

Sociobiology and Immigration: The Grim Forecast for America

“The laws of nature are the laws of God, whose authority can be superceded by no power on earth.”

George Mason

As a world power, the United States has displayed unique generosity toward less fortunate countries. In the decades after World War II, American foreign aid dollars cascaded into virtually all parts of the world. Moreover, our humanitarian impulses also led to an even more significant form of aid to foreigners, the opening of our borders to unprecedented numbers of immigrants. In some recent periods the destination of one-half of the world's total immigration stream has been the United States. Even as our aid flowed around the world, the immigrants poured in from the four corners of the globe.

Increasingly, however, the post-World War, II immigrants differed physically and culturally from earlier waves of European immigrants. By the 1970s, the most numerous groups were Third World peoples, especially Hispanics and Asians. These arrived, legally or illegally, in such numbers that dramatic changes in the American population and culture are now almost inevitable if present trends in immigration continue. Authoritative population projections indicate that within the lives of some people now living, the United States is destined to become a thoroughly multi-racial, multi-cultural society in which non-Hispanic whites will constitute only a minority of the population.¹ The once predominant White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) group will make up an even smaller minority.

The changing composition and size of the immigrant stream resulted largely from policies based on typically American ideals and humanitarian attitudes. It was argued that immigration preferences granted to Europeans discriminated against other groups, and laws were changed to minimize that possibility. Continuing world turmoil threw up new categories of political dissidents and persecuted peoples, and we rolled out the welcome mat for refugees from tyrannies of both left and right. After the Vietnam War, a mixture of gratitude and guilt feelings paved the way for admission of large numbers of Southeast Asians, chiefly drawn from our former allies, the South Vietnamese and the Hmong tribesmen. Sympathy for poverty-stricken peoples as well as a desire to get along with our Latin-American neighbors contributed to our acceptance of the largest immigrant group, the Mexicans.

Public forums have largely ignored the question of how immigration will affect the future of the United States and the lives of the children and grandchildren of current citizens. Discussions of such problems as federal budgetary deficits sometimes touch on the immorality of burdening future generations with the results of our economic profligacy. However, debates about immigration seldom ask whether present policies may be creating equally ponderous social problems for our descendants. Is our unacknowledged legacy to be a Third World country with all the characteristics

the term implies? The time is already late for us to begin seeking answers to such questions about the future results of present policies.

Traditional American attitudes toward immigration were summed up in the term, "the melting pot." It was assumed that after a relatively short period of acculturation, immigrants -- and particularly their children and grandchildren -- would be virtually indistinguishable from earlier arrivals. The ideal worked reasonably well in practice as long as most immigrants came from Northwest Europe, where national boundaries were less meaningful than the cultural and biological heritages which were closely related to those of the early American settlers.

As more Central and South Europeans joined the westward population flow in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the efficiency of the melting pot slowed noticeably and public alarm led to the enactment of a series of restrictive immigration laws. But it was only well after World War II, in the 1960s, that we permanently consigned the melting pot to the junkheap. Sociologists gradually began to talk about "cultural pluralism" as the new American ideal. It was noted that many large American cities had a mosaic-like pattern created by various ethnic groups, each tending to congregate in its own territorial and cultural enclave. The complexity of the mosaic pattern increased with the arrival of each new nationality group which came in substantial numbers.

A disinterested observer might conclude that writings on this important social phenomenon have concentrated more on rationalizing the status quo than on attempting to predict long-term effects. We have talked and written much about the alleged benefits of cultural diversity and the promises of the Statue of Liberty to the world's "huddled masses," but comparatively little about possible negative implications of the cultural mosaic. Unless we relish the role of blind hostages of fate, it is time to face the fact that our rather thoughtless "humanitarianism" is bringing changes to the United States that few of us have even imagined.

It is proverbial that he who consults the crystal ball should acquire a taste for broken glass. Indeed, all social prophets should maintain an appropriate degree of modesty. Nevertheless, scholarly literature as well as human experience in relevant areas suggest some probable results of present immigration policies. Sociology and sociobiology are two scholarly fields which embody extensive research and writing pertinent to the question at hand. This question is whether a population diversity unprecedented in a democratic country will lead to the great and tranquil society we all desire or to divisiveness and eventual disintegration.

Sociologists have studied numerous applicable topics, including ethnic group relations through time and space, stratification patterns, social integration and disintegration, the significance of personal and societal values, and the persistence of cultural characteristics. Sociobiologists attempt to identify the innate behavioral predispositions of homo sapiens as a species and to suggest how these propensities relate to his creation of and adjustment to specific social arrangements.

The Fields of Sociobiology and Ethology

Within the last few decades the science of ethology sprang from an astonishing proliferation of excellent studies of animal behavior done by researchers from many nations. The studies, often completed under difficult conditions in the animals' natural environments, attempted to determine the innate behavioral tendencies or "biograms" of various species. So fascinating were the findings that many ethologists achieved prominence in their academic fields and a few, such as Jane Goodall, Konrad Lorenz and Desmond Morris, became international celebrities.

Those three authored best-selling books on various facets of animal behavior, as did Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox as well as Robert Ardrey, a knowledgeable non-scientist.²⁻⁷

A major event which signaled the coming of age of the new science was the awarding of the 1973 Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine to three ethologists, Konrad Lorenz, Nikolaas Tinbergen and Karl von Frisch. Lorenz, sometimes referred to as the founder of the field, is best known for his studies of aggression and of imprinting in birds. Von Frisch discovered the dances bees use to communicate information to each other about the location of food sources, while Tinbergen did pioneering research relative to dominance in fish and dominance and territoriality in birds. Significantly, all three Nobel laureates as well as many other trailblazers in the field of ethology were Europeans. That fact apparently delayed American acceptance of the new discipline.

With great uniformity, ethological research demonstrated that each species has innate tendencies toward particular behavior patterns, which may be shaped in varying degrees by climate, population size, food supply or other environmental factors. Some types of behavior appeared repetitiously in the biograms of many species, even those widely separated geographically and as little related biologically as mammals and fish or birds. Among other things, numerous species were found to be hierarchical, territorial, aggressive, pair-bonding, male-dominated and xenophobic (hostile to strangers).

The explosive growth of ethological data provided part of the foundation for a landmark scientific event, the publication in 1975 of a weighty book entitled *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* by Harvard professor Edward O. Wilson. *Sociobiology* almost instantly gave its name to a new scientific field defined by Wilson as “the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behavior.”⁸ The new field is a branch of evolutionary biology and particularly of population biology, which has as its unit of study a set of individuals belonging to the same species and occupying a clearly delimited space.

Evolutionary biology assumes that the biogram or behavioral pattern of any species has developed through evolutionary selection. That is, any trait that enhances the individual’s survival and reproductive success will become increasingly common in future generations and will finally characterize an entire population. Thus the behavioral inclinations of any species will be those that were functional from a survival standpoint over a considerable period of time under then existing conditions.

Although sociobiologists have concerned themselves primarily with non-human creatures, most undoubtedly believe that *homo sapiens* is no exception to the rule that the behavioral tendencies of a species must reflect evolutionary forces. It is, of course, recognized that man’s evolutionary heritage includes unique capacities for communication and culture-building, which permit more complicated behavioral patterns than those of other animals.

Species Characteristics

Among the most intensely studied topics of sociobiology are three interrelated species characteristics, aggression, dominance and territoriality. Although variable in detail and degree, these are widespread as parts of the behavioral repertoires of mammals, birds, fish and even the more behaviorally advanced invertebrates. There is much reason to believe that man also displays these evolutionary characteristics and that they underlie many significant aspects of human behavior.

Dominance generally refers to an individual’s physical domination of

other group members in such a way that the higher-ranking individual has preferential access to food, shelter, mates or other commonly desired objects. The dominance hierarchy is initiated and sustained by aggression, although sometimes of a subtle or indirect nature. In many species, aggression is reduced by territoriality or the more or less exclusive use of a spatial area by an animal or group of animals. Territories may be originally established and, if necessary, protected by aggressive actions. Possession of territory can be of the utmost importance because individuals without territory may be deprived of food or mating opportunities.

Territoriality and dominance are methods of allocating scarce resources among individuals or groups. In social animals that live in relatively large and long-lasting groups, some sort of dominance hierarchy often develops. In the words of David P. Barash, "Competition produces ranking when resources must be shared among individuals that are inherently unequal."⁹ Territoriality tends to characterize species that have individuals or relatively small groups as the basic social units. Such a unit is often limited to a mated pair and their young, but may take other forms. Territoriality and dominance are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A given group may exhibit elements of both phenomena simultaneously. Furthermore, under crowded conditions many species switch from territoriality to dominance ordering.

So intriguing are dominance fights to naturalists and photographers that most Americans probably have witnessed such violent contests in television documentaries and even in televised automobile advertisements extolling "rain power." These dramatic spectacles first attracted widespread attention in 1922 through a Norwegian biologist's research on chickens.¹⁰ Thorleif Schjelderup-Ebbe's paper described actions so oddly reminiscent of behavior in human hierarchies that the term "peck order" (or "pecking order") almost immediately became part of our language. Although the dominance orders of many creatures have since been studied, the chicken still ranks first in the amount of formal research devoted to its behavior in this area.

Schjelderup-Ebbe discovered that hens in a barnyard assort themselves into a dominance-deference hierarchy which he called a "peck order." Topping the structure is one hen which without provocation or fear of retaliation can peck any other hen in the rigidly organized society. Immediately below is number two, which can peck all the other birds except number one. Each lower-ranking hen occupies a definite place in the social structure, above or below other specific chickens. At the bottom is a humble hen which must submit to pecks and threats of pecks from all of its companions. The top-ranking animal in a peck order has come to be called the alpha, the second the beta, and the last the omega. Peck orders are not necessarily the simple linear arrangement referred to above, but irregularities usually disappear over a period of time until each individual has a definite place. Fights and threats establish the peck order in a flock. Some chickens give in easily, perhaps without a fight, while others are fierce combatants. When two chickens are first placed together, rank is settled almost immediately. If one bird does not submit, a fight occurs. If two fighting chickens are separated, fighting will resume at the earliest possible moment and continue until both know which is dominant. Cockfights, a popular entertainment in some societies, need not be instigated, but capitalize on the natural dominance drives of the birds.

The immediate cause of status fights or threats is often food because each chicken wants to eat first. Eating first, of course, has survival value if food is scarce. In fights of hens and roosters, most wounds are rather

minor, but not uncommonly the neck and head are bloodied. Sometimes a chicken dies during a fight or shortly thereafter from serious wounds. A low-ranking fowl may also die from starvation because it is too terrorized to approach a feeder or other source of food. Low-ranking birds tend to feed primarily very early in the morning or very late in the evening when their dominant oppressors are roosting or can't recognize others in semi-darkness.¹¹

After publication of Schjelderup-Ebbe's paper on chickens, research on dominance became highly popular in the United States and Europe. In this country much work was done at the University of Chicago by W.C. Allee¹² and his students. By 1960 a dominance hierarchy or similar system had been reported for pigeons, parakeets, lizards, red deer, white mice, dogs, canaries, ring doves, various primates, geese, sheep, hermit crabs, lobsters, goats, wasps, horses, elk, crayfish, cows, jungle fowl and buffalo.¹³ Numerous other species have since been added to the list. Many modern scholars believe that something like a dominance hierarchy may eventually be found among most group-living animals. A hierarchy is sometimes difficult to observe, they suspect, only because rank orders are so rigid and so well-established that few fights or threats occur.

Although many characteristics are broadly applicable, dominance orders in other animals may differ in certain respects from those first reported for chickens. Dominance may be partial, situational or less rigid. A stable order may appear only after multiple fights rather than in the wake of initial encounters. Rank may be partially inherited from mothers, as in some primates, or it may be a family affair rather than individual where mating is long-term.¹⁴ Likewise, two or more males may cooperate in dominating their subordinates. A dominance hierarchy may include more than one species if they compete for scarce resources. In this respect bison are particularly vicious despots. A bull will charge an adult elk, and may kill horses, mules, and elk and moose calves.¹⁵

In the more intelligent animal species dominance tends to become increasingly non-physical and to depend upon a greater number of factors. Size, age and sex are generally important determinants of rank, but intelligence, aggressiveness and other personality traits as well as luck may also enter the equation. Jane Goodall wrote of one chimpanzee with an unimpressive physique who leaped to the top of the hierarchy with one coup. This individual stole kerosene cans from her camp and made a fearful din, banging them together and frightening away and cowing his companions.¹⁶

A fashionable cliché is that only man kills his own kind. The inaccuracy of this statement cannot be over-emphasized. Nature is indeed "red in tooth and claw," much as we might wish it to be otherwise. In one study of roosters, four out of 24 were killed by their superiors in a short period of time. Dominance fights among crayfish may not only be fatal but may end in cannibalism.¹⁷ Many, or possibly most, deaths in a normal herd of mice are due to fighting. This is true both in laboratories and under natural conditions.¹⁸

Even man's best friend, the dog, is not necessarily a friend to his own kind or to his own relatives. One of the most dominant breeds that has been thoroughly studied under laboratory conditions is the wire-haired fox terrier. Although small and appealing to human eyes, wire-haired terriers are reported to have such strong dominance drives that if a litter contains more than three puppies, they must be separated or some may be killed by their brothers and sisters.¹⁹

Many species have signaling mechanisms to indicate the rank of

individuals. These dominance-deference mechanisms are often conspicuous enough and similar enough from species to species to be easily recognized by human observers. Very commonly the dominant animal in a group can be identified by his posture and overall appearance. Usually he will be erect with head and tail up, while subordinate animals will have their heads and tails down.

Dominance-related behavior clearly is built into the genes of a great many species as an evolutionary trait because it has survival value for the individual as well as his genes. Dominance normally gives an animal priority with respect to food, mates and territory. All contribute to physical survival and to perpetuation of the animal's genes in the next generation. Numerous animal studies have demonstrated the close relationship between dominance and physical or genetic survival. For example, in a group of sage grouse the dominant one percent of the adult males did 75 percent of the mating in a period observed by researchers. Among birds the low-ranking have been observed to get so little food that a change of weather or other hazards meant death while those with prior access to more food survived.

In general, the dominance drive undoubtedly is more important than the sex drive in animals. Experimentally one can create stressful conditions such as cold for a group of animals and sexual behavior will disappear before dominance behavior. Similarly, observers of animals living under natural conditions often report that dominance is more motivating to animals than sex. In this respect it is interesting to recall that the question of the relative strength of the status and sex drives in people contributed to the falling out of Sigmund Freud and Alfred Adler. Adler talked about the primacy of the will to power while Freud stressed the significance of sexual urges. Animal behavior as well as American behavior suggests that Adler was right. Although we are living in an era more preoccupied with sex than most earlier periods in Western history, even desultory observation shows that people usually devote more time and effort to status seeking than to sex.

While animals may exhibit dominance-related behavior that is unlovely or shocking to human eyes, a dominance hierarchy is not without redeeming merits even for many subordinate creatures. Dominance orders may help to preserve both individuals and species by maintaining a degree of order. As bloody as it may sound, a dominance system is more peaceful than one possible alternative, a war of all against all. With relative internal peace, the group can concentrate on essential business like defending territory, breeding, evading predators and finding food.

Territoriality, a phenomenon closely related to dominance, occurs in many species ranging from ants to apes. Territorial animals, as individuals or groups, seize geographical areas and defend them from other members of the same species and occasionally from competing species as well. Territorial claims may be established and defended by physical aggression or by threats and displays or signals to other animals. Many animals mark their territorial borders with urine or glandular secretions which can be smelled by would-be invaders and interpreted as "no trespassing" signs. (This is what your pet dog is doing when he raises his leg by a tree or fireplug.)

Many species, such as birds, frogs and crickets, advertise territorial possession through repetitious vocal signaling. The spring songs of male birds not only help in wooing a female but also warn other males of the same species away from the terrain the prospective father has staked out as his own. Usually a territory is established by a male, who then waits for a female. After her arrival, she sometimes helps her mate in repelling

strange males. Typically an animal is unconquerable on his own territory and visibly uncomfortable on the territory of a rival. Thus signals may be sufficient to avert a battle which an invader is psychologically unprepared to wage successfully.

In most territorial species the boundaries of a territory are clearly defined by the owner and regularly patrolled. The landholder will ignore a nearby rival outside of his territory but will rush off to repel a more distant one that has breached the border. The size of territories varies greatly from species to species and to a lesser extent from individual to individual. Size depends upon various factors including the abundance of food and shelter, population pressure and individual aggressiveness.

Like hierarchical tendencies, territoriality appears to be an evolutionary characteristic that persists because it enhances the survival chances of victorious individuals or groups. Under natural conditions, space suitable for gathering food and rearing offspring is often so limited that many individuals will not survive or will be unable to breed. Thus territorial possession may literally be a life-or-death affair.

A widely-shared animal characteristic related to both dominance and territoriality is xenophobia, or hostility toward strangers. The strongest known stimulus to aggressive behavior in animals is the sight of a stranger. Edward O. Wilson says: "This xenophobic principle has been documented in virtually every group of animals displaying higher forms of social organization."²⁰ Conversely, nothing so encourages group unity and cooperation as the presence of an intruder which must be repelled. A newcomer is perceived as a threat to the status and welfare of every member of a group, and is likely to be greeted by a violent and united front.

The xenophobic principle extends to man's closest relatives, the primates. In this context, laboratory experiments have refined information based on field observations. One series of controlled experiments determined that the introduction of strange rhesus monkeys into confined groups caused a fourfold to tenfold increase in aggressive interactions.^{21,22} Likewise in the wild, the aggression displayed when two rhesus groups meet or when a stranger attempts to enter a group far exceeds that seen in the normally stressful daily life of a troop. This is true despite the fact that the exceptionally aggressive rhesus monkeys base their societies to a great extent on dominance hierarchies maintained by almost continuous aggressive encounters.

Some of the most stomach-turning passages in the ethological literature refer to the killing of an outsider by an existing group or dominant individual. One writer describes how a group of caged rats literally tore to pieces a strange rat placed in the cage. The intruder did not resist, apparently exhibiting horrified resignation to his fate. A strange chicken added to an existing flock may be harassed to death or at best worn down to the omega position by repeated attacks day after day.²³

In some species, notably chimpanzees, groups of related males may form murderous gangs which roam the jungle searching for lone strangers to attack. Jane Goodall has described a protracted chimpanzee "border war" in which a gang of five males defended their territory against male intruders, sitting each day at the boundary and waiting for their quarry. Goodall's research associate reports that at the sound of other chimps the waiting five 'get very excited and begin hugging each other, squealing, touching each others' genitals, and go streaming down the hillside.'

If the five chimps encountered two or more neighbors, both sides were likely to retreat after a noisy but rarely fatal display. But if a single stranger appeared, the Goodall associate reports, the gang descended

upon him, possibly with two members holding the victim while a third pounded on him. Or two males might kill the unfortunate intruder by dragging him over rocks. In an unsettling example of animal genocide, a group of about 15 chimpanzees wiped out a smaller neighboring group by killing off one male at a time over a period of months.

Similarly, successful intruders into a territory or existing group often show little mercy to the vanquished. In India, langur males sometimes invade established troops, chase away the dominant males, and brutally kill the infants, despite the united efforts of the females to protect the young. After the deaths of their babies, the females soon become sexually receptive again and mate with the murderers of their offspring.

When wild stallions successfully invade a group, they may prevent the birth of the young of the defeated males by harassing pregnant mares until they spontaneously abort. Sociobiologists frequently interpret such behavior as “the selfish gene”²⁴ operating with amoral efficiency to perpetuate itself. By eliminating the defeated males’ offspring, born or unborn, the victorious animals hasten the day when the females can give birth to the new mates’ progeny.²⁵

Edward O. Wilson has pointed out that after the conquest of the Midianites, Moses gave his people “instructions identical in result to the aggression and genetic usurpation by male langur monkeys.”²⁶ The instructions were: “So kill all the male children. Kill also all the women who have slept with a man. Spare the lives only of the young girls who have not slept with a man, and take them for yourselves.”²⁷

Aggression evolves not as an ever-present biological process such as blood circulation, but as a contingency plan. An animal is programmed to respond in one or more complex ways to certain types of stress. Aggression typically is provoked by challenges from animals external to the group, as well as by competition for resources from within the group. As previously noted, in competition within a group the prizes are often food, territory or mates, all of which can be closely related to individual and genetic survival. Thus behavior in these areas should be highly susceptible to evolutionary selection.

However, little or no readily discernible evolutionary significance can be assigned to some apparently small proportion of violent incidents among animals. Ethological literature contains numerous examples of animal murder, with neither sex and no age group entirely immune from attack. Killings within a group may be as seemingly senseless as some human murders, having no obvious justification or motivation. Peter Viet, who studied mountain gorillas in Africa, has described the unprovoked fatal beating of an aging female by an adult male member of the same troop. The victim’s mate watched impassively as the aggressor continued the beating for hours, taking time out only for copulation with a young female. With respect to primate life, Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, a field researcher on langur behavior, says: “It’s a grisly existence, which I wouldn’t wish on my worst enemy.”²⁸

A second cliché akin to “only man kills his own kind” is the notion that “only man kills more game than he needs to eat.” Field studies of animal behavior have cut the ground from under both of these often repeated statements. Among other species, both lions and hyenas may kill any unlucky prey that happens along, whether or not the victim then constitutes a meal.

The Sociobiology of Homo Sapiens

For several decades after World War II, American behavioral scientists placed an unprecedented emphasis upon social environmental explanations

of human behavior. The question of the relative influence of heredity and environment has occupied great minds at least as far back as Aristotle and Confucius, but seldom if ever in the past did environmental theories so nearly displace biological or balanced theories. The ultimate expression of this trend is the *tabula rasa* theory, which in its most extreme form holds that each human baby comes into the world without significant behavioral predispositions based upon either species characteristics or family ancestry. Differing little from any other infant in developmental potentials, each “blank slate” will be written upon and molded by the surrounding social environment.

The more sweeping environmental theories have been increasingly challenged in recent years by a great proliferation of relevant research, particularly in ethology, sociobiology, behavioral genetics and brain biochemistry. Meanwhile, new studies have cast doubt on early anthropological research which laid much of the foundation for the extremes of environmental or cultural determinism. For example, a recent book²⁹ severely criticizes the research and writings of Margaret Mead about Samoan behavior. Mead was the most famous member of the “Boas school” of social anthropology, which led the assault on earlier partially biological theories of human behavior. Members of the Boas school often made their points through studies of obscure primitive peoples who seemed conveniently prone to act in such a way as to buttress the researchers’ preexisting notions about the infinite malleability of human behavior and the behavioral irrelevance of biological variables.

While a few academic exponents of *tabula rasa* and cultural determinism continue to fight, occasionally viciously, to uphold their theories, it seems clear that the tide has turned against them. The evidence in favor of a partially genetic explanation of human behavior has grown large and apparently incontrovertible in many specific areas, including schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis, alcoholism, mental retardation, intelligence, musical aptitude, various mental abilities and disabilities and numerous personality traits. Sociobiology also has won greater acceptance, as indicated by the awarding of a 1973 Nobel Prize to the three European ethologists and the awarding of a 1979 Pulitzer Prize to Edward O. Wilson for his book, *On Human Nature*.³⁰

In the decade after the Nobel Prize was won by Lorenz, Tinbergen and von Frisch, sociobiology advanced rapidly in sophistication as well as in public esteem. Related books and articles poured from the presses: television documentaries brought dominance, territoriality and imprinting into the American home in living color. More significantly, the field of sociobiology grew in content and in credibility, the latter particularly as research frequently verified specific hypotheses based on preexisting sociobiological theory. By the mid-1980s, the “naked ape” and the “featherless fowl” appeared poised to push *tabula rosa* into a well-deserved oblivion.

Although most sociobiologists were principally preoccupied with nonhuman species, few if any failed to see some applicability of their findings to their fellow humans. It seemed quite implausible to suspect that of all the earth’s creatures, only *homo sapiens* lacked a biogram or innate predisposition toward certain types of behavior. Such a view, in fact, appeared nonsensical because it would imply that humans had forever remained apart from and untouched by the natural forces that shaped all other species.

When sociobiologists began turning their attention to human behavior, it appeared obvious that a human biogram exists and, furthermore, that it includes many of the traits widely displayed by other species. In general,

sociobiologists portray *homo sapiens* as a hierarchical, territorial, aggressive, xenophobic being also characterized by gender inequality and leanings toward more or less permanent and monogamous mating systems. The sociobiologists' view of humankind is generally compatible with what other scholars know about human behavior through time and space.

Cultural anthropologists list among the widespread characteristics of human societies a status or dominance hierarchy, a territorial base, rejection of or differential treatment for outsiders, gender inequality and more or less permanent pair bonding. Likewise, history suggests that a status hierarchy of individuals and possibly of groups is virtually inevitably within a society, and that aggression and defense of territory are depressingly common. Sociologists are so aware of the importance of dominance hierarchies that social stratification has long been one of the major subfields of the discipline. A specific aspect of stratification is also the subject of another important sociological subfield, variously referred to as "race and ethnic relations," "minorities" or "race relations."

Homo sapiens is in fact one of the most intensely hierarchical of creatures. Most large societies function through bureaucratic structures-- industrial, governmental, academic or otherwise-- that bear considerable resemblance to the dominance orders of lower animals. Tables of organization typically spell out and illustrate graphically who is superior to whom. Written job descriptions and organizational handbooks frequently describe in excruciating detail who does what and to whom. Titles and often insignia, such as worn by military personnel, may communicate status to all observers. Less officially, status may be advertised to others by such generally recognized status symbols as clothing, cars and jewelry.

In most bureaucracies, status symbols, often petty in themselves, assume great importance. Typical examples include size and location of offices, reserved parking places, windows in offices, keys to the executive washroom, access to the executive dining room and, at the very top of the hierarchy, offices on "Mahogany Row," so called because of wood-paneled walls. It might be noted that many of these perquisites involve territorial access. And once an executive has gained a prestigious office he usually marks his territory with family photographs and other personal possessions much as a dog marks his territory with urine.

Although often less physically violent than among lower animals, dominance fights among adult humans are no less serious and may continue for years. A bureaucratic power struggle may contain elements of policy or ideological differences, but another crucial component usually is a battle for individual or group dominance. Such battles are particularly likely to occur when an alpha's position is vacated by death, demotion or retirement.

In much of the world even in modern times violent power struggles erupt periodically with control of the state the prize. During any one year more rulers are likely to be brought down by coups d'état than by the ballot box. In many countries, especially in Asia and Africa, the death of a ruler has often led to a prolonged period of bloodletting during which each of several aspirant alphas struggled to eliminate his rivals until such time as one seized power.

The ultimate extremes of human dominance fights manifest themselves occasionally in the wholesale slaughter of a population segment which a leader or conqueror believes constitutes a barrier to his consolidation of power. Major twentieth-century examples occurred in Communist China and the U.S.S.R. In China, the greatest massacres in human history killed an estimated 26,000,000 to 62,000,000 victims. A

Chinese Minister of Finance reportedly explained on a radio broadcast that millions had been liquidated “for a lasting peace, for a people’s democracy.”

Among the first groups eliminated by the Soviet Communists were the kulaks, the most prosperous four to five percent of the peasants. Because of their resistance to collectivization of farms, the kulaks were completely dispossessed, sometimes banished to forced labor camps, and often left to starve during a famine that killed several million in 1932-1933. In a reign of terror known as the Great Purge of 1936-1938, eight to ten million additional supposed enemies of the state were executed. The Nazi Holocaust is too well known to require a sad recital here. Impersonal enumerations of the victims of such enormous tragedies can hardly begin to suggest the underlying toll in terms of human terror, doomed hopes, shattered lives and broken families, to say nothing of the years of precarious grisly existence that must have been the lot of uncounted millions who escaped annihilation.

The most monstrous conqueror of earlier centuries was the Mongol Tamerlane, who massacred 100,000 prisoners in Delhi and 20,000 in Baghdad. In other captured cities he buried alive 4,000 Christian soldiers, built 2,000 prisoners into living mounds and then bricked them over, killed 70,000 prisoners and piled their heads into minarets, and built 20 towers of the skulls of defeated peoples. Many other conquerors have destroyed civilian populations on a smaller scale to remove obstacles to their control as well as to terrorize survivors into submission to the new rulers.

Interestingly, some types of human dominance-deference behavior patterns that reflect and communicate rank ordering are very reminiscent of those of animals. Everywhere a human alpha holds his head high and may raise himself higher by sitting on an elevated throne or riding on the back of an elephant. And everywhere his subordinates lower their heads with a bow or curtsy or even grovel in his presence. Reverence for a deity is shown similarly by kneeling, bowing the head or sometimes by crawling to a shrine. The virtual universality of such deference patterns among humans and the strong resemblance to comparable animal behavior strongly suggests that a biological foundation exists.

Besides formal bureaucracies, all sizeable societies have a comprehensive status structure in which each individual has a place. Public recognition of that fact in this country is indicated by continual and unchallenged references to social classes, commonly designated as the lower, middle and upper classes. As is true of animals, human status is subject to change, is sometimes situational and may be partly hereditary. And always it determines many aspects of an individual’s life.

Not only individuals but also groups may have differential status in a society. Low status is particularly likely to be accorded to minority racial or ethnic groups with visible, long-lasting differences in appearance, language or culture. Historically, both slaves and human sacrifices were often drawn from groups different from the majority. Outsiders such as Jews and Gypsies have been subjected to various kinds of special rules in numerous countries.

Like animals, humans show a strong tendency to live in groups comprised of individuals with similar characteristics. Traditionally sociologists have defined a society as a group of people sharing a comprehensive culture with a common language, common goals and common values and attitudes. These shared characteristics encourage national unity and tend to minimize the degree and divisiveness of disagreements over public policy. The significance of a common culture is revealed in

sociological writings about “anomie,” an undesirable societal condition in which individuals are confused, depressed and demoralized by normlessness, conflicting values or a lack of respect for traditional values.

Sociologist Ian Robertson says the result of such normlessness “is a deep psychological disturbance at the individual level . . . and if individual anomie is widespread, disorder at the societal level.” A precondition for the individual’s successful integration into his society is that social norms “should form a consistent and coherent value system,” Robertson says.³¹ The popular term “alienation” is somewhat similar to the sociological concept of anomie. A highly diverse multicultural society would seem to be a fertile breeding ground for anomie and alienation but not for the “consistent and coherent value system” needed for individual and social integration.

The general unwillingness of distinct peoples to submerge themselves in a larger order appears to have blighted post-World War II hopes for a United States of Europe, a proposed solution to the problem of warring nations. Ironically, as visionaries dreamed of such goals as a united Europe or a world government, the dominant emerging trend was toward demands for smaller units representing previously submerged ethnic groups. Colonial yokes were thrown off around the world, and postcolonial governments sometimes acted to rid themselves of their own minorities, as in the Ugandan expulsion of Asians. Independence movements sprang up in many unlikely places, including Quebec, Wales, Scotland, Pakistan and the Basque region.

Probably all peoples have distinguished between the in-group and the out-group -- between what they regarded as “us” and “them.” Very often the out-group is defined as inferior or even as less than human, a definition reflected in the tendency of primitive peoples to give themselves names literally translated as “the men.” Such distinctions frequently go along with “tribal ethics” which prescribe a higher morality in dealing with members of the tribe than with outsiders. Another example of the tendency to denigrate outsiders is the word “barbarian,” which to the ancient Greeks literally meant foreigner. The present connotation of barbarian presumably reflects the undesirable traits the Greeks ascribed to non-Greeks.

Xenophobia or rejection of the outsider thus appears to be as widespread in human societies as among lower animals. Recent illustrations of that point have included the slaughter of thousands of people from Bangladesh who had migrated into a neighboring section of India, and the expulsion of a multitude of Ghanians from Nigeria. In Sri Lanka hundreds were killed in race riots involving the Buddhist Sinhalese and the Hindu Tamils, a minority with a growing separatist movement. Tension continues on Cyprus, where Greek and Turkish ethnic groups have traditionally identified with the mother countries rather than with each other. The Middle East remains a perennial hotbed of conflict between Arabs and Jews and between Moslems and Christians. And Northern Ireland is still the scene of violent struggles between two groups whose close biological relatedness has been overshadowed by religious differences.

Some social scientists have regarded human aggression as abnormal neurotic behavior and have constructed ingenious if untenable hypotheses to explain our frequent lapses from the altruistic cooperation they consider normal. Actually, some degree of group cooperation is required for all social animals, but the individual often must advance or protect his own personal interests through competition or conflict. In nature, nice guys not only finish last, but also leave few descendants.

Aggression appears to be a basic characteristic of nearly all species,

involving a set of evolutionary potentials which may appear in response to threats to self-interest. Expression of aggression in lower animals as well as in man is influenced by learning, hormones and situational factors. For humans the situational factors include historical background, culture and social roles.

All societies have moral codes intended to keep intragroup aggression at an acceptably low level. In advanced societies, complex legal codes supplement the moral codes in banning unacceptable types of aggression. The frequency of violations of both moral and legal codes is suggested by the wide variety of labels used to describe intragroup aggression: murder, manslaughter, rape, assault, battery, robbery, fraud, arson, kidnapping, wife abuse, child abuse, race riot, gang war, massacre, bullying, atrocity, sibling rivalry, schoolboy fights, etc.

But it is in intergroup aggression that the greatest mayhem occurs. History gives little support to those who regard human aggression as an aberration. It has been calculated that of the last 3,500 years only 230 years saw peace throughout the civilized world. Sorokin's survey of 1,000 years of European history revealed that on the average the 11 countries studied had been at war 46 percent of the time.³²

Furthermore, even without modern weapons of destruction, many wars were incredibly bloody. During the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century, one-third of the population of Europe was hacked or bludgeoned to death, according to some estimates. A century ago in this hemisphere, 84 percent of the population of Paraguay died in a war with other South American countries. At the end of the war less than 30,000 adult men remained in the country and Paraguayan women outnumbered men nearly ten to one. More recently, 22 percent of the population of Poland died during World War II.

One interesting aspect of aggression is the fascination it holds for even the most peaceable humans. Every newspaper editor knows he can sell more papers with accounts of murders and riots than with thoughtful analyses of the trade imbalance, even though the trade deficit may detrimentally affect numerous readers. And every television executive knows that over the decades two major staples in fictional fare have been western and crime dramas, despite reformers' periodic demands for less violence. Another major preoccupation of the American public has been sporting events such as football, boxing, wrestling and hockey, which often feature formalized violence. Actual fighting among hockey players reportedly has been encouraged by some managements because it dramatically increases rinkside or television audiences.

Many other nations are also addicted to similar sports and sometimes to even gorier ones like bullfighting and cockfighting. With reference to the past, the list can be extended to include such spectacles as public executions, human sacrifices and gladiatorial battles. Although no generally accepted answer exists for the question of why we so adore fictionalized or formalized aggression, it appears likely that vicariously experienced violence in some way taps into our inherent but relatively unutilized potential for aggressive behavior. Significantly, fans of violent sports are disproportionately male, which is compatible with the biological fact that in practically all species males are more aggressive than females.

Group aggression and territoriality are often closely related. A human society normally occupies a geographical territory which it stands ready to defend against all comers. It is a truism that people will fight tenaciously and to the death to defend what they identify as their own territory.

Wars often appear to be analogous to fights between groups of lower animals over territory. Human armies may be doing on a much larger and

more technologically advanced scale what baboons are doing when one troop fights another over an acre of jungle real estate. Some scholars believe population pressures and territorial needs are a real cause of war, and the supporting evidence seems incontrovertible in numerous specific instances.

Territorial gain for the victor is a common result of war, and territorial need is a common justification for aggression, as in Hitler's demand for *lebensraum* (living space). Contemporary conflict in the Middle East has as a root cause the competing claims of two groups, each of which identifies a particular territory as its homeland. Historians say population pressure and consequent territorial needs loomed large in the motivations for one of the world's most momentous aggressions, the Norman Conquest of England.

Human societies typically define their geographical boundaries precisely, although overlapping claims sometimes lead to border skirmishes with neighboring countries. Boundaries are likely to be marked with fences, walls or other indicators and often follow at least in part natural barriers such as rivers. Entry into a strange territory as a visitor almost invariably requires advance permission from the host country and compliance with prescribed formalities. Entering another country as a long-term resident or as a prospective citizen is usually more difficult and may well be impossible.

An individual human identifies not only with his society's territory but also with his own piece of turf. In virtually all societies each family occupies a private residence, whether a house, apartment, igloo, hut or a room or two in a larger unit. A more or less universal etiquette requires an outsider to ask and receive permission before entering the home of another. The permission typically extends only to the living room or comparable area, and a guest must seek further permission to go into another room, such as a bathroom or bedroom. The expression, "A man's home is his castle," reflects a widespread reality. Rather commonly, even police are prohibited from entering a home without proper legal authorization, which will not be granted frivolously.³³

A citizen of a large country may have an intense territorial identification with a unit whose size falls somewhere between his own home and the country as a whole. Such a unit may be a city, an abstract area like "the South," or in this country a state. In the last category, native Texans are justly famous for their pride in their own land. Territorial feelings are often celebrated in national anthems and other songs.

Territory serves similar functions for humans and for lower animals. Once a territory has been established, competition with outsiders for its resources is minimized. Those resources enable the residents to carry out the essential activities of life, which are much the same for humans and lower animals -- acquiring food and shelter, mating and rearing offspring.

The Sociobiology of U.S. Immigration

What happens to a territorial, hierarchical, xenophobic and aggressive group when it faces the prospect of becoming a submerged minority in a land controlled by its ancestors for the greater part of the past four centuries?

Minority status could become a reality for the white non-Hispanic population of the United States in less than a century, even if immigration levels are reduced somewhat below the estimated present totals of legal and illegal entrants. The authoritative population projections³⁴ upon which this statement is based assume that immigrants will continue to come predominantly from Third World countries, that their age ranges

will remain relatively unchanged, and that their fertility rates will decline slowly to below replacement level by the year 2030. Many scholars would argue that a decline in fertility probably would occur more slowly, and that the projected proportion of white non-Hispanics in the total population is thus overestimated for the next century.

The projections by Leon F. Bouvier and Cary B. Davis use two different estimates for average annual immigration into the United States. These are 1.5 million and 1 million per year, the former near the high end of most estimates of recent legal and illegal immigration and the latter figure near the low end of such estimates. Because the annual flow of illegal aliens has increased steadily for a decade and probably totals, when combined with 700,000 legal admissions, another 2 million in 1984, the projections of Bouvier and Davis, based upon 1.5 million immigrants a year, are almost certainly too conservative.

If immigration were to remain near the 1.5 million figure, the white non-Hispanic group will become a minority by the year 2060. If immigration is instead around 1 million per year, the white non-Hispanics will remain a statistical majority until 2080. Since immigrants settle disproportionately in certain states, white non-Hispanics will be outnumbered in those states well before the population transition occurs in the country as a whole, according to the Bouvier-Davis projections.

Assuming only 1 million immigrants per year, the white non-Hispanic population will become a minority in New York, Texas and Florida before 2040. In California, the shift away from a white non-Hispanic majority will occur well before the end of this century, at which time the former majority will constitute only slightly more than 40 percent of the state's population. A frequently repeated remark is that within the next decade California will become the country's first Third World state.

If the startling projected transformation of the American population occurs, it will result from our continued failure to assess the immigration problem and take control of our own borders, which a recent U.S. Attorney General admitted are "out of control." Most estimates indicate that the 600,000 to 800,000 legal immigrants we accept each year are now outnumbered by illegal entrants. The uninvited flood may well grow, pulled by the magnet of a wealthy country with virtually open borders and promises of amnesty for those already here, and pushed from Third World countries by the lack of jobs for rapidly increasing numbers of young people. Despite a prudently low fertility rate in the United States, the Third World population bomb will explode here, too.

Public opinion polls have repeatedly found that overwhelming majorities of Americans want more restricted immigration and secure borders. But as in the case of budgetary deficits, Congress has been reluctant to take the necessary steps because of the political sensitivity of the issue due to the influence of special interest groups. Meanwhile, the average citizen is only beginning to comprehend the scope of the projected population changes.

Sociobiology suggests a cluster of answers, ranging from unpleasant to appalling, to the question of what a dominant, territorial, xenophobic and aggressive population group will do when its status and territory are seriously threatened by outsiders. One might summarize probabilities by predicting that if the threat grows and is more clearly understood, the present majority of non-Hispanic whites will become increasingly territorial, xenophobic and aggressive, and will devote more of its energies to dominance contests with the challenging population groups. Such a suggestion probably places one's crystal ball at little risk because it is supported by much research in sociology as well as in sociobiology.

Furthermore, the beginnings of the projected trends are already visible.

The scenarios summarized below are based on an assumption that present American immigration policy--or lack of policy-- will remain in effect indefinitely with only minor cosmetic changes or with poorly enforced changes which have little impact. The scenarios are actually projections of the results of present policy rather than predictions, because it is possible but by no means certain that an outraged public will force strong government action to secure the borders before the worst scenario unfolds. Other relevant factors also could change in unpredictable ways.

If present immigration policies and trends continue, a battle for ethnic dominance will preoccupy the country for decades, possibly for a century or more. Early battles will center around control of governmental units at all levels. Later, scattered violent incidents could grow in number and intensity. Finally, guerrilla warfare could engulf whole regions and lead eventually to dismemberment of the United States. For a quick preview of what could await your children and grandchildren, tune in to the next scheduled TV documentary on the modern history of Lebanon.

Bloc voting by racial and religious minorities has been a feature of the American political scene since the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, but in earlier decades their numbers were not large enough to control without a coalition with other groups, often white Southerners with an emotional attachment to the Democratic party. This situation is gradually changing as Third World peoples become an ever-growing element in the electorate. Jesse Jackson's call for a "rainbow coalition" of black, brown and other minorities in 1984 probably was too early to have a major national impact, but this is a portent of the future.

Both black and Hispanic minorities are having increasing success in electing their own to federal, state and local offices in areas where they predominate. Evidence of white voting on a racial basis is spottier, but apparently appeared in the 1980s in several mayoral races, most notably in Chicago, where Harold Washington reportedly was elected by a largely black vote while white Democrats deserted in droves to the Republican candidate. Bloc voting by whites can be expected to accelerate in the future in reaction to perceived threats to their interests.

Ethnic group sparring in the political arena will also make extensive use of pressure tactics intended to persuade public officials to vote for favored policies. Existing examples of such policies include "affirmative action" programs which, in effect, often encourage preferential hiring of minorities to the detriment of white males, and what has been called "affirmative gerrymandering" of voting districts to maximize minority voting strength.^{35,36} The recent restructuring of the Civil Rights Commission brought into the open the desire of some minority leaders to supplement "affirmative action" hiring with actual quotas which would distribute jobs on the basis of population numbers.

More broadly speaking, welfare and redistribution programs generally benefit minorities more than the majority. Attempts to curtail such programs typically bring forth almost instant denunciations from minority spokespersons. Hispanic groups have also exerted heavy pressure to tailor immigration policies to their own tastes. After a "summit conference" early in 1984, leaders of the nation's major Hispanic organizations warned congressional Democrats of possible retaliation at the polls in the event of passage of a pending immigration bill which conservatives attacked as too solicitous of Hispanic interests, particularly in granting amnesty to illegal aliens, whose numbers are estimated to be at least 5.5 million and possibly as high as 15 million. Hispanic groups objected to

this bill, the Simpson-Mazzoli bill, because of its provisions authorizing worker identification cards and penalizing employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens.

Litigation will remain one of the country's major growth industries, with much activity related to precise definitions of civil rights. Hispanic activists have threatened to make greater use of multiple civil rights suits to tie up immigration officials. However, as compared with earlier years, a larger proportion of civil rights litigation will be on behalf of whites claiming reverse discrimination or challenging the principle of differential treatment based on group membership. Busing to achieve integrated schools, already opposed by large majorities of both blacks and whites, will continue to preoccupy federal judges.

As the battle for group dominance escalates, xenophobia will mount in the major population groups. A normal accompaniment of a xenophobic rejection of outsiders is a strengthened identification with one's own group, and this too is already appearing. The religious ideal of universal brotherhood may be supplanted by "universal otherhood" for persons outside one's own group.

Intensified xenophobia combined with in-group pride is clearly visible in both majority and minority groups. Among Hispanics, the drive for bilingualism is a significant indicator. Until recently the necessity of quick adoption and general use of English had been accepted by practically all immigrants. However, some Hispanic groups now advocate long-term or permanent use of Spanish in schools and other public agencies, and agitation is heard for the establishment of two legal languages, English and Spanish.

The drive for bilingual education has succeeded to the extent that the federal government supports it with \$200,000,000 a year. Less enthusiastically and less successfully, blacks have sometimes called for the use of colloquial "black English" in predominantly minority schools. A somewhat related phenomenon is ethnic studies -- usually courses in Black Studies, Chicano Studies or Holocaust Studies -- which are sometimes short on academic content and long on group chauvinism.

With less fanfare, group identification is growing among white Americans. A significant indicator here is the growing search for roots in historical and genealogical research. A traveling American who has failed to notice the "roots" movement at home is likely to fall over it in Europe in the form of other Americans searching for ancestral records, tombs and homes. A Nordic revival is underway with the writing of new books and the reprinting of old ones about the history, literature, archaeology and anthropology of Northwest Europe. Several periodicals publish similar materials on a more or less regular basis. And Odinism, the old Scandinavian religion, has reappeared spottily in the United States.

A recent resurgence of ethnic humor of a type hardly heard in public for half a century presumably stems at least in part from widespread xenophobia. In the mid-1980s, a number of popular joke books³⁷ could qualify for an "equal opportunity" label in that collectively they libel practically all sizeable ethnic groups. Such books are generally available in book stores, supermarkets and pharmacies. Some are the products of well-known publishers, and the sale of at least one such book topped one million copies.

Targets of the joke books include blacks, Italians, Poles, Irish, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Gypsies, Vietnamese, Greeks, Arabs, Chinese, WASPs, Russians, Argentines, Mexicans, Spaniards, Czechs, Yugoslavs, Hungarians, Scots and Indians. Among the characteristics ascribed to one or

more groups are stupidity, lack of sanitation, low sexual morals and dishonesty. During the same period, derogatory comments about minorities were broadcast frequently by radio stations in several sections of the United States. Meanwhile, research for the CBS television network found that the categories of people most disliked by viewers were Jews, divorcees, men with mustaches and New Yorkers.³⁸

Increased xenophobia may also be reflected in the apparently growing tendency toward ethnically related reactions to specific crimes and police actions. For example, the national news media reported in 1984 that New Bedford, Massachusetts, had been ethnically polarized by the gang rape of a young woman by Portuguese immigrants. The case inspired widespread and unfavorable discussions of group differences in values and sexual mores. A Portuguese immigrant unconnected with the crime told a national television audience that the native New Englanders want to send back home all of New Bedford's large Portuguese immigrant group. Earlier, the murder of a number of black children in Atlanta stirred anti-white feelings in the black community prior to the arrest and conviction of a black man for the crimes. Jesse Jackson undoubtedly voiced the suspicions of many others in commenting that it was "open season" on blacks in Atlanta.

When xenophobia is rampant, any major disturbing incident can touch off an outbreak of actual aggression against an out-group. In recent years two such outbreaks have occurred in the predominantly black areas of Miami. In December 1982, rock throwing and looting by angry crowds in the Overtown section followed the shooting of a black youth by a Hispanic policeman. It was reported that whites unlucky enough to be passing through the area at the time were randomly pulled from their cars or seized on the streets and violently attacked. The policeman's acquittal on a manslaughter charge led to further looting in March 1984. Four years earlier, eighteen persons died and about 240 businesses were damaged or destroyed in a rampage in Liberty City, two miles from Overtown, after a jury acquitted four white policemen who had been accused of fatally beating a black man. Witnesses reported that one black man ran his car repeatedly over the unconscious body of a white man while a crowd cheered him on. Blacks also slashed away the tongue and one ear of another white man who had been caught in the riot area.

Interracial violence also has appeared in prisons and in military units. More than one large prison reportedly has been terrorized by rival gangs of blacks, whites and Hispanics. The U.S. Navy has admitted the occurrence of significant interracial conflict aboard one of its ships. Particularly disturbing rumors during the Vietnamese War suggested the possibility that white officers were sometimes deliberately killed in combat areas by black enlisted men.

The occurrences referred to above are illustrations rather than exhaustive listings of indicators of growing xenophobia and group-related aggression in the United States. Violent incidents occur sporadically in many schools, and "gang wars" break out occasionally in urban areas. Murders as well as other crimes sometimes appear to be at least partially motivated by intergroup hostilities, but most are unpublicized outside of local areas and details may be omitted by the news media to avoid inflaming public opinion.

Possibly the most ominous portent of civil strife in our future is the tendency for xenophobia and territoriality to merge into separatism and irredentism in the minds of Hispanics in the Southwest. The term irredentism is derived from the Italian *irredenta* (unredeemed) and came into use in connection with nineteenth-century Italian calls for the annexation

of Italian-speaking regions under Austrian or Swiss rule. History has witnessed many other demands, successful or unsuccessful, for reunification of an ethnic group divided by the boundaries of two adjacent countries. One of the most fateful of the past century was the pan-German movement which affected Germans living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and contributed to the rise of National Socialism in Germany.

Hispanic demands for control of the American Southwest appear already in such publications as the *Chicano Manifesto*,³⁹ which includes calls for an independent mestizo nation of Aztlan on the “Bronze Continent.” Aztlan refers to the mythical northwestern home of the Aztec Indians who controlled a Mexican empire prior to its conquest by Cortez in 1519. The *Manifesto* declares that the “northern land of Aztlan” belongs to the Chicanos rather than the “foreign Europeans. “This claim is supported by revisionist histories such as Rudolfo Acuna’s *Occupied America: The Chicano’s Struggle Toward Liberation*,⁴⁰ which compares the Mexican-American War with Hitler’s invasion of Poland and describes the Anglo-Texans’ treatment of the Mexican as violent and inhumane. Chicano claims to the American Southwest probably would be as ephemeral as earlier black demands for a homeland in the Deep South except for one critical factor. That factor is the projected majority status of Hispanics in the Southwestern states in the reasonably near future.

If Hispanics become a numerical majority in all or large parts of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California, it is predictable that separatist sentiment will grow as it has among the French-speaking majority of Quebec. Scholars and journalists in fact sometimes refer to the Southwest as the U.S.’s future Quebec. But the situation in the Southwest is vastly more complex in that many Chicanos have close relatives in Mexico and have lived there or visited frequently, while the great majority of French-Canadians have had more than two centuries of family continuity in Quebec and little personal contact with France. Furthermore, Hispanics in the Southwest are across a river rather than across an ocean from their homeland. The geographical proximity of Mexico would make it easy for the Hispanic majority to swell in numbers, to reinvigorate its roots by traveling between the two countries, and to become the target of agitators and demagogues on both sides of the border, as well as the focal point of strained relations between the U.S. and Latin America.

Such circumstances might well encourage a separatism more militant than Quebec’s. At the least, majority population status would insure a considerable degree of cultural and political autonomy, even within the United States. But demands could well intensify for either reunion with Mexico or establishment of an independent Hispanic country in the Southwest. A widespread Hispanic desire for either independence or reunification could create a challenge comparable to the Southern secession crisis that led to the Civil War.

How would the U.S. react to such a challenge? Press, politicians and public alike are now highly attuned to the wishes of ethnic minorities. And much earlier in this century we fought a European war in which one of our primary goals was self-determination for minorities. Would we use force to prevent a Southwestern secession in the face of predictable hostility from much of Latin America and the United Nations? A forcible attempt to prevent the splitting off of a united and geographically concentrated group could lead to a prolonged period of conflict marked by terrorist attacks on government buildings and officials, as well as on opponents of separatism. The issue could divide the rest of the public, with some opting to “preserve the Union” at any price and others

favoring splitting it in the interests of perceived justice, the restoration of “domestic tranquility,” or the removal of a minority threat to the status of a non-Hispanic majority in the country as a whole.

Several types of apparent threats to non-Hispanic whites might engender willingness to grant independence to a Hispanic Southwest. Such a move might give the majority a breathing spell by postponing the time when it would be outnumbered by Third World peoples. It might also alleviate a perceived threat of internal subversion, which some observers fear will emanate from a more radicalized Mexico and Central America in the future. Further, secession of the Southwest might remove a bloc of voters who were pushing national policies toward goals most non-Hispanics did not share.

A divided public would likely have no stomach for forcible preservation of the Union. But the decision might be based in part on the value placed at the time on Southwestern industry, as well as such natural resources as Texas oil, Arizona copper and California farmland. Another critical factor might be the size of the remaining non-Hispanic white population in the Southwest and the depth of its desire to retain its American identity.

These non-Hispanic whites undoubtedly will be key combatants in the dominance struggles that can be expected to result from uncontrolled immigration. The folklore and to a great extent the reality of the Southwest -- most notably Texas -- is of a breed of strong, dominant, independent men who wrested wealth from an inhospitable desert that would have defeated less heroic figures. The descendants of such men are unlikely to watch passively as control of their territory is seized by outsiders, and could resort to such tactics as guerrilla warfare.

However, humans, like many other animals, are biologically programmed to choose between “fight” or “flight” when faced with a threatening situation. During the early stages of the coming transformation of the U.S. population, some Southwesterners might conclude that northward or eastward flight would provide an easy answer to the problem of an increasingly alien environment. Although evidence of an emerging trend toward non-Hispanic white flight is relatively insubstantial and largely anecdotal, such a possibility is suggested by the history of white flight from black-dominated areas in Northern cities. If a similar pattern develops in areas favored by Third World immigrants, the Southwest could be subject to something resembling the slow economic decay seen earlier in Northern inner cities. Other areas of the U.S. could benefit economically from a partial reversal of the recent trend toward movement of population and industry from the Frostbelt to the Sunbelt. Ultimately, large-scale non-Hispanic white flight from the Southwest could result in a de facto Mexican reconquest, possibly followed by a formal separation from the United States.

Once a break in the Union occurred, Balkanization might well follow. Part or all of the Deep South might “rise again” and finish the job abandoned more than a century ago. Portions of New England and the Midwest might become a remnant country dominated by descendants of old Americans, while Southern Florida might become another Hispanic nation. Such speculation about possible fragmentation of the once United States is not entirely far-fetched in view of the profound and declining lack of confidence in American institutions and leaders found by pollsters during the last two decades.⁴¹

As mind-boggling as the idea may be when first encountered, Balkanization of the U.S. is not even the “worst case” scenario in regard to the possible results of uncontrolled immigration. A worse horror, which

might precede dissolution, would be a more or less permanent state of armed conflict between ethnic groups. This might take the form of either civil war or guerrilla warfare, characterized by political assassinations, terrorist bombings, kidnappings, looting, arson and unprovoked attacks on random individuals and families. As previously noted, in many parts of the world such ethnic hostilities have continued intermittently for generations or even centuries. In regard to the United States, we might remember that Indian-white struggles extended across the continent over a period of 250 years. A final chilling thought is that internal breakdown in a society is often followed by foreign invasion.

If massive Third World immigration remains unchecked, even the 'best case' scenario is unpleasant. Balkanization might be averted because the Hispanic majority in the Southwest wished the tangible benefits of American citizenship while retaining much of its own culture and language. Our governmental system gives the majority in a state much leeway in determining its laws, language and culture. Thus a Hispanic majority in the Southwest could create a genuine, largely autonomous "New Mexico" within the United States, but with American citizenship intact. Furthermore, bloc voting by Hispanics could win special favors through the sometimes disproportionate influence the group could wield in national elections. And national political control might eventually be achieved by a "rainbow coalition" of Third World peoples in which Hispanics formed the largest element.

But almost inevitably the population would be deeply divided into competing groups, each attempting to advance its own interests in the courts and through legislative bodies. Although the trauma of constitutional changes probably would be necessary, civil strife might be reduced by allocating political offices, jobs, professional school enrollments and other valuable benefits on the basis of group quotas rather than individual merit.⁴² Lebanon and South Africa are two examples of countries that have opted for political systems based frankly upon ethnic group membership. In a large country like the United States, widespread use of quotas would mean an administrative nightmare which would lead to more rigid and intrusive government controls. An authoritarian government might eventually emerge and be accepted as the only reasonable alternative to unbearable strife.

Human Behavior Validates Sociobiology

The scenarios sketched above will strike some as far too pessimistic. Optimists might suggest that mutual tolerance and goodwill may eventually enable numerous diverse groups to live together in peace, and that time will blur -- if not melt -- cultural and racial differences sufficiently that their importance will diminish or disappear. Unfortunately, neither history nor sociological research offers significant support for such optimism.

While individual sociologists may talk glibly about such alleged benefits of immigration as "cultural diversity," both history and the bulk of sociological research indicate that mutual tolerance and goodwill are usually sorely lacking when diverse groups try to live together in a democratic country. Sociologists have searched long and industriously in an effort to find contrary evidence in the form of a democratic society with ethnic groups but no "ethnic group problem." A commonly cited example is Switzerland, where the population is divided into four language groups, about 65 percent German, 18 percent French, 12 percent Italian and one percent Romansch. The country is also divided religiously into Protestant and Catholic groups with approximately equal numbers.

However, the Swiss experience has limited applicability elsewhere because of certain unique factors. One is that many Swiss cantons are quite homogeneous linguistically and religiously. Moreover, Switzerland is a confederation in which the central government has responsibility for foreign affairs and the cantons have almost absolute independence in internal matters. These two factors decidedly limit the potential areas of group conflict and dominance struggle. The situation is quite different in the United States, where a strong federal government has insinuated itself into almost every nook and cranny of each individual's affairs, and redistributes much of the national product as benefits to special interest groups with political clout.

Furthermore, there has been much more animosity among the *edelweiss* than is generally appreciated. The First Civil War occurred in 1443, and thereafter internal hostilities erupted often enough that it is difficult to decide exactly how many additional civil wars followed. For three centuries after 1531, one historian writes, "religion so divided the Swiss people that cooperation was hardly possible."⁴³ Armed conflict over religious issues broke out in 1712. In 1847, the Catholic cantons seceded and formed a separate union named the Sonderbund. After the Sonderbund War, the new constitution of 1848 reunited the country but specifically excluded the Jesuit religious order. As recently as 1979, the new French-speaking canton of Jura was created as a result of more or less violent demands by a French-speaking, Catholic minority which had felt its interests threatened by the German-speaking, Protestant majority of Bern.

Belgium, another ethnic composite, made up of Dutch-speaking Flemings and French-speaking Walloons, is attempting to reduce chronic political and civil strife by transferring much of the power of the central government to Flemish and Wallonian regional councils. A Swiss-type solution based on a weak, decentralized confederation of the strife-ridden ethnic groups has also been proposed for Lebanon by members of the outnumbered Christian group.⁴⁴

Americans who wish to consider Switzerland or Belgium as a model for our multiracial, multicultural society should bear in mind that the long-continued conflict in those countries involves only two ethnic groups in Belgium and three major ones in Switzerland. All groups are predominantly Christian, all are of the same race, all are offshoots of relatively advanced European peoples with related cultural backgrounds, and in Belgium almost all (97 percent) are Catholic. If similarities of such magnitude cannot assure peaceful, cooperative relationships, and conflict is virtually universal elsewhere in ethnically mixed societies, can we realistically foresee ethnic harmony in the United States?

Intergroup antagonism is not only almost universal in ethnically mixed societies, but it is also remarkably enduring, as illustrated by the history of Switzerland. Not uncommonly, specific types of ethnic group friction continue for centuries, sometimes in the face of multiple changes in national sovereignty, boundaries and political systems. Even granting the strong possibility of an inherent human tendency toward xenophobic reactions, why is intergroup hostility so widespread and so persistent? At least a partial answer to that question may be that a group often feels realistically that its interests are threatened by another group or groups.

Like lower animals, humans compete for control of scarce resources and that competition often involves groups as well as individuals. An influential sociological insight about a condition promoting conflict within a social system is Emile Durkheim's notion of "moral density," which among other things refers to the number of people competing for

the same scarce privileges.⁴⁵ Other sociologists have extended the concept to such areas as Irish, Italian and Polish competition for control of the Catholic church in America,⁴⁶ and Chicano and Anglo competition for land use in the Southwest, where the Chicanos may wish to graze sheep on land middle-class Anglos would prefer to use for their own recreation.⁴⁷ The same principle applies to desires for jobs, housing and governmental favors.

Another type of perceived threat might be based on the fear that under certain conditions ethnic group members might be more loyal to their fellows outside a country than to the country in which they are living. This attitude in the U.S. led to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War H. Currently, and less dramatically, fears are sometimes expressed that Irish Americans are too supportive of IRA terrorists and that parts of the Jewish community may place Israeli interests above those of the United States.⁴⁸ At least potentially, the foreign loyalties of multiple ethnic groups could seriously interfere with a country's conduct of diplomatic and military affairs. The head of the FBI commented recently that he expects future terrorist problems in the U.S. to be inspired largely by grievances brought into this country from abroad. As an example, the Armenian charge of genocide against the Turks apparently has been related to violence in the United States.

Control of governmental policies and agencies is a major prize for which ethnic groups often compete in realistic pursuit of their own interests. A strong central government can bestow wealth and privileges on the favored and take them away from the disfavored, sometimes without regard to abstract issues of fairness and justice. In a democratic system, relative numbers of various groups are highly significant in the political arena. A contemporary illustration of the significance of numbers is Lebanon, where one of several destabilizing factors has been the Moslem population's growth from minority to majority status in recent decades. As previously noted, at some future time in the United States, the white non-Hispanic electorate may be outvoted by a "rainbow coalition" of minorities with a different agenda.

But why does a society split more or less permanently along ethnic lines? A few decades ago it was fashionable for social reformers in the United States to assure the public that racial and ethnic group differences amount to no more than "paint jobs," which are insignificant except as signals to bigots. It is, of course, true that group differences in physical appearance and language in themselves should have little or no long-term significance, but what is crucially important is that observable differences tend to be accompanied by persistent differences in values, beliefs and moral judgments. Such cultural differences may mean that a society's subgroups lack a workable consensus about the ultimate questions of life, as well as about any number of questions of taste, ethical standards and institutional arrangements. One group may realistically feel that many things it considers sacred, sensible, right or proper are threatened by the behavior of another group.

The astonishing persistence of cultural elements in a population and its descendants elsewhere is well illustrated by a long-term comparison of governmental institutions in three broad areas of the world: sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the English-speaking countries. On the basis of an ethnographic survey of all the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa, the well-known anthropologist, George Peter Murdock, labelled the basic form of government as the 'African despotism.' Major characteristics include monarchical (or chiefly) absolutism, the monarch's right of eminent domain over land and livestock, distinctive royal insignia of

office, elaborate courts, proliferation of titles, extensive security provisions for the monarch, anarchic periods between rulers, lack of binding rules of succession, human sacrifice, and other brutal treatment of subordinates or captives.

Murdock writes: "It is though all of Africa south of the Sahara were Permeated . . . by a mental blueprint of a despotic political structure, transmitted from generation to generation as a part of traditional verbal culture, and always available to be transmuted into reality. . . ."49 Such despotic governments flourished in the more developed areas of pre-colonial Africa and, despite high hopes for democratic regimes in the new independent states, reversion to at least a pale copy of the African despotism was common. Instability or a one-party system often appeared, sometimes along with brutality and corruption. Among others, Idi Amin, president of Uganda from 1971 to 1979, created a reasonable facsimile of the African despotism. He declared himself president for life, abolished the parliament, and purged the judiciary and civil service. During his reign of terror, 300,000 Ugandans were killed, 250,000 fled to Kenya, and others lived in exile in Great Britain. Amin also detained American Peace Corps members and was accused of cannibalism and other atrocities.

Haiti, an African offshoot in the New World, has faithfully reproduced many unfortunate aspects of the African despotism. Of the 16 rulers who held office between 1843 and 1911, eleven were overthrown by revolution. Between 1911 and 1915, one Haitian president was blown up in his palace, one died by poison, and three were overthrown by revolution. In 1915, a mob butchered the then president. The next day American marines occupied the country and stayed until 1934, after which the earlier pattern combining tyranny and anarchy resumed. In 1957, the Haitians elected as president Francois Duvalier, who granted himself lifetime tenure and won a worldwide reputation as a rapacious tyrant.

With few exceptions, South and Central American countries have been scarred at least intermittently by a pattern of coup and counter-coup, revolution, authoritarianism, military government, political killing and civil rights abuse that might be labeled the "Latin American instability." In Bolivia in 1980 a general seized power in the 189th coup in the country's 155 years of independence. Between 1825 and 1980, Bolivia had more than 60 revolutions, 70 presidents and 11 constitutions. Similarly, from 1821 to 1877, Mexico had a new government on the average of once every nine months. Elsewhere in Latin America, governmental upheaval sometimes came less often but the result was usually a more or less authoritarian regime which did comparatively little to improve the lot of the average citizen.

Not surprisingly, such governmental instability has not usually provided fertile ground for economic prosperity. In recent years triple-digit and even quadruple-digit inflation has devastated several countries including Mexico, Uruguay, Argentina and Bolivia, where the figure may soon top 2,000 percent.⁵⁰ Although by the early 1980s Mexico was the world's fifth largest oil producer, the number of unemployed and underemployed exceeded 50 percent of the labor force and the large peasant population was only marginally better off than in 1910.

Spain, the European country with the greatest influence on the cultures of Latin America, has likewise been plagued by violence and instability. Pitirim Sorokin's historical survey of the incidence of wars in eleven European countries determined that Spain topped the list, having been at war during 67 percent of the years between 1476 and 1925. The median incidence for the eleven countries was 46 percent.⁵¹ Since 1925 Spain has

experienced a short-lived workers' republic, dictatorship, monarchy, civil war, a recent attempted military coup and violent separatist movements by Catalonian and Basque nationalists.

The general fate of mankind is in fact unstable and unrepresentative government. Long-term stable and representative government, unbroken by either external conquest or internal break in legitimate succession, is virtually a monopoly of the English-speaking peoples plus a few culturally and biologically related Western Europeans. The oldest unbroken representative regime⁵² in the world is Great Britain's, which dates back well over three centuries to the restoration of Charles II in 1660. The United States has an unbroken regime dating back to its establishment as an independent country. Elsewhere other English-speaking peoples have shown similar and rare talents for stable self-government.

Immigrants to the U.S. bring with them their own deeply ingrained cultural heritages. Governmental stability may well be threatened by the arrival of millions with no tradition of peaceful representative government. Likewise, our economic future may be clouded by immigrants who lack the "work ethic," which has contributed immeasurably to our attainment of wealth. The fact that the work ethic flowers most conspicuously in certain Western European peoples is indicated by the term "Protestant ethic," which was applied to the phenomenon by Max Weber, the sociologist who first called attention to it.⁵³

The existing friction in the U.S. relative to many religious and moral issues can only be exacerbated by the conflicting values of numerous groups of Third World peoples. Even such apparently unimportant matters as diet can be divisive. Both Californians and Canadians have reacted with outrage to stories -- founded or unfounded -- of what was perceived as mistreatment of dogs and horses on the part of Asians, some of whom are accustomed to eating such animals. To many Americans, who consider dogs almost as family members, such behavior is only slightly less reprehensible than cannibalism. Their concerns gave rise to such sick humor as jokes about a new Vietnamese cookbook with 101 ways to "wok your dog."

Taken together, current trends, history, sociological research and sociobiological theory suggest that the United States has thoughtlessly placed its future in peril by embarking upon an unprecedented experiment in the large-scale mixing of multiple peoples with highly diverse cultures in a democratic society. If present immigration policies continue, a great nation "indivisible" seems less likely in the next century than cultural chaos, political instability and economic deterioration. The legacy of present citizens to their children and grandchildren could be an opportunity to witness the decline and dismemberment of a country that was once a symbol of stability and prosperity for the whole world.

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