open to any programming, no matter how coarse. His position is clear and needs no elaboration.

The position of Americans at the top is somewhat — but not a lot — more complicated. The bellwethers in all fields are bonded together in the promotion of interlocked lies (programming boobs) in order to maintain their control. They have drifted into all-out mendacity from modest beginnings — a little lie here, a little lie there — and now are faced with

the enormous demands of running an ever-larger propaganda industry. (Borrowing from Orwell, this is the American Ministry of Truth, which dominates . . . everything. Try to see a movie or a television “show” which does not promote the party line.) They do so because they believe — as they believe nothing else — that there is no life outside the top. It’s propagandize ceaselessly — on everything — or be cast out and down into oblivion, into “unlife” and “non-personhood.”

(The extent of the interlocking is remarkable. Some years ago, Tom Wolfe wrote a book called *The Painted Word*, which exposed the machinations by which abstract art is produced and marketed. The painters themselves come off as hired hands; the key figures are the critics and gallery owners who tell the “artists” what to do. Those at the top — who are as committed to the “enrichment” of abstract art as they are to that of unchecked immigration — went wild, and Wolfe and his book were pilloried in every important organizational outlet from *The New York Times* down. If the benefits of abstract art could be questioned, what next? All blocks support each other; remove one and the whole edifice is threatened.)

Inside the Ministry of Truth, it is not so much that positives are supported as that negatives are avoided. Unchecked immigration has to be allowed because the alternatives are worse. Stopping such immigration could lead to a bad world image, to very bad “relations” with Mexico and the rest of Latin America, and a shortage of menial labor (resident whites and blacks just won’t perform certain tasks), etc., and these negatives could trigger the biggest negative of all: stock market repercussions which could damage everyone’s portfolio! So unchecked immigration must be allowed.

Once such a decision is made, the full propaganda storm is unleashed, and we end up with glowing articles in *Time* (and everywhere else), and boobs demanding “enrichment” and “cultural diversity.”

The process is not overtly conspiratorial. The Ministry of Truth is not a place where people at the top gather behind closed doors and plot. It is a state of mind in which nothing need ever be said, and all the stronger because of that. No one *tells* Joan Didion to write *Miami*; she just *knows* it is her required contribution. She will help stave off the general negatives, and in turn she will avoid her personal negative — being pushed outside (into “non-personhood”) rather than being allowed to remain inside. If she is to continue to be inside, she must write *Miami*.

Again, this is an historical process, and has taken place in many societies in the past. It is also a final-phase process, one which does not appear until the end is in sight. Like other final-phase constructions, it is doomed because it is too big and too rigid. Too many lies and too much effort to maintain them.

Certainly, those at the top — and not the immigrant peons — are the villains of the immigration scandal. They have betrayed their people and their culture. A future American Nuremberg would have an overwhelming

case against them. But it is most unlikely that the scoundrels will ever be brought to justice, because it is most unlikely that their subjects will ever turn on them.

What does seem likely is that the resident Americans — controllers and controlled alike — will deliver themselves and their culture into the hands of others. They seem to desire their own end, and they are experiencing no difficulty in finding outsiders ready and able to carry out their wishes.

Those at the top, in the Ministry of Truth, who set up the current immigration program in order to protect their financial interests, shall find — as in all such blackmail scenarios — that they might well have been better off fighting than giving in. The end of the resident-American cultural era will be violent, and no one at the top now — or the immediate descendants thereof — will survive with personality or possessions intact. All will be driven into the dark oblivion they fear so desperately. Convinced that they have to sacrifice their people and their culture in order to secure the survival of themselves and their goods, they or their descendants will find that they can't separate themselves from the fate of those people and that culture. In the subsequent society, Joan Didion may well have to write endless sequels to *Miami* for bread and water alone.

John Ney
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Miami Today -- The U.S. Tomorrow The Increasing Conquests of the Immigrant Cultures

“There is no room in this country for hyphenated Americanism. The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin, of preventing all possibility of its continuing to be a nation at all, would be to permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities.”
Theodore Roosevelt, 1915

In General

In the great arc of the Sunbelt, from southern California through Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and the Gulf states to the southern tip of Florida, profound changes are taking place in the ethnic composition of the inhabitants. Fifty years ago, with the exception of certain pockets, this area had a relatively sparse Hispanic population. Today, it contains a high percentage of the tremendous national increase in Hispanics, especially over the past ten years, and its cultural pattern has changed to a considerable degree.

There is, of course, endless statistical evidence of this change; but numbers are no substitute for a firsthand experience. To drive from Los Angeles to Miami is to go through a world in such a flux that the final result cannot be imagined if present trends continue. Indeed, in that case,

it is doubtful that the result can ever be final.

Los Angeles had an official 1980 Hispanic population of 816,000, but official numbers on Hispanics are almost invariably understated. Obviously, those Hispanics who are in this country illegally don't want to be counted, and will go to any lengths to avoid the Census takers. In addition, even those here legally are in such constant movement between the agricultural areas and the cities that many are missed by the Census; and, because of their alienated position in this society, even the legals would just as soon be missed as not.

In any event, much of Los Angeles seems completely Hispanic, and the *barrios* are very much like the slums of Mexico City. They illustrate perfectly the evaluation of Victor Palmieri, former United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs: "The dangerous situation is the economic and social cleavage represented by the mushrooming of a permanent underclass of people, mostly Hispanic . . . with no prospects beyond the lowest-paid, lowest-status, dead-end work of the secondary job market and the underground economy. . . ." Although the Hispanics come for agricultural work, at least in theory, they tend to end up in the cities.

According to testimony by Attorney General William F. Smith before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, on July 30, 1981, only 15 percent of the illegal aliens entering this country remain low-paid farm workers. In the cities, the migrants exacerbate existing urban problems and become a further drain on local and national economies.

In an article in *Education Week* (January 26, 1982), Guillermo Lopez, chief of the California Department of Education's Office of Bilingual Education, is quoted as saying that in the Los Angeles Unified School District, Hispanics became a majority in kindergarten and first-grade classes last year, and that similar trends are evident elsewhere in California. "It is the first sign of the tide to come," he added. The article continues:

Mr. Lopez noted that the figures in the lower grades are in sharp contrast to high-school enrollments in the Los Angeles Unified School District. "Anglos" represented only 12 percent of the students in kindergarten this year, compared to 65 percent in the 12th grade, he pointed out. "We find the same thing in other metropolitan cities in California. . . . Imagine what these schools will be like in 11 years when the Hispanic bulge has worked its way to the senior class."

Ramiro Reyes, associate state superintendent of public instruction in the California Department of Education . . . cited additional statistics to show the dramatic demographic changes that have taken place in recent years: between 1970 and 1980 . . . the combined minority population in California increased by 6.1 million. . . . Minorities now make up 48 percent of the state's total school enrollment . . . compared with 25 percent in 1967. Between 1967 and 1979, the number of Hispanics enrolled increased by 51 percent. The number of language minorities is increasing not only because of a high birthrate . . . but because large numbers of illegal immigrants are

entering the country from Mexico, and more and more refugees from Indochina and elsewhere are reaching American shores.

Outside Los Angeles, in the small towns of the Imperial Valley and other sections of the immense California agribusiness, the atmosphere is heavily Hispanic, but in contrast to Los Angeles itself, where the alienation is complete, there is work and some sense of purpose. However, at night, when the work day is over, there is the same aimlessness in those who wander the streets. The Hispanic population of California is estimated at 6 million. The 1980 Census figure is 4.5 million “persons of Spanish origin,” and California authorities assume an additional 1.5 million uncounted illegals.

This pattern of near-total urban alienation and partial-but-definite rural alienation is repeated from Los Angeles to eastern Texas. There are eight cities in Texas with Hispanic populations of 50,000 or more. They range from San Antonio with 422,000 to Austin with 65,000, and average 176,000 for a total of 1,408,000. Again, these numbers are probably grossly underestimated (the Census figures on Hispanics anywhere in the country cannot be considered as anything but very low guidelines). Nor does this total cover the large Hispanic population of Texas outside those eight cities. Certainly, all southern Texas seems dominated by an Hispanic majority.

From Louisiana to Northern Florida, Hispanic concentrations, although they exist, are not so obvious. Southern Florida has a large number of Hispanics and Caribbeans, but they are concentrated in agricultural areas where few Floridians or tourists ever see them. Miami itself, however, is quite another matter. It is discussed in detail below because it is the clearest example of cultural aggression and takeover, which are the most disturbing long-range threats implicit in heavy immigration from Latin America and Asia. Miami is now notorious as the drug-importing capitol of the United States, with most of the kingpins having come to this country illegally from South America; and also for the highest crime rate in the country, a statistic directly traceable to the drug runners and to the criminals sent from Cuba in the Mariel boatlift. But these problems, while superficially more dramatic and terrifying, are not as significant for the future as the cultural threat. Drug smuggling and related crimes are the actions of relatively few persons, and can be stopped far more easily than cultural aggression backed by millions upon millions of people. What has happened in Miami is somewhat more extreme than what has already happened in many cities and regions where migrants are a majority, but it is not atypical. It is a preview of what will inevitably happen elsewhere as those majorities increase and coalesce.

Before Castro came to power in Cuba in 1959, the Hispanic population in Miami was insignificant. In twenty-odd years it has exploded to about 700,000, very nearly all of Cuban origin. The Cubans differ significantly from the Hispanics of Mexican origin who constitute the overwhelming majority of Hispanics in the rest of the Sunbelt, and from the large

majority of Hispanics in the country as a whole. They even differ from Cubans still in Cuba in that most of them originally came from the country's middle and upper classes. Many of them were trained professionals, and they arrived in Miami determined to work and to succeed, in the best American tradition. (The criminals and sick whom Castro unloaded recently are, obviously, quite different.) Although many of them had college degrees and spoke excellent English, they were often unable to obtain employment in their professions; but they were willing to start work at menial jobs.

Their determination carried them through all the initial difficulties, and today the Cuban community in Miami is prosperous and successful in a highly visible fashion. On the whole, Cuban residential sections boast tidy homes, washed cars and an absence of trash in the streets. Young Cubans often seem far neater in personal appearance, far more polite, and far better educated than their "Anglo" counterparts.

In business, the Cubans have revitalized Miami by helping to make it a magnet for South American trade. Scores of American corporations have moved their Latin-American headquarters to Miami (concentrated in Coral Gables), and the office staffs are heavily Hispanic. Cubans have moved into banking, real estate and development. It seems that all wealthy South Americans want to put at least some of their assets in Florida and, naturally, they prefer to do business with fellow Hispanics. In addition, hundreds of thousands of Latin Americans come to Miami each year on shopping sprees, to buy clothes, appliances, radios and other American products far cheaper than they can in Central and South America. (How they manage to transport all this past customs agents in their own countries is a mystery, but is evidently possible.) They, too, naturally prefer to deal with fellow Hispanics, and the Cubans have gradually taken over the downtown Miami stores. As a result, these Cubans do not need non-Hispanic business. In fact, they are indifferent to it: the majority of clerks in these stores do not speak English.

At first, the native Miamians were not unhappy about the Cuban takeover of the central residential and business part of the city. They respected the Cuban adherence to the work ethic — which seemed to be disappearing from their own culture — and they were grateful for the money flowing into Miami, some of which, naturally, flowed to them. (As the Cubans took over more and more — especially in the banking field — this flow dried up considerably.)

The initial indication that the takeover might have its drawbacks came on the language issue. Dade County educational authorities could have forced English as a single language on these new immigrants, but they chose to allow bilingualism. For practical purposes, this resulted in monolingualism, with the single language being Spanish (more accurately, Cuban Spanish) rather than English.

For some years after 1960, most of the young Cubans were eager to learn English in school because they assumed — correctly, at that time —

that they would have to speak it to get jobs. Before 1970, they were prepared to move into an English-speaking world. They would still speak Cuban Spanish at home with their parents, and perhaps with each other, but not at work.

But after 1970, it became apparent to them that their Cuban community was going to become self-sufficient. It would be the pipeline for the huge sums of money flowing from Latin America. Miami would be the prototype for all Hispanic communities rising in the vast, defenseless American sunbelt. It would be a beacon for all Latin America, exciting and enticing the endless numbers of potential fellow immigrants. It would be, its members realized with heady excitement, the leader in turning Miami from an “Anglo” to a Latin city. These sentiments were not hidden. They were trumpeted by Cuban business leaders, and young Cubans took the cue. From then on, there was no need to be serious about English. In a few years it wouldn’t be needed at all. Today, that emancipation has arrived for the majority of Miami Cubans. They can live and work in central Miami without ever having to speak a word of English.

In an article entitled “Is America the World’s Colony?” in the summer, 1981, issue of *Policy Review*, former Senator Eugene McCarthy calls the cultural challenge by new immigrants “neo-colonialism,” and has this to say about allowing a language takeover: “A more subtle manifestation of neo-colonialism is the challenge to the status of the English language in the United States. . . . Imperial nations traditionally impose their languages on subject or colonial people — or try to do so. . . .” He sees the immigrants not as permanently poor dependents, but as carrying in their rags the seeds of future dominance over us. Compared to past imperialisms, “The process [of language as a tool to domination] is more subtle in the United States. It is being done in the name of civil rights, of good citizenship, and of economic and cultural equality. Yet it runs contrary to historical evidence of the dangers of bilingualism in a country. . . .” It is significant as well as amusing that this very alarming evaluation of immigration as a form of colonialism comes not from a conservative, but from a public figure noted for his liberal views.

The realization of the strength of the Cuban community became obvious to the non-Hispanic white Miamians at about the same time it became obvious to the Cubans. No longer poor but eager immigrants, timid and anxious to please, these Cubans were suddenly well-to-do, self-assured and quite indifferent to the natives. The very word “Anglo” underwent a symbolic transformation. “At first,” says a Miami businessman, “it seemed respectful, perhaps even too much so, rather like ‘sahib’ in India when the British were there. When a Cuban applied it to you directly in the 1960s, he was usually poor and made it obvious that he thought you were on top, had money and were part of the Miami establishment. If you were part of that establishment you liked his recognition, and if you weren’t you were flattered at being upgraded.

Now when he applies it to you, it's a contemptuous epithet. He's part of the new establishment, and you're the enemy, and you're on your way out. Incidentally, we now use 'Anglo' in referring to ourselves vis-à-vis them. We've accepted their word for us — we're no longer Americans, we're 'Anglos.' Could anything be more pathetic, or give a better picture of our new, servile posture?"

Very few non-Hispanic white Miamians are happy about what has happened in their city. Even fewer complain, except in private. To do so would, they feel, jeopardize their positions even further. (The business man quoted above, for instance, insisted on anonymity). Many have left, and more are planning to.

Certainly a cultural transformation has taken place in Miami. It is not quite the same as cultural transformations wrought through heavy immigration in other parts of the country, because Cubans are not quite the same as, for example, Mexicans or Puerto Ricans, and certainly differ from Asians. But it is close enough to those other Hispanic and Asian transformations to serve as an example and a warning of all.

The real question is not whether cultural transformations have taken place in Miami or elsewhere, but whether they are desirable. Until recently, the American melting pot theory worked fairly well — after all, it turned such individualistic immigrants as the Irish, the South and Central Europeans, the Jews and even the Japanese into "good" Americans. Some of these immigrants may have maintained — and may still maintain — their languages of origin and certain customs; but almost always in private, or in public only on special occasions, and certainly never in such numbers or in such intensities that they constituted direct cultural challenges (McCarthy's "neo-colonialism"). The melting pot failed with the American Indians, the Chinese and a few other peoples, mostly Asiatic; but all those failures together came to such a low total (before the current, heavy Asian immigration, which is producing a far different situation), and the peoples themselves were so unobtrusive, that the great majority never felt culturally threatened.

(The melting pot also failed in certain ways with the blacks. Because of the sharp difference in skin color, blacks will always seem visibly unassimilated. Also, for reasons too complex to discuss here, black ghettos contain high incidences of unemployment, family breakdown, crime and despair, all of which are clear evidence of integrational failure. If blacks were as few in number as the Chinese, or living as far from urban centers as the American Indians, the difference in color and the alienation of the ghetto would not seem significant. Because blacks represent 12 percent of the population and are concentrated in the cities, the melting pot breakdown in their case is too obvious to be overlooked.

(But on the other hand, there are millions of blacks who are not in ghettos, and who live and work inside rather than outside the American mainstream. With few exceptions, American blacks think of themselves as Americans, not as part of a foreign culture; they speak English rather

than a foreign language; they are not trying to impose a foreign culture; and above all, although their proportion of the American population shows a slight increase from decade to decade, it remains relatively stable, without large and continuing infusions from outside the country.)

In Miami, for the first time in American history, a foreign culture and a foreign language have come to dominate a major American city. The Miami Hispanics do not intend to join the English-speaking American culture. On the contrary, they have every intention of widening and expanding their sphere of influence in Dade County and South Florida. They now constitute roughly two-fifths of the Dade County population, but in the central area of Miami they are a majority. Their proportion of the South Florida population will continue to increase for several reasons: a higher birth rate; continued Hispanic immigration from Latin America, the Caribbean and possibly even from Cuba; and the departure of non-Hispanic whites.

For reasons beyond the scope of this study, the Hispanic culture will not integrate with the American where large numbers are involved. There may well be thousands of instances of individual Hispanics who are wholly integrated into the American culture, but where Hispanics are heavily concentrated in this country they tend to maintain their own culture and to reject the American. This leads, finally, to confrontations between the opposed cultures in which one or the other must dominate. To date, the Hispanic has triumphed, not so much because of its aggressiveness as because the American has quit the field and retreated.

The point is not whether the American or the Hispanic culture is superior, but whether a majority of the citizens of the United States — a majority which may well include a large number of integrated individual Hispanics — wants areas like South Florida to become even more alien than they already are. To date, the problem has not been addressed, and the issue is being decided by default.

The Hispanic takeovers in the southern California-Texas area differ from that in South Florida in several ways: very nearly all the Hispanics in the former are of Mexican (Spanish-Indian) origin, and come from the poorest and least skilled level of that country. This keeps them from entrance into the professions and power centers, at least for the present, and lessens their impact on society's nerve centers. At the moment, they are highly visible but without real influence. However, they show the same pattern of adherence to Hispanic culture (or, more accurately, Hispanic-Indian culture) and rejection of American culture, with the degree of both tied firmly to sheer numbers, as with the Miami Cubans. If this increase continues at its present runaway rate, they will slowly but inexorably impose their culture on the vast southern California-Texas arc. They are less educated than the Cubans, and less interested in material prosperity, but in some other respects they are far stronger: they are coming in overwhelming numbers; their Indian heritage is an even greater bar to cultural integration (see our own Indians) than the more

conscious Spanish side of their resistance to such integration; and as Mexicans they feel they are only taking back what was once theirs. As in Miami, the point is not whether this is good or bad, but whether a majority of the American people wants it to happen.

The Hispanic immigration problem is not confined to the South and the West. There are heavy concentrations in several northern cities — New York City has 1,400,000, mostly Puerto Rican; and Chicago has over 400,000. Nor is the problem confined to Hispanics. There has been a large increase in Asian and Caribbean immigration, especially in the past ten years. The Haitian influx has received a great deal of publicity, because they come by open boat with all the attendant dramas and disasters, and thus serve as the most compelling example of the desire of all immigrants to escape their native countries and flee to the United States. In terms of numbers, however, the Caribbeans are far less threatening than the Hispanics. Asian immigration is as serious as Hispanic. According to Leon Bouvier, legal Asian immigration into this country in 1977-1979 was 39 percent of the total, very nearly the figure of 42 percent for the percentage for all Latin Americans.

The key clue to the depth of the immigration problem is language. As former Senator McCarthy has pointed out, it is the wedge behind which all the rest of the reverse colonization follows. Wherever there are large numbers of immigrants with historical resistance to integration into the American culture, language will be the first — and, to date, usually the last — battleground. Especially when those large numbers are being constantly expanded by further immigration.

In all such cases, the same question — Is this what we want? — arises for all Americans.

Even though it is a reasonable question, it is also an explosive one because the whole immigration issue is highly charged and extremely emotional. It is so bound up with foreign relations, big business and fear of “racism” that many people will not discuss it at all.

In South Florida, as noted, the leading non-Hispanic whites complain behind closed doors, but are afraid to come out in the open. They are trapped by the inertia of the past twenty years, which started with their welcome to the Cubans and their backing down on the language issue. They really don't see how the present situation can be undone. When asked about restricting further Hispanic immigration, legal as well as illegal, they reply glumly that if they came out for such a policy they'd be called Nazis, not only by the Cubans but also by their peers. They add that they can't afford, because of their own financial interests, “to do anything which would injure the growing importance of Miami as a trade center.” Those who employ the armies of Hispanics in the Southwest say roughly the same thing. And yet, the problem must be addressed, because it is a matter of cultural life and death.

It also has its economic side. At the present time, the immigrants are considered a plus in the country's productivity. They are necessary, so

runs the argument, because they do work which no indigenous Americans will do. Without them, the vegetables wouldn't be harvested, and so on. This line ignores the fact that for every field worker there are many immigrants who don't work, or who drift to the cities to become public charges, or who are dependents. (As noted, Attorney General Smith has estimated that only 15 percent of the illegals are working in low-paid jobs in the fields.) These non-producers already constitute a significant drag on the economy, and in the event of a serious depression they could become an unmanageable millstone. Conversely, those who do work, especially in non-agricultural jobs, are taking employment away from native Americans. Either way, the immigrants are an economic time bomb.

(As an illustration of the financial dram of immigration, an Associated Press story of December 5, 1981, states: "INS officials have estimated that the cost of detaining the 2,700 Haitians now in custody, along with some 500 Cubans left from the 1980 boatlift, is approaching \$75,000,000 annually." This divides out to \$23,000-plus annually for each Haitian and Cuban. This item, of course, is only a minor debit in the colossal overall cost of immigration, hidden as well as acknowledged, but its casual extravagance serves as an example of the whole.)

Even in the teeth of conclusive evidence of the seriousness of the problem, there are still those who claim that no problem exists. "Didn't we all come here as immigrants?" they ask, smugly confident that because the question is unanswerable except in the affirmative, the discussion is effectively closed.

However, as several critics have pointed out, we don't find it illogical or immoral for human beings, the results of reproduction, to propose a limitation on births; nor for those who enjoy the benefits of economic growth to propose its curtailment. The argument that we must allow immigration forever because we are the descendants of immigrants is demonstrably indefensible.

No matter their origin, and no matter certain exceptions, the people of the United States still comprise, in 1982, a cultural and economic entity. This entity is the result of natural modifications over the past 200-odd years, but is still the recognizable extension of that entity which existed at the founding of the country. Those who make it up — the present citizens of the United States — have the right (even the duty) to decide whether they wish to preserve that entity rather than see it taken over by another culture and/or irretrievably compromised economically. This is the decision which will have to be made. Even if it is made by default — i.e., by simply allowing the trends to continue as at present — history will still say that it was a conscious decision. There is no escaping the responsibility.

Numbers and Statistics

If Hispanic and Asian immigration, legal and illegal, were stopped tomorrow, the American cultural entity, still dominant overall, might be able to absorb the immigrants who have already arrived. South Florida

and certain areas in the west might be permanently Hispanic and Asian; but with immigration terminated, many Hispanics and Asians might wish to become integrated into the American culture. (On the other hand, a continued Hispanic/Asian birth rate far higher than the national average would more than offset the gain.) If the positive aspects of terminated immigration were encouraged, and the continuing negatives discouraged, the generic culture could survive.

It is the continuing avalanche of immigrants — legal as well as illegal — which really threatens such survival. This threat is double-edged. First, there is the enormous initial pressure of hundreds of thousands of poor, unskilled immigrants a year, with a high birth rate acting to compound the pressure. Most of these immigrants do not speak English, and do not wish to become part of the American culture. They do not mean to impose their own culture — at least that is not their primary reason for coming to the United States — but they end up doing so. They naturally wish to stop feeling alienated; and how can that be achieved more naturally than by undoing their alienation, by making their world “normal,” and thus making that world to which they do not wish to belong the alienated world?

Second, and more subtle, is the psychological effect of continuing immigration on the immigrants already here. As long as immigration remains high, there is far more incentive, however hidden, for them to refuse to become culturally integrated. As those immigrants already in large numbers in certain areas of America see their fellows arriving by the hundreds of thousands year after year, they can't help but realize that in time their numbers will be such that they will completely dominate those areas. So there is no reason to join the culture which will be superseded. The process of absorbing existing immigrants into the generic American culture cannot really begin as long as high immigration continues. The situation feeds on itself.

There are Americans who concede that we cannot survive continued heavy illegal immigration, but argue that we can sustain the legal immigrants who arrive each year. This figure climbed to about 800,000 in 1980, the highest annual number in American history, with some 80 percent of the immigrants coming from Latin America, the Caribbean and Asia, all of them from less developed countries.

In an important monograph entitled “Immigration and its Impact on American Society” (Population Reference Bureau, September, 1981), Dr. Leon F. Bouvier makes some key points about legal immigration. (Dr. Bouvier is one of the country's leading demographers, and has served as demographic advisor to the International Statistical Programs Center of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the Select Committee on Population of the U.S. House of Representatives, and the U.S. Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. His paper — indeed, all his recent work — is required reading for anyone wishing to go into the immigration problem in statistical depth.) He first points out the snowballing

effect of both the preference system and the lack of numerical limitation for certain relatives:

There are three types of legal immigrants: those who fall within the preference system; those exempt from numerical limitation; and refugees. The regulations are such that relatives of recent immigrants, citizens and resident aliens alike, are more likely to benefit from the present preference system than relatives of earlier immigrants. . . . In the two most widely used categories, 1979 figures show that 75 percent of all second preference entrants (spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens) and 67 percent of fifth preference entrants (brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens) came from Latin America and the Caribbean or Asia.

If the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act amendments remain in effect, the number of immigrants entering the country exempt from numerical limitation will undoubtedly increase in future years — especially if overall immigration is relatively large. The law specifies that all immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (parents, spouses and children) are admissible without limits on their numbers. For the 1969-1976 period, the number entering under this category averaged only 88,000 per year. In 1977, 111,555 persons entered (excluding Cuban immigrants). By 1979 the number had risen to 149,000.

Under this open-ended commitment, we may expect to see a continued, dramatic rise in the no-limit categories. They rose at a compounded annual rate of 15.6 percent from 1977 to 1979. A projection at the same compounded rate until 2000 shows an influx of 3 million for that year alone, and a 21-year total of 22 million.

Bouvier uses the following comparative graphs to illustrate the shifts in legal immigration from 1820 to the present:

He goes onto say:

As people immigrate to the U.S. and as these immigrants become citizens, their immediate relatives, in turn, become eligible to join them in the United States if they so desire — all can enter with no numerical limitations. Asians and Latin Americans will no doubt predominate among those who enter outside the numerical limits for the foreseeable future, given the large number of immediate relatives already in the U.S. from those regions. In 1978, 36 percent of those entering outside numerical limits came from Asia, and 37 percent came from Latin America.

On refugees:

Refugees, numbering about 200,000 per year, now comprise a significant proportion of legal entrants. That level may well be maintained for the foreseeable future . . . it seems reasonable to suggest that most are likely to come from Southeast Asia and certain Caribbean and Latin American countries . . . the large majority will probably come from Asia.

Asia and Latin America should continue as dominant regions of origin in the future. . . . While there might be a tendency for legal entries from Asia to increase under certain preference categories, in general, the proportion of total immigrants originating in Latin America and the Caribbean may well experience the largest growth, in part because of illegal entries

and in part due to the proximity of the area. For the purposes of this report, therefore, it is assumed that future net migration to the U.S. will be subdivided into three categories as follows: Latin American/Caribbean (that is, all countries south of the Rio Grande . . .) 45 percent; Asian and Pacific Island countries 40 percent; all other countries 15 percent.

A very disturbing picture emerges:

1) Inside the preference quotas, the proportion of Latin Americans and Asians will rise to 85 percent of the total, and continue at that figure indefinitely.

2) There is no reason to believe that an ever-larger number of immigrants already here will not result in an ever-larger number of entering relatives in the no-limit categories.

3) Nor is there any reason to believe that the figure of 200,000 refugees a year will slacken.

In future projections, Bouvier has said (in an article entitled "Immigration at the Crossroads," published in the October, 1981, issue of *American Demographics*), "If current demographic behavior continues as at present, I have noted earlier that 40 percent of the 2080 population [of the United States] will be post-1980 immigrants and their descendants. Perhaps 80 percent of these will be Hispanic, Caribbean or Asian in origin." In reaching these figures, he has used total fertility rates which are "assumed conservatively to be the same as [those] of the resident population of the U.S." He concedes that this assumption may "result in an under-estimate of the impact of immigration on the U.S. population." As noted above, that underestimate could be enormous.

He has also used 1,000,000 per year as the high figure of combined legal and illegal immigration. However, the foreword to his paper in "Population Trends and Public Policy" notes that, "Perhaps 1.25 million people immigrated in 1980 alone — 800,000 of them legally." Attorney General Smith has told President Reagan and the Cabinet that between 1½ and 2 million illegals entered in 1980. Adding the 800,000 legals would give a total between 2.3 and 2.8 million per year.

(Estimates of the total number of illegals in this country vary from 2 million to 12 million, according to a 1979 report by the House Select Committee on Population. The U.S. Census offered 3.5 to 5 million in 1980. It is often claimed that many of the illegal Mexican-Americans return to Mexico, thus lowering the total illegal population far below the usual estimates. In reality, no one knows. According to Attorney General Smith's testimony before a subcommittee on July 30, 1981, we have "lost control of our borders," and if that is true it is not unreasonable to assume that we have lost control of our statistics, too.)

Even under Bouvier's admittedly hyper-conservative assumptions, his projection for 2080 is sobering in the extreme. In certain states, the 40 percent figure for post-1980 immigrants and their descendants is far higher. In California, for instance, that percentage could go as high as 64.4 percent, or 37 million of a total state population of 57 million!

Bouvier has effectively disposed of the dangerously erroneous notion that the problem can be solved by cutting off illegal immigration. Legal immigration alone constitutes an overwhelming threat in and of itself.

Before going further into statistics from various sources, especially the U.S. Bureau of the Census, a few basic facts should be stressed:

1) All statistics on immigration are suspect. The Census, source of most statistical evidence on established immigrants, is not necessarily accurate. As noted earlier, all illegals and many legal avoid the Census takers. (The Census itself conceded this point in a release dated February 23, 1981: "No satisfactory demographic estimates exist for Hispanics and counts for the white population are complicated by the inclusion of significant numbers of illegal residents.") In addition, the Census, for emotional and psychological reasons, wishes to minimize the number of immigrants already in this country. For many reasons, the Census figures are suspect on Hispanics, and also on all other categories with high immigration.

2) All demographic projections are suspect, because demographers can do no more than project from existing trends (based on questionable statistics). Because, for instance, the rate of natural increase declined from 1970 to 1980 in the U.S., that trend is projected out for 50 years to 2030 and 100 years to 2080, with a stationary population of 273 million reached by 2030, according to most predictions. (For instance, the World Bank's 1980 World Development Report.) But the trend could obviously be upset by continued heavy immigration, an upswing in the rate of natural increase (primarily because of immigration) or other factors. Projections are only guesses. Some, like Bouvier's, are better than others, but there is no way of knowing what will really happen. The most pessimistic predictions may be the most accurate, but on the other hand such predictions may alarm people into taking action to prove them wrong, a desirable result which would destroy their accuracy. "If nothing changes," is the unspoken prefix to all projections. Of course something will change; the question is in which direction and how much.

3) No matter how shaky the projections are, governmental and private agencies must use them in planning. The general reader should be aware that such agencies will choose the most conservative projections.

4) Numbers, statistics and projections, while necessary to any understanding of the problem, are only a tool. Many people are so numbed by numbers that statistical detail can cause them to lose all interest in this problem. On the other hand, there are people who become so absorbed in the differences and contradictions between the various experts and their projections that they lose sight of the fact that, no matter the details, a grave problem exists.

5) The basic numbers to keep in mind are:

A. About 800,000 legal immigrants entered the U.S. in 1980. In addition, somewhere between $\frac{1}{2}$ and 2 million illegal immigrants entered in the same year. The overall number was between 1.3

million and 2.8 million.

B. If the low rate — 1.3 million per year — continues, it will total 65 million in the next 50 years, and 130 million in 100 years. These totals do not include the additions from natural increase, which will vary between a high of over 3 percent per year, the current rate for Mexico (World Development Report, 1980, etc.), and a low of less than 1 percent per year (the current U.S. overall rate), declining to 0 percent in 100 years or less. Even at the low rate, the post-1980 immigrants and their descendants will number, according to Bouvier (using an annual influx figure of only 1,000,000), 40 percent of the U.S. population in 100 years. If the descendants of the Hispanics and Asians already here are added, the combined total will be at least 50 percent in 100 years. If either the 1.3 million entering or the rate of natural increase of 1% declining is in error, the percentage could be correspondingly higher.

C. Even if the number of immigrants — especially the illegals — is drastically reduced, the projections are still staggering.

D. Even the short-term projections — for 20 years, until 2000— are staggering. A continued influx of 1 million or more for the next 20 years, plus the rate of natural increase, will effect sweeping changes, and impose a burden on the country's resources which could prove insupportable.

Further analysis of statistics and projections is given in an appendix.

We know that our society has already been altered by the recent heavy immigration of persons from less developed countries; and that it will continue to be altered by those immigrants already here even if future immigration (legal as well as illegal) is cut off immediately and completely. If this kind of immigration is allowed in the future, in any combination of legal and illegal, our society will be altered further in direct ratio to the number entering. If it continues at anything like the present rate, we will become, in Leon Bouvier's words, "a vastly different society." But even a considerably lesser rate will still effect vast differences.

In any event, we are left with the enormity of the numbers, with a picture of future world population swollen almost beyond comprehension. With a picture of endless hordes of poor pushing with ever-increasing pressure against the borders of the more fortunate countries, especially our own. With images ranging from the decline and fall of the Roman Empire (a hackneyed example, but still the most relevant one from the past) to armies of ants or locusts overrunning the land, to any final, doomed stands against overwhelming odds — to, finally, each and every terrifying nightmare involving annihilation by any exterior force. We all know in our hearts, whether we admit it even to ourselves, that this threat is gathering power day by day, a great shadow slowly but inexorably moving to envelop our world.

Can Anything Be Done?

If continued immigration, especially illegal immigration, is such a threat, why isn't something being done about it?

The obvious solution would be to seal the borders. With enough manpower and equipment, the long border with Mexico could be made impregnable. With far less effort, so could all coastlines and the Canadian border. In addition, the immigration laws could be amended to any degree of exclusion. So could the present encouragement of bilingualism. From a technical standpoint, America could very easily choke off all undesired immigration and all factors contributing to the alienation of immigrants already here.

If that is true, why doesn't it happen?

There are many reasons. To begin with, the subject is taboo to a considerable degree, as noted in detail above. (People will discuss the immigration problem in a cursory way; the taboo is invoked against serious discussion and effective action.) In addition, we have a tradition of allowing immigration, and of giving aid to the poor and the persecuted. Tradition dies hard, and we don't want to be indifferent to the less fortunate. This is compounded by our knowledge that we are all the descendants of immigrants.

To turn America into a fortress would be un-American. The Russians and East Germans may build walls to control immigration, but it is not our way. If we sealed our borders against Hispanics, Asians and "Others," the action would appear — to ourselves as well as to others — more selfish and arrogant than desperately necessary. To Americans, such selfishness and arrogance is unthinkable anachronistic — it is the attitude which led to the French and Russian revolutions and countless other European troubles, and which our forebears fled when they came here. To adopt it now would be to go backwards, to admit that the whole American experiment was doomed from the start and not worth the effort. It would be esthetically and psychologically impossible.

Then there are foreign relations. To stop illegal immigration from Mexico, or even to curb it drastically, would be insulting to Mexico. Former Senator Eugene McCarthy discusses this in the *Policy Review* article mentioned earlier:

The failure to control illegal immigration from Mexico is defended by some on the grounds that strict enforcement of immigration laws, more vigorous and thorough patrol of the border, harsher penalties, and quick deportation would "provoke" Mexico and lead to unrest among Mexican-Americans already in the United States. Possibly such actions would be provocative -- but such a possibility does not eliminate the reality of the movement of persons into the United States, without legal right, either by statute or by treaty.

A provoked Mexico might withhold its oil, but that would be the least of the consequences. The real blow would be to relations with all of Latin

America. After trying since the end of World War II to rid ourselves of the Yankee Imperialist label, we would reassume it with a vengeance. And add the even more dreaded label of racist state. Our leaders fear that all of Latin America would turn against us in such an event, aided and abetted, of course, by the Soviet Union. The loss of Central and South America as hemispheric allies, no matter how tepid, could be a disaster sufficient to tip the worldwide balance conclusively against us in our never-ending struggle with Russia.

To cut off or curb Asian and "Other" immigration would not create a reaction of such magnitude, but there would be some repercussions.

There is also the business interest. As noted, Hispanics come here to do the agricultural work which, it is claimed, no indigenous Americans will do. And they can be paid less. It can thus be argued that they make an important contribution to the American economy. The growers naturally exert an influence far beyond their numbers, and have considerable political power. They also have the support of businessmen in other fields all over the country. The sum of this business resistance is, according to observers in Washington, the major reason for Congressional avoidance of the issue of unchecked immigration.

In addition, there is a psychological block. It is extremely difficult for most Americans to admit finite limits to their ability to expand and absorb. This is noticeable in all aspects of American life; we think we can feed, educate, and give medical attention to any number of people. The feeling is fueled by such books as *The Ultimate Resource*, in which Julian Simon argues that there are really no dangers from population increase, environmental pollution, materials shortages, or any other apparent threat, because man is always successful in solving his problems. To admit that there are limits, that we cannot absorb immigrants at a million-plus rate per year, goes counter to the very core of our mystique.

Finally, there is the enormity of the problem, and the far-reaching consequences of any really significant changes in present policy. Such changes would inevitably trigger changes in the whole fabric of American life. We will be a different country if heavy immigration continues, and we will be a different country if we cut off heavy immigration. In the latter case, the pressure from the excluded poor will continue to mount, and we will be caught in an ever-deepening consciousness of being an isolated fortress, a prospect which pleases no one.

It is clear that the cultural threat, present and future, is not so strong at the present time as other factors: the general taboo, the tradition of aid to the poor and needy, and the distaste for changing policy; foreign relations and the struggle with Russia; business interests; psychological resistance to the notion of limits; and the enormity of the problem. At this time, these factors merge into a force far too powerful for any real solution to uncontrolled immigration.

What about compromise solutions?

The official position of the Reagan administration as of early 1982 is

that there should be a one-time-only amnesty for all illegals who entered the country before January 1, 1980. The administration feels that such an amnesty will cut future illegal immigration, but it is difficult to see how. If the current illegals are legitimized, the action would logically seem to encourage future illegals to believe that they will eventually receive the same consideration, and increase rather than decrease their desire to enter the United States. In any case, this measure is currently bogged down in committee.

On the question of stopping illegal immigration by other means, the administration can only suggest a small budget increase for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, from about \$360 million to \$400 million per year. With this tiny raise, it is “hoped” that illegal immigration will somehow be cut back to 100,000 per year from the present figure, somewhere between 500,000 and 2,000,000.

President Reagan has issued a dramatic order to interdict boatloads of Haitians on the high seas; but, as noted, Haitians are only a small fraction of illegal immigrants. (The disaster in which thirty Haitians drowned in the surf off Boca Raton, Florida, in October, 1981, occurred after his interdiction order.)

There is also talk in Washington about punishing employers who hire the illegals, and about creating fool-proof Social Security cards. But it is doubtful that enough employers will be checked closely enough, or that the punishments will be sufficient to deter them. A fool-proof Social Security card would enable INS officials to identify illegals, but they would first have to have the manpower to check all Hispanics constantly, a highly improbable prospect, and then they would have to have the manpower, resources and legal backing to deport all illegals, an even more improbable prospect.

The Reagan administration, like previous administrations, is not dealing with the immigration issue except in the most superficial way. For the reasons already cited, it cannot propose the obvious solution of closing the borders. Like all of official Washington, Reagan and his advisors are actually more indifferent to the cultural and long-range economic aspects of the problem than the average American. Most Congressmen, cabinet officers and high-level administrators take pride in being “pragmatic” and “hard-nosed.” which really means that they are interested in immediate, cosmetic stopgaps rather than long-term solutions. They can see that unlimited immigration is undesirable, but they will not — they cannot — grasp the fact that it is a real threat, and fatal if ignored. If it became apparent, in the depths of a future Depression, that millions of illegals were a drain on a shattered economy, there might be real Presidential/Congressional action to stop further immigration; even to deport the illegals. But as long as a fairly strong economy can use the illegals, nothing of substance will be done in Washington.

In “Models of Pluralism: The New American Dilemma,” published in the *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,

March, 1981, sociologist Milton M. Gordon argues that the choice for America is not between cultural pluralism and the assimilation and disappearance of ethnic groups. On the contrary, it is between “liberal pluralism” (a state in which ethnic differences are tolerated but not encouraged by government actions) and “corporate pluralism” (in which ethnic differences are actively promoted by government actions). If Mr. Gordon is correct, the difference between the supposed and the actual choice is so slight, compared to the magnitude of the problem, that it is meaningless. It is, however, on just such imaginary, meaningless choices that most Washington and regional immigration policy debate centers. And usually succumbs to active promotion of ethnic differences!

Also, Washington is especially susceptible to the argument that limits do not exist. The bureaucratic mind which lives in and by the heady atmosphere of ever-increasing expansion finds the no-limit concept applicable everywhere, and reads Julian Simon for corroboration.

The only way in which Washington could be stirred to action would be through strong pressure from the American people. Washington is a wholly reactive animal, and will always bow to pressure if that pressure is strong enough.

However, it should be kept in mind that Washington is clever in its collective dissembling, and can almost always convince the public that it is doing something on “issues.” The public is usually apathetic about these issues anyhow, and ready to be convinced. If this were not the case, there would be violent public reaction to Attorney General Smith’s bland admission that we have “lost control of our borders,” an extraordinary state of affairs in a country not averse to considering itself a superpower. At the present time, the illegal immigration issue is very much in this public apathy/Washington dissembling stage; and it may very well not move beyond this limbo. Or not move until it is too late.

Certainly there is tremendous public/Washington inertia working against any real solution to the immigration problem. In order to overcome that inertia, a counterforce of even more tremendous inertia would have to swing against it.

A Possible Sequence of Events

There is no reason to believe that this counterforce will arise spontaneously. In theory, the majority of Americans are against continued illegal immigration on a large scale, but they are reluctant to translate that theoretical opposition into action. Also, the majority is disorganized, and the people who want illegal immigration to continue — (the illegals themselves and most of the recent legals in their racial or cultural groups, plus the employers); or who are sympathetic to it (businessmen in general); or who are afraid of foreign reaction (Washington and Wall Street) — are too strong for them. At least at present. Obviously, the disapproving majority can only overcome the minority which wants illegal immigration to continue by ultimately bringing its greater strength

to bear, by applying the necessary, immense pressure on its adversary minority, especially those elected representatives who resist its wishes.

Can this happen?

On the positive side, there is a growing realization that, as difficult as this problem is, it must be addressed. We Americans tend to ignore problems until they can be ignored no longer, but when we finally face the fact that something must be done, we do it. At least we have to date. If the immigration problem follows the same timetable, we are approaching that point.

The chain of events in such cases usually runs as follows:

1) A tiny group of concerned persons urges the government to take steps to correct a dangerous situation.

2) The government insists that: a) the situation is not dangerous; b) the situation is dangerous, and it is taking all necessary steps to rectify it.

3) The tiny group sees no steps being taken and confronts the government again.

4) The government points to some cosmetic tinkering, and refuses to discuss the matter further.

5) The tiny group takes its case to the public through all the means at its disposal — books, pamphlets, word-of-mouth, etc.

6) The people begin to be alarmed, as much or more from their own observations as from the efforts of the tiny group, but are lulled back into inaction by reassurances from interested agencies and persons in and out of government.

7) The genuinely concerned persons, their numbers growing, awake the people again, but they are once more lulled back into inaction.

8) The cycle is repeated over and over again. However, if the problem is such that it will not go away, but keeps growing, each cycle will find the genuinely concerned persons increasing in number and more adamant, and the people more resistant to being fobbed off.

9) Finally, the concerned persons and the people become bonded together in an irresistible force. Representatives who really reflect the desires of the majority are voted into office and something happens, at last.

This is the historic American scenario — see the Civil War — for dealing with problems which won't go away, and there is no reason to believe it will be any different in regard to immigration if that problem is to be faced and dealt with.

Today, anyone concerned about immigration should realize that substantive changes in current policy will only be realized after a long and protracted struggle. A beleaguered Washington will fight change every step of the way. Its first line of defense might be a reduction in illegal immigration. (Its publicity campaign in regard to the very minor cutoff of Haitians is fair warning of how each and every small adjustment will be used to “prove” that the problem is wholly under control.) Its second, a near-cutoff of illegal immigration; its third, a reduction in legal immigration;

its fourth and final, a great reduction in legal immigration. Each of these lines of defense will be contested with all the dedication, considerable resources and guile at its command.

(It is entirely possible that the Census, which already attempts to explain away a large part of the 1970-1980 growth in certain categories by claiming “better coverage” in 1980 and other hedges, may find itself under tremendous pressure in 1990 to produce a Census — by whatever means — which does not show drastic increases in those categories in 1980-1990.) And at any sign of slackening on the part of the concerned persons and the people, it will immediately undo all concessions and reinstate its former policies. It will be a formidable adversary.

It may be of interest to remember that the Civil War was fought on the issue of secession—or the right to emigrate en masse. Now we are faced with the obverse of that situation, and the central government may finally be driven to a decision equally adamant — on the right to immigrate en masse.

The Civil War was fought only after a great deal of soul-searching on both sides; for twenty years, from 1840 until 1860, compromise after compromise was proposed to avoid it. The immigration dilemma may, in the future, show increasing similarities if not a precise analogy. Perhaps the most profound issue in the Civil War was the future development of the United States. This cultural concern is beginning to be echoed now, with Americans starting to ask themselves, “Do I wish this country to be drastically different twenty years from now and beyond? Do I wish my children, grandchildren and their descendants to live — or attempt to live — in such a different country? Do I wish to abdicate the right—even the obligation—to maintain the endangered cultural core of my country? Do I wish the continuation of cultural aggression, which can only end in separatism of one kind or another? And possibly in civil conflict?”

We should realize that if genuinely constructive steps are not taken now to avert such a grim future, it will become a reality.

Appendix

The U.S. Census provides a record of the past in 10-year increments, and although suspect, it is the official — often the only — authoritative source. Projections made from Census statistics may be fanciful, but the Census figures are as close as we can come to hard, current fact.

(The Census tries to explain away the huge increase in “Persons of Spanish Origin” from 1970 to 1980 by a difference in its questioning procedure. According to Supplementary Report PC80-S 1-1: “The 1980 figures for some race groups are not strictly consistent with 1970 totals because of significant changes in the way persons of Spanish origin reported their race. . . . As a consequence of this change and the difference in reporting by this population [*sic*], the proportion of the Spanish origin population classified as ‘other’ increased considerably between 1970 and 1980.” The implication is that if the questioning procedure had

been the same in 1980 as in 1970, the increase in “Persons of Spanish Origin” would have been dramatically lower. However, common sense tells us that this increase could not have been dramatically lower in the light of the admittedly large increases in legal and illegal immigration. It is a classic case of bureaucratic slipperiness under pressure — in this case, the necessity of minimizing the evidence. If we use the official Census figures, which show a large increase in Hispanics, we are told by the Census apologists that those figures don’t really mean what they say because the questioning procedures changed. If we rely on informed estimates — such as Attorney General Smith’s — which show an Hispanic immigration so enormous over a 10-year period that it must result in a larger 1970-1980 increase than could have conceivably come from the Hispanic residents in 1970 plus a small immigration, we are told by the same apologists that such estimates do not constitute “hard evidence,” and that the only source of true hard evidence is the Census itself. For the purposes of this analysis, we shall stay with the so-called hard evidence and use the Census figures as they stand, assuming that what the Hispanic count gained by changed questioning procedures has been more than offset by the losses in missed illegals and legals. If anything, the Census figures are low in regard to Hispanics, despite the apologetics.)

Estimates for current legal and illegal immigration for Hispanics run from a low of 400,000 per year to a high of well over a million. If we turn to the Census, we can arrive at a 10-year figure by subtracting the Census total for Hispanics in 1970 (9,072,602) from the 1980 Census figure (14,605,883), giving 5,533,281. Dividing this figure by ten gives 553,328 per year, which is consistent with the low side of most estimates. The rate includes a natural increase which should be subtracted from the total, dropping it to somewhere between 400,000 and 500,000. There is no way of knowing, of course, how much greater that figure might actually be. We may be sure that the Census figures err on the low side. Even so, it is a tremendous influx and, when added to other immigration, enough to alter the cultural and economic composition of the United States drastically.

The Census asks people if they are “White,” “Black,” “American Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut,” “Asian and Pacific Islander,” or “Other.” In another question, “Persons of Spanish Origin” are asked to identify themselves in the one of these categories they find most appropriate. Most Hispanics, of course, are of Mexican origin. The overall figures for 1980, with special emphasis on Hispanics (“Persons of Spanish Origin”) are as follows: According to the following Census table, persons of Hispanic/Spanish origin were identified in every one of the five categories.

As noted, the great difference between the number of Hispanics who identified themselves as “Other” in 1970 and in 1980 is explained by the Census as due to changes in the questioning procedures. By any yardstick, these procedures are prone to error. The 94,719 Hispanics who called themselves “American Indian, Eskimo and (or) Aleut” and the

166,135 who called themselves “Asian and (or) Pacific Islander” may have done so because one parent or grandparent was in that category. By the same token, how many Hispanics with one “White” parent or grandparent called himself or herself “White” and were not challenged by the Census on that designation?

However, even if the official Census figures are used, an alarming pattern develops. The table below was developed from the tables already given. The Hispanics in all categories (except, naturally, the Hispanic category itself) have been subtracted, according to the figures in Table II.

Several points from Table III (page 41) should be emphasized:

1) From 1970 to 1980, the United States population as a whole grew at the compounded rate of 1.09 percent per year, for a ten-year increase of 11.46 percent.

2) The combined total of those categories with low immigration rates — “White,” “Black,” “American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut” (hereafter totaled as “Category A”) — grew at the compounded rate of .78 percent per year, for a ten-year total of 8.03%.

3) The combined total of those categories with high immigration rates — “Asian, Pacific Islander,” “Other,” “Hispanic” (hereafter totaled as “Category B”) — grew at the compounded rate of 5.53 percent per year, for a ten-year total of 71 percent..

4) The Hispanic population grew at a compounded rate of 4.88 percent per year, for a ten-year total of 60.99 percent.

There is an enormous disparity between the growth rate of Category A and Category B. In the 1970-1980 decade, Category A, which was 94.59 percent (192,208,613) of the total population (207,648,103) in 1970, contributed only 66.28 percent (15,439,490) of the total growth (23,292,899). Category B, which was only 5.41 percent (11,003,313) of the total population in 1970, contributed 33.72% (7,853,409) of the total growth.

If the compounded 1970-1980 growth rate (.78 percent per year) of Category A is projected for fifty years, 2030 would show an increase of 47.47 percent over the present 208 million in that category, or a total of 307 million. If the compounded 1970-1980 growth rate (5.53 percent per year) of Category B is projected for fifty years. 2030 would show an increase of 1375.02% over the present 19 million in that category, or 280 million. The two categories combined would give a total U.S. population of 586 million.

It is unlikely that such a fantastic population (with about 48 percent of it in Category B) will be reached. Other factors will intervene. (For example, the growth rate of Category A is already declining.) On the other hand, it is equally doubtful that there will be no increase, or only a very small increase. The actual increase will lie somewhere between the two extremes. But it is entirely possible that the ratio of persons in Category A to Category B — 52 percent to 48 percent — will occur no matter the numerical increase.

(Professional demographers resist extrapolated compound growth rates from any period in the past in regard to any category. Nevertheless,

in terms of raw mathematics an extrapolated compound growth rate is unarguable. As a statistical tool, it can shed light on and emphasize a 10-year growth rate in any area in the immediate past. Projected into the future, it can also serve as a clear illustration of what will happen if that growth rate continues. In such a projection, it is as obviously theoretical as any other type of projection. Its advantage in understanding the immediate past is that it lumps together increases in any category or combination of categories into one clear line of compound progression, which can then be compared to any other categories or combinations of categories. Its advantage in projections into the future is that it provides an equally clear base line. A compounded growth rate is not meant to supplant or compete with the more complex methods of demographers in charting the future, but to serve as a reminder that what has happened will continue to happen (as in any inertial progression) until and unless other factors intervene. Only in the future will the actual compounded rate of growth (or decline) for that future's past be unarguably clear; but at any point in the future it will be as hard and fast for the past as it is today).

According to a World Development Report put out under the auspices of the World Bank in August, 1980, the United States has an overall annual growth rate of .8 percent per year (including legal immigration), a generally accepted figure. (The actual figure extrapolated in Table III above from official Census data shows 1.09 percent per year compounded, but with adjustment made for a slightly higher rate in 1970 declining slowly through the decade, the figure could well be .8 percent at this time).

The World Bank Report projects a U.S. population of 252 million by 2000, and a stationary population of 273 million by 2030. This would be a total increase of only 46.5 million over the next 50 years, or 20.53 percent of the present population of 226.5 million, with the growth rate going from .8 percent in 1980 to 0 percent in 2030. And to somewhere around a total of 12 percent for the entire 20-year 1980-2000 period, or an average of .6 percent per year.

These World Bank projections are close enough to those of most demographers to be standard. Which does not mean, of course, that they are correct. They are evidently nothing more than extensions of the decline in the annual growth rate over the recent past. This decline, with certain minor adjustments, is projected out to its mathematical end in zero growth in 2030. However, any such projection of a current trend is only a guess. If anything happens to reverse the decline, or even to change its rate, the projection will be incorrect.

Also, the overall growth rate of .8 percent for 1980 is the proportional average of two growth rates: a low one for Category A, and a high one for Category B. As Category B grows, because of both a higher growth rate for those already here and a constant increase from immigration, it will assume an ever-larger proportion the overall growth rate. On the evidence, most so-called demographic experts (Leon Bouvier is an exception, although even he is conservative) do not take this into consideration in their projections.

Thus the most likely causes of overall failure for standard projections lie in the growth rates of the ethnic subgroups, especially those fueled by high immigration. Even if it is assumed that the projection of zero growth for 2030 for Category A is attainable, by no means does it follow that it is true for Category B.

If the roughly 208 million persons currently in Category A grew only 20.53 percent in the next fifty years, they would number 248 million in 2030. Subtracting this figure from the overall 273 million total projected for 2030 shows a total of some 25 million persons in Category B, an increase of only 6 million over the 19 million now in that Category. But this increase is less than the documented increase in Category B in the last ten years alone. Obviously something is exceedingly questionable in the fifty-year extrapolated World Bank projection for Category B.

If the 19 million currently in Category B grew over the next fifty years at that Category's compounded 5.53 percent annual rate for 1970-1980, they would number, as noted above, 280 million by 2030. If those in Category A went to zero growth by that time they would, as noted in the paragraph above, number 248 million. Category A would have 47 percent of the population, and Category B 53 percent.

If Bouvier and the other demographers who assume continued high immigration and continued high natural increase for Category B in their projections are right, and the demographers who do not assume it are wrong, it is difficult to see how a stationary U.S. population of 273 million could possibly be achieved. According to Bouvier's figures, in 2080 only 60 percent of it, or 164 million, would be the descendants of the current population of 226 million. That would represent a decline of over 27 percent in the present population (which includes 19 million in Category B) over the next 100 years!

Other factors of significance:

1) As noted previously, some 80 percent (640,000) of the estimated current annual 800,000 U.S. immigrants are coming from less developed countries. If they continue to arrive at this rate, with a compounded natural increase of only 1 percent, they and their descendants will total over 40 million in 50 years. If the rest of Category B (those 19 million already here) multiplies at only 1 percent annually, compounded, they and their descendants will add over 30 million to that figure. The whole of Category B, without any additions from illegal immigration, will total over 70 million by 2030. A higher rate of natural increase, and a higher rate of legal immigration (with an ever-larger number of arrived immigrants able to bring in relatives without numerical limit) would increase the total tremendously.

2) Estimates of natural increase among immigrants are the most questionable of all projections. Bouvier and others tend to peg them to the projections of the United States as a whole at this time. These projections go down from the current .8 percent per year to 0 percent in the next 50-100 years. For instance, at his median TFR (Total Fertility Rate) of 2.0 per year,

Bouvier sees the number of Latin Americans, Asians and “Others” as increasing 19.4 percent above and beyond the immigration total itself over the next 20 years.

Over the next 50 years, using the same TFR, 1000 immigrants per year, totaling 50,000, will increase 37.0 percent to 68,500. Over the next hundred years, 1000 immigrants per year, totaling 100,000, will increase 48.6 percent to 148,000. However, Bouvier’s first increase, the 20-year span from 1980 to 2000, of 19.4 percent, works out to 1.66 percent per year compounded and totaled for each group of 1000 immigrants on a 1-20-year scale. If the same percentage is continued for 50 years, it results in an overall increase of 56.6 percent rather than his 37.0 percent; and for 100 years it result in an overall increase of 156.5 percent rather than his 48.6 percent. Obviously, he has steadily dropped the rate of natural increase over the 100-year span.

As authority for doing this, he cites a paper by Frank Bean, Gray Swicegood and Thomas F. Linsley, prepared in 1981 for the Select Committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy. This study claims that Mexican-Americans “decrease their fertility depending on the length of time spent in the United States,” with “eventual convergence with the fertility patterns of the native population.” It is a tenuous assumption at best, and based on a very narrow sampling. (Bouvier contradicts it himself by saying elsewhere that “there . . . is such evidence [of high levels of fertility] for Latin Americans, especially Mexicans.”) In Mexico, the current annual growth rate is over 3 percent per year. Certainly, that is the “starting” rate for recent and future Mexican immigrants and their children in their first years in this country. Selected Mexican-Americans in relatively close contact with native American society may show a lessening natural increase rate now; but future conditions, as greater total concentrations of immigrants erode such contact, may slow that lessening. Greater numbers must increase cultural aggression and the refusal to integrate; and a high birth rate is a very basic way of expressing those drives. In the long run, if high immigration continues, it is reasonable to expect the maintenance of all aspects of Mexican culture on the part of Mexican-Americans, including a high rate of natural increase, no matter how that rate may seem to drop in selected studies.

3) According to the World Bank figures, Mexico, with a 1980 population of 70 million, will have a population of 116 million by 2000, and will reach a stationary population of 205 million in 2075. There is no reason to assume that this estimate of enormous growth (actually, a guess which even at that is far more likely to be too low than too high) will not push more and more Mexicans toward the United States. The pressure of illegal immigration will tend to increase rather than decrease over the next hundred years. If strong counter-measures would be needed now to stop or slow illegal immigration significantly, even stronger measures would be needed in the future.

In “Long-term Trends in Migratory Behavior in a Developing Country: The Case of Mexico,” an article by Michael J. Greenwood, Jerry

Ladman and Bany S. Siegel in the August, 1981, issue of *Demography*, the authors argue that even if relative prosperity comes to Mexico and other developing countries, the result may be a spur rather than a deterrent to long-distance migrations. They claim that economic development in such countries may only mean more people will be able to afford such migrations.

4) Mexico is not the only source of immigrants from the south. According to an article in *U.S. News and World Report* (July 27, 1981), Latin America as a whole, with a current population of 366 million and a compounded annual increase rate of 2.3 percent, will have a population of 562 million by 2000, a jump of 54 percent. There is no reason to assume that some significant proportion of this increase (in addition to that part of it in Mexico) will not attempt to enter the United States illegally, either through Mexico itself, or by other routes.

According to the *U.S. News and World Report* piece, the population of Latin America is supposed to level off by 2100. Even if that guess is correct, that population will total around a billion. (According to the U.S. News projection, Latin American population will climb from its present 8.13 percent of world population to 9.28 percent by 2000. The ultimate projection for a wholly stabilized world population is 10.5 billion by 2110. Latin America will be one of the last areas to stabilize, and will probably have a somewhat larger share of that projection than 9.28 percent, which would work out to 974 million.)

Certainly, if the 10.5 billion projection is at all accurate, Latin America and the Caribbean together will number well over a billion by 2100; and it is impossible to believe that a population growing to such a number will not exert extraordinary pressure for immigration into the U.S. long before 2100. Added to it will be tremendous pressure from Asians and "Others." As noted, the U.S. population is generally predicted to stabilize at 273 million by 2030. Also as noted, this is a most doubtful figure even if immigration is reduced or cut off immediately, to say nothing of continued immigration, legal as well as illegal. But even assuming that it were a possible figure, by 2100 those 273 million persons would long since have had to turn the U.S. into an armed fortress in order to fight off the continuous, relentless, terrifying onslaught of billions of Latin Americans, Caribbeans, Asians and "Others." In no other way could the projection be realized.

5) At the present time, according to the *U.S. News* report, the less developed countries represent 75 percent (3.4 billion) of the world population of 4.5 billion. By the year 2000, their share of a projected world population of 6 billion is expected to be 4.8 billion, or 80 percent. The 5 percent rise in the proportional share is not so impressive as the numerical leap from 3.4 to 4.8 billion, an increase of 1.4 billion, or 41 percent.

If at least 80 percent of the projected world population stabilization figure of 10.5 billion will be poor — and if anything that percentage will be greater — there will be a total of some 8.4 billion poor somewhere around 2100.

The poor alone would be twice as numerous as the total world population today.

It is a depressing prospect, not only for the United States but for the world. Alan B. Mountjoy of the Geography Department, Bedford College, University of London, summed it up in an article entitled "Population Increases" in the *Third World Quarterly*, April, 1980:

World population is now about 4,250 million and is likely to attain 6,250 million within the next twenty years. The map and tables indicate that almost all this enormous increase will be located in Third World countries, for fertility is much less in the developed countries where, for example, in Europe and the U.S. rates of natural increase are now below 1 per cent. In fact, in several countries of Western Europe the net reproduction rate (a measure of population replacement) has dropped below unity, indicating that the present number of women of childbearing age in the population are not replacing themselves. If this continues for an appreciable time the absolute numbers of the populations will eventually decline. This means that by the year 2000 almost 80 per cent of world population will be in the present developing countries (66 percent in 1950) and the numerical importance of Europe will be much reduced. What has to be faced is that within the next twenty years major Third World cities may be of 25-30 million inhabitants, and we must expect a situation where India has a population of 1,200 million, Indonesia 230 million, Pakistan 130 million, Mexico 100 million, to name but a few of the countries that will be seriously affected.

An analysis of these soaring increases reveals the juvenility of these populations — proportions as high as 40-45 per cent of the populations being under fifteen years of age. Thus, with the addition of the aged, there is a very large part of these populations that consume but do not produce.

One can see the dynamic but often obstructionist character of demographic factors. Experience so far suggests that the Third World can abolish poverty or it can increase its numbers, but it is becoming clear that it cannot do both simultaneously. The whole problem of development becomes more and more intractable with soaring population totals. We should keep in mind that all Latin America has the same forces pushing people into emigration that Mexico does. So do Asia and Africa. A vast, worldwide pressure forcing movement from the less to the more developed countries, by any means whatsoever, is increasing steadily and is going to have profound repercussions.

Bouvier, in a continuation of the material from his *Demography* article quoted earlier, says: "As a result, [of 40 percent of the 2080 U.S. population being post-1980 immigrants and their descendants difficult questions regarding bilingual and even multilingual education, possible readjustments in political alignment, post-western civilization economic orientations, will emerge. One thing is certain, by 2080 the U.S. will have a vastly different society The most chilling word in this understated summary is "post-western," a condition of which "post-American" is certainly a large share.