Part I: Principles of Ethnic Relations

- Hindu mobs burned alive seven Moslems, two of them after they had been beaten into unconsciousness and thrown from hospital windows, during week-long rioting in Ahmedabad, India, in 1986. Among those burned by an angry mob were a Moslem mother and her three-year-old daughter.¹

- Dark-skinned Fijian natives seized power in a military coup shortly after a 1987 election transferred government control from them to the descendants of Indian indentured laborers brought to the area in the nineteenth century. The coup followed angry mass demonstrations and mob attacks by Fijians on Indians and their property.²

- A rash of reprisals -- window-smashings, bomb threats and a firebombing -- were directed against Montreal businesses which posted signs in English after a 1987 court decision declared unconstitutional Quebec’s language law requiring that only French be used in public signs. The leader of a political party advocating Quebec’s secession from Canada called for a boycott of shops posting bilingual signs.³

- Rabbi Meir Kahane, an American serving as a member of the Israeli parliament, has repeatedly called for the expulsion of all Arabs from Israel and from the occupied Arab territories conquered by Israel in 1967. Arabs in the occupied areas remained under Jewish military control, with muted civil rights.

- Tribal insurgents in southern Bangladesh killed 18 persons and kidnapped 16 others during a four-day period in late 1986 in continuing efforts to drive out nontribal settlers in their area.⁴

- In the African state of Burundi, the dominant Watusi tribesmen massacred 100,000 Hutus in a period of six weeks and possibly another 100,000 later in 1972 in the wake of a failed invasion by exiled members of Burundi’s Hutu tribe.

- English Queen Mary, the Catholic daughter of Henry VIII, earned an unenviable place in history, and the nickname “Bloody Mary,” by burning at the stake several hundred Protestants, including the archbishop of Canterbury.

- A 30,000-year-old Cro-Magnon painting in Iberia shows a human being, imprisoned like a trapped animal, in a cage basket hung from the edge of a cliff. The captive obviously is from a Negroid group, the Capoid, possibly related to the Bushmen of Africa. Seymour Itzkoff says of the grisly representation, “The cruel humor of this painting and the events it describes imply a kind of racial disdain...⁵ Capoid art in the same region vividly depicts a battle with an unseen enemy, presumably Cro-Magnon. Soon evidence of Capoid life in Spain ends, and their story continues in Africa. Cro-Magnon
remained to become ancestral to modern Western Europeans.

What common thread runs through these events so widely separated in time and space? The common element is a deep-rooted, bitter ethnic group conflict for which no mutually satisfactory resolution seemed possible. The specific events, chosen more or less randomly from a profusion of possible illustrations, reflect the destructive, insensitive passion which can sweep aside any sense of shared humanity when one ethnic group defends itself against the claims of a rival. In such a situation, violence is hardly an aberration. Indeed, much of the history of the world has been written in the blood of rival ethnic groups. Nowhere has “man’s inhumanity to man” been displayed more clearly than in conflicts between different tribes, races, nationality groups and, ironically, religious groups. By one reckoning, ethnic violence has claimed more than 10 million lives since World War II.6

Conflict -- not harmonious cooperation -- is the rule wherever two or more well-defined ethnic groups inhabit the same territory. This conclusion emerges from the writings of scholars and journalists who have seriously investigated ethnic relations on a world scale. The editors of a 1987 book representing the work of an international panel of scholars comment: “. . . [I]nterethnic discord is a fact of life virtually everywhere.”7 On the basis of many years of intensive scholarly study of the subject, Donald Horowitz concurs: “Ethnic conflict is a worldwide phenomenon.”8 M.G. Smith describes “plural societies” containing culturally divergent ethnic groups as “. . . defined by dissensus and pregnant with conflict. . . .”9

Similar views are expressed by knowledgeable journalists. In 1987, newspaper columnist Richard Reeves noted that “Racism is a way of life in Asia” and “race war” a “real threat in many countries,” adding that he has yet to see a place on our planet where people “are truly not racist.” James Fallows describes such racist Asian societies as “significant because they are the norm for the world. . . .”10 A 1987 Washington Post article lists 25 countries currently torn by ethnic violence, which it characterizes as frequently “more vicious and intractable” than international wars.11

In a commentary subtitled “Nobody wants a melting pot,” Fallows points out that the United States is an oddity among nations in its theoretical belief -- contradicted, however, by actual behavior -- that a society can absorb and be strengthened by large numbers of immigrants from every ethnic group and background. Most other societies apparently “think this can’t be done, and that it’s a bad idea to try,” Fallows says, noting some fruits of ethnic diversity: “Bitter tribal divisions in Africa, religious and ethnic hatred in the Middle East and Northern Ireland, tensions over migrant workers in Western Europe. . . .”12 Most Asian countries, he adds, share the belief that “a society is strongest when its members all come from the same race or ethnic group.”

American immigration policy, official and de facto, is based on an almost Orwellian reversal of traditional views almost everywhere. In some recent periods, the destination of half of the world’s total immigration stream has been the
United States. Increasingly, the post-World War II arrivals have differed physically and culturally from earlier waves of European immigrants. By the 1970s the most numerous groups were Third World peoples, especially Hispanics and Asians. These arrived, legally or illegally, in such numbers that dramatic changes in the American population and culture are now almost inevitable if present immigration trends continue. Authoritative population projections indicate that within the lives of some people now living, the United States is destined to become a thoroughly multiracial, multicultural society in which non-Hispanic whites will constitute only a minority of the population.13 The founding and once predominant White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) group will make up an even smaller minority.

This population transformation is occurring fastest in the states most favored by immigrants, such as California and Texas. Demographic projections indicate that white non-Hispanics will have minority status in both states by the year 2000 and 40 years later will constitute less than one-third of the population of each. Already, one occasionally hears the derogatory label, "Third World city," applied to certain U.S. metropolitan areas, particularly New York, Los Angeles and Miami.

The changing composition and size of the immigrant stream has resulted largely from policies based on typically American idealism and humanitarianism. It was argued that immigration preferences granted to Europeans discriminated against other groups, and laws were changed to minimize that possibility. As continuing world turmoil threw up new categories of political dissidents and persecuted peoples, we rolled out the welcome mat for refugees from tyrannies of both left and right. After the Vietnam War, a mixture of gratitude and guilt feelings paved the way for admission of large numbers of Southeast Asians, chiefly drawn from our former allies, the South Vietnamese and the Hmong tribesmen. Sympathy for poverty-stricken peoples and a desire to get along with our Latin-American neighbors contributed to our acceptance of the most numerous immigrant group, the Mexicans.

The largely unconsidered result of past and present immigration policies is that the United States is in the process of changing the racial and cultural composition of its population to a degree probably unprecedented in human history, except for situations involving the military conquest of a society by a foreign aggressor. A disinterested observer might conclude that writings on this important social phenomenon have concentrated more on rationalizing the status quo than on attempting to predict long-term effects. We have talked much about the alleged -- usually unspecified -- benefits of cultural diversity and the promises of the Statue of Liberty to the world's "huddled masses," but little about what such a population transformation will mean to the culture and institutions of the United States.

Traditional American attitudes toward immigration were summed up in the term, "the melting pot." It was assumed that after a relatively short period of acculturation, immigrants -- and particularly their children and grandchildren -- would be virtually indistinguishable from earlier arrivals. The ideal
worked reasonably well in practice as long as most immigrants came from Northwest Europe, where national boundaries were less meaningful than the cultural and biological heritages which were closely related to those of the early American settlers.

As more Central and South Europeans joined the westward population flow in the late 1800s and early 1900s, the efficiency of the melting pot slowed noticeably and public alarm led to the enactment of a series of restrictive immigration laws. But it was only after World War II that we permanently consigned the melting pot to the junkheap. Sociologists gradually began to talk about “cultural pluralism” as the new American ideal. It was noted that many large American cities had a mosaic-like pattern created by various ethnic groups, each tending to congregate in its own territorial and cultural enclave. The complexity of the mosaic pattern increased with the arrival of each new nationality group which came in substantial numbers.

In the 1980s, greater concern about immigration policies surfaced and led eventually to a new law whose results cannot yet be completely assessed. Significantly, during the related public debate, discussion tended to center around economic and humanitarian issues such as the extent to which immigrants take jobs from American citizens, the economic benefits of “cheap labor” to certain employers and possibly to consumers, the number of self-styled political “refugees” who are actually economic refugees from their impoverished native lands, and America's “moral obligation” to maintain a liberal immigration policy. Left almost unasked by either politicians or scholars was the question of whether the scores of unassimilated ethnic groups will eventually bring to us the political turmoil and violence that are so frequently the lot of plural societies. With respect to academicians, Horowitz's comment is apt: "As scholarship is reactive, the spilling of ink awaits the spilling of blood."

This monograph "spills ink" in an effort to indicate the degree of likelihood that a widespread "spilling of blood" looms in the American future. The longest section, Part II, chronicles ethnic conflict in some 80 countries, from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. This appalling history of human misery, however, is by no means a complete summary of problems around the world. A number of countries are not considered, and some ethnic conflicts within various countries are not referred to for various reasons, including time and space constraints, lack of accessibility or reliability of source materials, and the sometimes relatively small number of persons involved. A comment about sources of information is in order. Unless specifically noted, these are primarily standard encyclopedias, almanacs, and leading nationally circulated newspapers. The reader is cautioned that details of both current reports and historical accounts are sometimes debatable. Sizes of population groups are often only estimates (and not always disinterested estimates), and even historical dates are in some instances only approximate. Further confusion can be created by a frequent lack of uniformity in the spelling of names of places, people and ethnic groups.

Part II should, however, adequately indicate the ubiquity of
ethnic conflict. It scarred ancient empires as well as modern democracies and predated both in primitive man. It flares in both rich and poor countries. European and non-European nations. Furthermore, such a cross-cultural overview, supplemented by a review of much relevant scholarly literature, clearly demonstrates that ethnic conflict seldom occurs in a form totally unique to a particular society, but shows identifiable patterns and tendencies that may appear in societies widely separated in time, space and cultural level.

Ethnic conflict thus shows regularities more or less similar to those found in many natural phenomena, including other aspects of human social behavior. These regularities make it possible to generalize and make tentative predictions about many aspects of ethnic conflict, such as probable duration, types of friction, societal responses and results of accommodation attempts. A number of these common patterns are described in the remainder of Part I. Part III offers some tentative suggestions as to which of the widespread patterns will cloud our future and that of succeeding generations of Americans.

In the interest of clarity, the terms “ethnic group” and “conflict” should be defined. Ethnicity implies differences identified by color, language, religion, nationality background or some other attribute of common origin. Ethnicity is connected to birth and blood. In the sociological meaning of the term, it is an ascribed status acquired by birth and infrequently changed thereafter. Important features include a notion of distinctiveness, a feeling of relatedness within the group and a sense of shared traits acquired either genetically or through early childhood training. As ethnicity is frequently related to presumed group origins, biological kinship, real or mythical, may be present. The term ethnic group thus can encompass tribes, castes, racial and subracial groups, nationality groups, adherents of a religion and persons with a common historical or geographical background.

Conflict can be briefly defined in the words of Lewis Coser as “a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals.”5 Conflict between ethnic groups often involves physical violence but may also take place in political, economic, social or other arenas. Frequently occurring types of ethnic conflict will be described in later pages. The following paragraphs contain important generalizations which emerge from a cross-cultural look at ethnic discord.

In divided societies ethnic affiliation is a highly important and emotionally charged aspect of self-identity for many, possibly most, people. In Horowitz’s words, “...ethnic affiliations are powerful, pervasive, passionate and pervasive.”6 Sociologist William Graham Sumner coined the term “ethnocentrism” to refer to the general tendency of individuals and groups to favor their own kind over outsiders, and modern observers agree that the in-group phenomenon is virtually universal among human groups. British social psychologist Ian Vine, for example, refers to ethnocentrism’s “cross-cultural ubiquity in human social life.” The reverse side of the coin is that people who identify strongly with their own ethnic group are likely to have hostile,
fearful or rejecting attitudes toward other groups. The label “xenophobia” has been applied to such feelings, and this too is widespread among human groups, as well as in social animals. Dutch scholar Johan M.G. van der Dennen has commented that an analogy exists between immunological reactions of the body and ethnocentric reactions of the individual or of a society.19

Intolerance of out-groups results not only from competition for power but also from a desire to protect and promote the uniformity and integrity of the in-group.20 Ethnic groups often fear subordination or extinction, either physical or cultural or both. The existence of two or more well-defined ethnic groups within one territorial environment typically gives rise to uncertainty and anxiety which may lead to extreme reactions to even modest threats.21 The desire for group integrity may, as Horowitz says, produce “impulses to make the society homogeneous, by assimilation, expulsion or even extermination.”22 Horowitz adds: “The desire to extirpate diversity seems greatest in states that are among the most heterogeneous.”23

Anxiety about group survival and integrity can be intensely motivating, sufficiently so to explain at least partially three otherwise puzzling principles. First, ethnic conflict is not necessarily motivated by rational considerations of gain.24 Secessionist movements, for example, frequently fly in the face of economic reality, as in the cases of Quebec and Bangladesh. Second, support for ethnic movements is often stronger among well-educated individuals with high incomes and high status occupations than among those from lower socioeconomic levels.25 Research in both developed and developing countries shows that the American stereotype confining ethnic sentiments largely to the ignorant and unsuccessful is not compatible with experience elsewhere. Third, the intensity of ethnic conflict is not closely related to the degree of difference between competing ethnic groups or to whether the differences are racial, subracial, religious, linguistic, cultural or a combination of factors.

With respect to the third point, examination of ethnic interaction around the world does not readily pinpoint any particular type of group difference as more productive of disorder than other types. While Americans are prone to think of intergroup hostility in racial terms, religious differences are involved in many of the most inflamed contemporary conflicts, including those between Israelis and Palestinians, between the Sinhalese and Tamils of Sri Lanka, Sikhs and Hindus in India, and Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. Although South Africa is disturbed by racial conflict, many other parts of Africa have seen violence between culturally different black tribal groups in the post-independence period. Conflict apparently can develop around almost any type of visible, lasting difference identified as significant by the residents of an area.

A group’s fear of subordination is typically better founded than its fear of actual extinction. A major prize coveted by an ethnic group is often sufficient control over society and its institutions to assure dominance over rival groups and the
resultant creation of what scholars call a “ranked system” in which a clear hierarchy of group status exists. Because of their historic experiences with black-white relations, Americans tend to assume that ethnic conflict occurs only when one group is subordinate and another dominant and therefore will be eliminated with progress toward an unranked system. Again, experience elsewhere disproves this comforting belief. Most ethnic group relations in other countries are not between clearly superordinate and subordinate groups, but ethnic conflict is practically universal. Some scholars would, in fact, argue that ranked systems experience more tranquility than unranked ones because perpetual jockeying for position is the lot of groups in an unranked system.

Intergroup conflict is often a zero-sum game, in which one side must lose if another wins, because the ultimate goals concern control of a society as well as relative group position and image. The former implies the existence of two incipient societies within the boundaries of one country, each struggling for dominance. The latter means that a battle may not be over the actual number or value of group perquisites but over what proportion they are in comparison with those received by rivals. The relativity of such goals makes mutual satisfaction difficult to achieve.

Ethnic division tends to produce what has been called “tribal ethics,” which apply one set of standards to dealings within the group and a less stringent set to dealings with other groups. Herbert Spencer referred to the phenomenon of dual morality, talking of the “Code of Amity” used for the in-group and the “Code of Enmity” governing relations with out-groups. A system of what might also be labeled “ethnic ethics” tends to lower the general standards of morality within a society, forcing greater reliance on legal, secondary social controls when informal controls are not generally applicable. If the existence of dual morality is widely recognized, society is further divided by the rational desires of people to limit dealings with out-groups which may have unreliable ethical standards.

Ethnicity tends to be permanent, with genuine assimilation of an ethnic group rare. Not uncommonly, a group retains its distinct identity for hundreds or even thousands of years, often while living in a society dominated by another group or dispersed within the borders of multiple countries. Examples well known to Americans are the Jews, who had settled in Western Europe by the beginning of the 4th century; the Gypsies, who arrived in Europe by the 11th century; the French Canadians of Quebec, who sometimes call themselves the “Negres blancs d’Amerique”; the American Indians of the United States and Canada and, of course, American blacks, some of whose ancestors have lived in the United States for more than three and a half centuries -- far longer than the ancestors of most white Americans.

Ethnic identity can withstand not only centuries of minority status but also long periods of foreign rule by an oppressive regime which attempts to force cultural assimilation. The Russian and Ottoman Empires are historical examples of great powers able to conquer the bodies but not the minds of their unwilling subjects, although their control continued for per-
iods ranging up to four centuries. Currently, the Soviet Union is attempting “russification” programs reminiscent of those of the Russian Empire, with little apparent prospect of long-term success.

Ethnic group attachments can either gain or lose intensity over a period of time. But ethnic identity has more lives than the proverbial cat; a declining phase does not necessarily portend disappearance. In fact, a fear of group extinction frequently triggers a cultural revival after much of the culture has been submerged, often under foreign occupation. Such a cultural renaissance typically unfolds over half a century or more, and under appropriate circumstances may lead eventually to political autonomy for a previously submerged minority. An example is Bohemia’s cultural revival, which arose in response to the attempts of its Hapsburg rulers to hasten its total absorption into the Austrian Empire. Even the Czech language had to be revived through the compilation of dictionaries and grammar books and the publication of newspapers and periodicals. Such efforts by Bohemian nobles and intellectuals gradually stirred nationalist feelings and led eventually to independence.

The tendency of ethnicity to transcend national boundaries can have important social and political consequences. Ethnic identity goes with an immigrant to his new country and may be retained for a very long period of time. Besides contributing to the development of a cultural mosaic, an immigrant group can become involved in foreign policy decisions. In the United States, numerous groups of “hyphenated Americans” have formed pressure groups to urge American foreign policy decisions in favor of their home country or in opposition to its enemies. Such activities are not necessarily in the interest of the general public.

Even more damaging can be treasonous activities by individuals or large groups with dual loyalties. Many countries have been hampered during wartime by sabotage or guerrilla or military activities by disaffected minorities. The risk is particularly great when a country is at war against the homeland of a resident ethnic group. A classic illustration of the problem of dual loyalty is the story of Arminius, a Roman citizen and officer of Germanic origin, who in 9 A.D. united recently conquered German tribes in rebellion. His warriors annihilated 20,000 Romans in the Teutoburger forest, and thus permanently altered Rome’s policy of unlimited expansion into Germany. Fear of disloyalty by an unassimilated minority was, of course, responsible for the internment of ethnic Japanese by the United States and Canada during World War II.

Particularly disruptive national and international problems often develop when an ethnic group is split by the boundaries of two or more neighboring countries. Group members are prone to identify more with each other and their common heritage than with the countries within whose borders they live. One frequent result is cross-border ethnic cooperation in such criminal activities as smuggling to defeat bans on drugs, arms or other contraband or to avoid import duties on legal products. Law enforcement is hampered if criminals can easily escape across a border to find sanctuary with their ethnic kin.
An even more serious result of such a split ethnic group is a tendency for the divided parts to seek union. Agitation in favor of union may be centered primarily in any segment of the concerned population, depending on circumstances. An ethnic minority in one country may seek to have its people and territory incorporated into its homeland, an adjacent country. On the other hand, pressure may come primarily from the homeland itself, which may attempt to expand its territory and population by taking over parts of a neighboring country heavily populated by its ethnic relatives. The first of these phenomena is one of many possible forms of separatism. The second is known as irredentism, a term derived from nineteenth-century Italian efforts to claim parts of neighboring regions, called Italia irredenta or unredeemed Italy, largely Italian in population but governed by other countries. In the twentieth century irredentist aims were among the flashpoints that ignited both worldwars.

In deeply divided societies, ethnic identifications permeate organizations, activities and roles to which they have no formal relationship. For example, a jury may find a defendant guilty or innocent more on the basis of his ethnic relatedness than on the evidence. The judicial punishment of a clearly guilty defendant may inspire his fellow ethnics to deny his guilt and charge discrimination. The tendency of ethnicity to invade all institutional areas imparts an omnipresent quality to ethnic conflict and can lead to a widespread “walking on eggs” syndrome among employers, teachers, government officials and others whose work involves minority group members. Almost any problem or phenomenon can suddenly and unpredictably “turn ethnic,” with angry and damaging charges hurled at the person or organization held responsible. Undoubtedly, this possibility sometimes interferes with organizational efficiency by preventing cautious officials from making justifiable decisions which could be misconstrued.

In a society with multiple ethnic minorities, demands by one group are likely to spread quickly to other groups. Such contagion is almost inevitable if one group succeeds in winning beneficial concessions. Even separatism, one of the most potentially destructive ethnic demands, can flower in several groups within a relatively short period of time, as in post-independence India. Thus even an apparently weak separatist movement in a single area can pose a significant threat to an ethnically diverse country or empire.

Ethnic relations within a country have much in common with international relations. Both often involve incompatible groups with divergent interests but necessarily intertwined activities. Some similarity can be seen even in the types of violence used by national armies and ethnic rebels. War often amounts to ethnic conflict writ large; ethnic conflict is often analogous to a small-scale war. A major difference is that even long wars eventually end with ceasefires and peace treaties. Serious ethnic conflicts may have no resolution, continuing for hundreds or thousands of years, broken from time to time by relatively quiet periods resulting from temporary exhaustion, hope for new proposals or momentary concentration on other issues such as an external threat. Not all ethnic conflict is violent, of course. Rivalries take many forms and often change
over time, with variable intensity and variable degrees of violence and non-violence at different periods.

The abstract goals of ethnic groups are remarkably consistent everywhere. Each tends to strive for a high degree of control of its own destiny and to seek dominance over other ethnic groups, or at least to avoid dominance by them. A common and related goal is relative ethnic homogeneity within a defined territory. This desire may be less acute for a dominant group with an assured status in a ranked system than for the constantly uneasy rivals in an unranked system. Tactics used to pursue those goals depend somewhat on such factors as the number and relative sizes of competing groups, the existing institutional restraints, and the total cultural context.

Partly because the ultimate goals of ethnic rivalry tend to be similar around the world, focusing on group autonomy, societal dominance, ethnic homogeneity or some combination of those aims, types of conflict appear in sufficiently similar forms in various countries that a scholar studying the topic finds ready-made descriptive labels already available. The following paragraphs discuss many of the most characteristic types of conflict, first those involving a high degree of physical violence and then predominantly non-violent forms. Actual conflicts may, of course, alternate between violence and non-violence and may exhibit several types of competition either simultaneously or over a period of time.

One of the bloodiest forms of ethnic violence is civil war, which involves relatively large-scale organized fighting. Genuine civil war requires the existence of two or more sizeable and highly motivated groups. One side often has separatist ambitions, which may include secession from an existing country and formation of a new, more ethnically homogeneous one. Secessionist demands imply apparently irreconcilable conflict and thus seldom lend themselves to easy solutions. A somewhat less disruptive separatist demand may be for ethnic autonomy in a specific territory within a country. Other possible goals in civil wars may be a change in ethnic dominance relationships or the reduction of ethnic heterogeneity through expulsion of an unwanted group. Secessionist violence is more likely if a minority is geographically concentrated rather than scattered. However, when ethnic tensions are high, either forcible or voluntary population movements can sometimes create rapid changes in the degree of group concentration.

Ethnically-based civil wars in recent decades have, for example, devastated Lebanon, killed one million in Nigeria and 500,000 in Sudan, and pitted Palestinians in Jordan against a predominantly Bedouin army. In the first three countries, contention arose over ethnic dominance relationships. The Jordanians eliminated a contender for ethnic dominance and also created greater homogeneity by forcing many Palestinian refugees to flee again, often to Lebanon. In earlier centuries, ethnically-based civil war appeared even in such an unlikely place as Switzerland.

Guerrilla warfare may be very bloody, but is usually less well-organized and conducted on a smaller scale than full-fledged civil war. One may shade into the other in a specific conflict, as in Lebanon. Guerrilla wars often occur when one
side in the conflict is considerably smaller and less powerful than its adversary and therefore incapable of carrying on a civil war. In the mid-1980s ethnically-based guerrilla warfare was seen, among other places, in Sri Lanka, Angola and the Philippines. In both the Philippines and Sri Lanka, an ethnic minority sought political and cultural autonomy in its own territory. Some guerrilla wars go on for decades with occasional breaks and frequent changes in tactics and in intensity.

Terrorism is often the weapon of an ethnic group too small, weak or scattered to engage in either civil or guerrilla warfare. Terrorist acts may be carried out by a single dissident individual, but usually occur within the context of support by a group, the active arm of which is likely to be smaller than a guerrilla band. Terrorist activities tend to be sporadic rather than ongoing. The ethnically-based terrorism most familiar to contemporary Americans encompasses the car bombings, plane and ship hijackings, kidnappings and other acts perpetrated by Arab groups motivated partly by a desire to call attention to the plight of Palestinian refugees.

In recent decades, blood has also been shed by ethnically-motivated terrorists in numerous other areas, including Northern Ireland, New Caledonia, Spain and the Netherlands. The terrorists of Northern Ireland and New Caledonia both want changes in ethnic dominance relationships under new governments. The Basques of Spain have already achieved considerable autonomy, but still demand independence. The Moluccan immigrants in The Netherlands sought to force Dutch intervention in the internal affairs of their home country, Indonesia.

Rioting, frequently accompanied by arson and looting, is another common expression of ethnic hostility. Such bloody and destructive behavior often erupts with little advance planning in response to a perceived provocation by either ethnic rivals or authority figures. Riots typically last no more than a few days but may recur, as well as inspire "copycat" behavior in other parts of a country. Americans will remember the black rioting that leapfrogged the country after six days of insurrection in the Watts section of Los Angeles in 1965 left 34 dead, 1,000 injured, nearly 4,000 arrested and fire damage estimated at $175 million. In recent decades, ethnically-based riots have also occurred in Fiji, Malaysia, Bermuda, Pakistan and Montauk, all concerned with ethnic power and dominance relationships.

While individual riot victims often appear to have represented "targets of opportunity" whose deaths were not premeditated, genocide, massacres and executions may single out specific persons as well as groups. Genocide refers, of course, to the destruction of entire groups, and instances involving only one country usually result from ethnic, racial or religious conflict in a plural society. Even in the case of genocide, however, it is sometimes difficult to establish intent or to decide whether the genocide label should be applied to mass atrocities. Leo Kuper, a student of genocide, discusses that subject, along with other types of oppression which may be equally destructive. These include forced population movements, such as were inflicted on the Armenian population of Turkey in 1915, and artificial famines as in the USSR in the
1930s. In these and other cases, it may be difficult to establish the extent to which those responsible deliberately planned the great loss of life that occurred.

Large-scale massacres, which sometimes amount to partial genocide, may occur in connection with civil or guerrilla warfare or ethnic riots, either with or without governmental approval or connivance. Many appear to be motivated by a desire to eliminate a troublesome or unwanted ethnic group. Among the well-known historical examples are the St. Bartholomew's massacre of Protestants in France and the wholesale executions of Dutch Protestants ordered by their Spanish overlords, both in the sixteenth century. In recent decades, ethnically-motivated massacres have occurred in Bangladesh, India, Burundi and Lebanon, among other places.

Well-publicized executions of sizeable numbers of ethnic group members often appear intended to punish the group, possibly for resisting or protesting its own subordination, as well as to warn and intimidate other potential dissidents. For example, the Japanese conquerors of Korea killed hundreds of natives in 1919 in reprisal for a non-violent nationalist uprising. An earlier but in many ways similar occurrence was the "Stockholm blood bath," in which King Christian II of Denmark opened his reign over restive Swedish subjects by beheading 80 national leaders who had gathered for his coronation in 1520.

Five other frequently occurring types of ethnic conflict -- enslavement, imprisonment, exile, population expulsion and forcible population relocation -- involve variable amounts of bloodshed, but extremely severe restrictions on the actions of those affected. The practice of enslavement, usually of minorities, was widespread in many parts of the world until recently. Since it now appears to be confined to isolated cases, lengthy discussion here is unnecessary. It might, however, be noted that in the past the institution of slavery was not uniform everywhere, with considerable variation from place to place in its rigors and in the permanence of the condition for individuals and their descendants.

A troublesome or distrusted minority is sometimes imprisoned as a group or, more typically, as individuals, but in disproportionate numbers. The American and Canadian internment of practically all those of Japanese descent during World War II is an example of group imprisonment which is likely to occur only in exceptional circumstances. The disproportionate number of Ukrainians almost always found among Russia's political prisoners illustrates the practice of selectively incarcerating leaders of dissident minorities, a practice which functions to deprive a group of its existing leadership, as well as to inhibit potential future leaders.

The forcible expulsion of an unwanted minority from a country is the final chapter in a long story of ethnic conflict. Such movements sometimes involve millions of people and much hardship, along with variable numbers of fatalities. Twentieth-century expellees have included Turkey's 1.5 million Armenians; many thousands of Asians forced out of a number of newly independent black African nations; ten million ethnic Germans ejected from lands east of the Oder-Neisse line after World War II; two million West African
aliens ordered out of Nigeria in 1983; and many of the 500,000 Vietnamese "boat people," most of whom were ethnic Chinese and many of whom possibly should be categorized as "economic refugees" rather than expellees. Among the historical examples are the Jews and Moors expelled from Spain, the 400,000 Protestants driven from France in the seventeenth century and 6,000 French Acadians who were forced out of British Canada and later immortalized by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow in the poem, "Evangeline." Not uncommonly, leaders of troublesome minorities are singled out individually for expulsion, in which case they are usually referred to as exiles.

In the 1980s, several Western European countries, disturbed by racial tensions and unemployment in areas inhabited by Third World immigrants, considered offering financial incentives to such immigrants who would voluntarily return to their native lands. Voluntary repatriation schemes were actually adopted in Belgium and by both right-wing and left-wing governments in France. In Great Britain, similar action was advocated in the 1970 Conservative Election Manifesto but was not implemented. Revival of the idea seemed possible in the late 1980s.

Occasionally, two countries agree to a bilateral population transfer in which each country exchanges an ethnic minority within its borders for its own ethnic relatives living in the second country. A massive population exchange between Greece and Turkey after World War I greatly reduced the size of ethnic minorities in both countries. However, many persons suffered greatly in the uprooting of 1,300,000 Greeks who went home from Turkey and 353,000 Moslems who returned to Turkey.

Forcible internal relocation of an ethnic group, often to remote area, has also been carried out in a number of places as an attempted solution for a problem perceived as difficult. In the United States, certain Indian groups were forcibly moved to the West in the nineteenth century after many others had been persuaded to move voluntarily to new lands. The ejection of the remaining Cherokees from Georgia is known to history as the "Trail of Tears." A more recent example was the USSR's removal of seven relatively small ethnic groups to Siberia during World War II. An estimated one-third of the more than one million people died within a year from hunger, cold or disease.

As previously suggested, a blurred line often separates violent and non-violent ethnic conflict. Some frequently seen types of interaction can occur in either violent or relatively peaceful forms, and can alternate between greater and lesser amounts of bloodshed. This is true of separatist demands, one of the ultimate indicators of troubled ethnic relations. Because ethnic group aspirations so frequently include homogeneity and autonomy within a defined territory, separatist movements tend to spring up like weeds wherever unassimilated minorities nurse long-time grievances. These often flare into violence, but some pursue a relatively peaceful path for considerable periods of time. It should be noted that separatist movements are not uniform in the nature and rigidity of their goals. Some demand complete independence while others will
settle for varying degrees of political autonomy, possibly accompanied by removal of specific irritants, such as lack of official status for a minority language.

Recent examples of comparatively peaceful separatist movements include those mounted by the French ethnic group in Canada and the Welsh and Scots in the United Kingdom. None of the three movements has led to independence or political autonomy, but the Quebec separatists won significant concessions from the Canadian government and the Welsh saw their language restored to official status after 440 years. The Scots received a promise of political autonomy and their own parliament in the event of a Labor party victory in the 1987 elections, which were, however, won by the Conservatives. Earlier in this century a bloodless separatist movement succeeded in dissolving Norway's union with Sweden. Although the Swedes considered forcible maintenance of the national ties, they abandoned the idea in the face of the nearly unanimous separatist sentiments of the Norwegians. In a general plebescite on the issue, only 184 Norwegians voted to remain part of Sweden.

In more than one instance, a relatively peaceful separation which removed or reduced a country's minority population appears to have been promoted by the dominant group as much or more than by the minority, and thus might possibly be classified not as a successful separatist movement but as a peaceful, legitimized expulsion of an ethnic group along with its territory. For example, the Malay-dominated government of Malaysia expelled a reluctant Singapore in 1965, with the announced goal of preventing racial outbreaks directed toward the predominantly Chinese residents of that city. Similarly, South Africa has created several nominally independent black states, as well as a number of black homelands with their own legislatures.

Some ethnically-motivated population migrations are also relatively peaceful and may be more or less voluntarily undertaken by groups seeking greater ethnic homogeneity. Unforced movements may take place with or without official governmental sponsorship. Such population transfers sometimes occur in the wake of serious ethnic rioting, massacres or civil war and may involve varying degrees of hardship and loss of life. The largest separatist population movement in history occurred when 12,000,000 Hindus and Moslems crossed the Indian-Pakistani borders to live with their own groups after irreconcilable ethnic hostility led to partition of the subcontinent at the time of the British withdrawal. Another huge ethnically-motivated population movement took 10,000,000 Bengalis into India in the early 1970s when a separatist revolt eventually transformed East Pakistan into the nation of Bangladesh.

Many other forms of ethnic conflict are normally non-violent, although they may be punctuated from time to time with minor disorder and may escalate into more destructive actions. For purposes of analysis, non-violent conflicts can be divided into four major categories -- political, economic, social and cultural. In real life, however, these categories often overlap. In a world characterized almost everywhere by intrusive big governments, minorities are often able to use political clout to
achieve gains in the economic and other arenas. Modern governments can dispense valuable favors and can also take away valued rights and privileges. Thus one of the really big prizes typically sought by rival ethnic groups is control of the state.

If an ethnic group aspires to government control, a related goal must be to prevent any other group from attaining and solidifying its control. Many tactics have been developed to minimize the political power of rival groups. In more or less democratic countries with regular elections these tactics are often designed to reduce the voting strength of one or more ethnic groups. Possible deterrents to voting include property qualifications, poll taxes, literacy tests, lengthy residence requirements, inconvenient registration systems, inaccessible or crowded voting places, limited hours at polling centers and gerrymandering of legislative districts in such a way that a group's voting strength is diluted. A more drastic possibility is stripping ethnic group members of their citizenship, as in the case of 7,000 Asian citizens of Uganda. Extralegal deterrents to voting may include threats of physical violence or economic penalties, such as loss of jobs or welfare benefits.

If political dominance cannot be attained, a group may strive for such lesser prizes as veto power over major governmental decisions, proportionate legislative representation, or preferential claims to some top government positions and to civil service jobs. Lebanon is an example, although recently an unhappy one, of a country with a formalized ethnic power-sharing agreement. According to a 1943 agreement, the parliament members represented religious rather than political groups and Christians were guaranteed a 6-to-5 majority, as well as the office of president. By the 1970s, the agreement broke down, partly because the fast-growing Moslem population apparently outnumbered the Christians by then and demanded governmental changes to reflect the new demographic reality. A different form of ethnic legislative representation is seen in Botswana, where the constitution provides for not only a unicameral National Assembly, but also for a House of Chiefs which has a voice on all legislation relevant to tribal affairs.

Emphasis on the size of the vote cast by ethnic group members presupposes the existence of ethnic voting blocs which cast their ballots more or less uniformly for the same party or candidates. And, indeed, such voting blocs spring up in most heterogeneous societies which contain minorities large enough to acquire electoral strength through numbers. Bloc voting can lend itself to various strategies, depending partly on the number and size of other groups. A single sizeable minority can cast the decisive votes if a majority is more or less evenly split on the issues. It is not uncommon for an ethnic group to cast in excess of 90 percent of its votes for a particular party or candidate, as is frequently true of American blacks. This has meant that they were the "swing" voters in a number of post-World War II presidential elections, with the outcome determined by their preference.

If a country has several sizeable minorities, they may combine their bloc votes to defeat the majority on critical issues. Such an informal coalition of minorities, frequently arrayed
against the majority, played a significant role in undermining Poland’s fledgling democracy between the two world wars. The minorities, constituting about 30 percent of the population, greatly influenced and occasionally decided elections through their support of leftist parties opposed by most ethnic Poles.

The power of ethnic bloc voting is, of course, greatest when the majority bases its opinions on issues other than purely ethnic ones and thus divides its ballots among various parties and candidates. The collective disadvantage resulting from such judicious picking and choosing is usually not long lost on the majority, and it, too, is likely to begin to concentrate its votes along ethnic lines. As Horowitz says, “. . . ethnic votes tend to drive out nonethnic votes.”

Political parties in a number of Western countries have an ethnic dimension, but usually not to the exclusion of all other questions. However, many non-Western countries have witnessed the flowering of ethnic parties concerned almost entirely with ethnic issues and with adherents drawn almost exclusively from a single ethnic group. This phenomenon is regarded as a major reason for the debilitated state of democracy in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. In a system dominated by ethnic parties, an election is akin to a census, leaving smaller groups with little hope. Such a system often leads to a one-party autocracy dominated by a single ethnic group.

A degree of control of government gives an ethnic group power to influence its position in many other areas. A generalized goal is usually to alleviate ethnic group disadvantages in economic, cultural and social spheres. Since group position is judged on a comparative basis, a related goal is to minimize the advantages of rival ethnic groups. For a subordinate ethnic group, one aspect of the latter goal is to limit the natural tendency of a dominant group toward nepotism or preference for its own ethnic kin. Favored policies then often include redistributive taxes and programs which take from one ethnic group and give to another; ethnic preferences which give a group an advantage in the pursuit of such prizes as jobs, educational benefits and government contracts; and laws which require recognition of an ethnic group’s language and culture and sometimes its history and heroes. Ethnic preference programs often lead to corruption and lowered productivity, as seen recently in Malaysia, but once established are difficult to eliminate. The reverse of ethnic preference also occurs, with a group barred by law or custom from certain occupations or its entry limited by quotas. The businesses and other property of a minority are sometimes confiscated by government decree, as in Uganda, where thousands of Asian residents were stripped of most of their financial assets prior to their expulsion in 1972.

Ethnic group rivalry in economic affairs also occurs in areas not directly under government control. Not infrequently, a minority uses strikes to seek higher wages and fringe benefits or greater access to good jobs. The labor movement in the United States had a little-discussed ethnic component in that employers and organized employees were very often drawn from different ethnic groups. This factor may partly explain the relatively slower growth of unions in the South, where
employers and their employees were more likely to share the same ethnic background. Boycotts of merchants or other businesses are sometimes used by an ethnic group in an effort to force changes such as greater employment opportunities. Ethnic group members may also cooperate in many ways to maximize their own wealth and thus gain economic advantages over other groups. Possibilities include preferential business and financial dealings with fellow ethnics and cooperation to control prices of goods and services or to manipulate markets. Relative economic success is sought by an ethnic group not only in itself, but also as a tool to be used to enhance political power and facilitate social acceptance.

Ethnic group conflict in the social area often centers around issues related to residential, organizational or educational segregation, which may be desired by a dominant group but opposed by one or more minorities. Opposition may be based on genuine hardships imposed by segregation, but may also stem from the wounded pride stemming from a perceived rejection and implication of inferiority. Many forms of partial segregation may occur, however, without discriminatory intent, because minorities often prefer to live and socialize largely with their fellow ethnics. In the United States, for example, such preferences have sometimes complicated government efforts to persuade Asians to move from ethnic enclaves to other states with better job opportunities. In the area of social conflict, governmental action is often sought by dissatisfied ethnic group.

Cultural conflict is almost inevitable in an ethnically mixed country because the language and customs of one group will tend to dominate, and other groups may be forced to adapt. However, each group is most comfortable with its own way! and may well believe that they are right and other group wrong, misguided or immoral. Even such apparently unimportant matters as diet can be divisive. Both Californians and Canadians have reacted with outrage to stories -- founded or unfounded -- of what was perceived as mistreatment of dog and horses by Asians, some of whom are accustomed to eating those animals. To many Americans, who consider dogs almost as family members, such behavior is only slightly less reprehensible than cannibalism. Some social historians list another example of ethnic conflict the American Prohibition movement, which they see as inspired in part by rural Protestant disapproval of the habits of urban Catholics.

In an effort to perpetuate its own culture, as well as to improve its own self-image, an ethnic group is likely to downgrade other groups informally through negative stereotypes and ethnic jokes. More formally, one group may portray another group or groups negatively in fiction, scholarly work or the mass media. History may be reinterpreted to give great credit to one group and less to another. Historical revision may, of course, be a circular affair, with new revisionists disputing the earlier revisionists. As in other areas of conflict, government may be called in to regulate propaganda battles. Several countries have enacted "anti-hate" laws, which ban statements derogatory toward an identifiable group. Under such laws, truth is not always a satisfactory defense for those accused of violations.
Language is often a sticky problem in ethnically-mixed countries. A majority typically expects a minority to adopt the predominant language, but the minority may resist, not only because of the practical difficulties involved, but also because official recognition of its language becomes a symbol of relative group worth. In recent years, conflict over language usage has been apparent in many countries, including Belgium, Canada and the United States. As of mid-1987, thirteen states in the United States had passed laws establishing English as their official language. Such actions resulted largely from pressures toward bilingualism or multilingualism from immigrants, especially Hispanics.

Ethnic friction frequently develops with regard to rather small matters, which are seen as symbolic of ethnic group dominance. A recent example in both the United States and Canada has been litigation demanding the elimination of Christmas symbols from public buildings and schools. Another matter of symbolic significance may be the name of an ethnic group. When a minority succeeds in improving its relative position, it frequently attempts to abandon its traditional and stigmatized group name in order to substitute another with a flattering or at least neutral connotation. For example, the former “untouchables” of India became the Harijans or “children of God.” Similarly, as their relative status improved, American Negroes tentatively called themselves “Afro-Americans” and then settled on the not entirely descriptive term, “black.”

Still relatively isolated geographically and intellectually, many Americans view the ethnic conflicts of various countries as unrelated phenomena. In some cases, an often shallow and uninformed public opinion condemns the actions of one side and condones those of its opponents. In other cases, the acts of both combatants are dismissed as the inexplicable barbarisms of less advanced peoples. But, as we have seen in country after country, ethnic group members regularly identify with their own and view other groups at best with relative indifference and at worst with murderous hostility. The similarities of patterns found in nations widely separated in time, space and cultural level suggest that they are related to basic aspects of human nature and group processes.

Why, then, do ethnic groups so relentlessly and often ruthlessly carry on their vendettas? A simple “realistic” answer is that it is rational to compete for generally desired resources and perquisites which are not available in sufficient quantity for all. A dominant place in a society gives an ethnic group preferential access to power, prestige and privilege -- to leadership positions, high-income jobs, education, housing and other material goods. Also not to be underestimated are the psychic rewards that come from emotional identification with life’s winners rather than losers.

But these explanations leave many questions still unanswered. Why do ethnic groups often prefer relative ethnic exclusivity to economic advantages? And why are people prone to identify so passionately with their ethnic group in the first place? To attempt brief answers to such questions it is
necessary to turn to the findings of social scientists and socio-biologists.

A relevant conclusion of many students of human behavior is that humans inherently have a limited ability to empathize with humanity in general. The available supply of human affectivity is so small and inelastic that it cannot go far beyond the in-group," however defined. Much social psychological research and some experimentation have indicated that the close emotional ties of an individual typically extend to no more than ten or eleven other people.31 On the battlefield or in other highly stressful situations, psychological solidarity may encompass groups ranging from six or seven down to only two, the latter number being the “buddies” depicted in the war stories of many countries.32

For most people everywhere, the earliest and most important identification is with a family which is the chief source of emotional support and gratification. Typically, this experience broadens to embrace varying numbers of relatives and then extends to a wider circle of others seen as sharing common characteristics. Identification with an ethnic group is in many ways comparable to an extension of family ties. Significantly, a belief in common ancestry or at least a common history usually characterizes an ethnic group. As Johnson, Ratwik and Sawyer have pointed out, patriotic references to countries are often expressed in words denoting kinship, such as fatherland, mother country, “Mother Russia” or “Uncle Sam.”33 Those attempting to promote intergroup tolerance frequently proclaim the “brotherhood” of the targeted groups.

For an explanation of the constraints on human affectivity, it is helpful to turn to sociobiology, the rapidly developing and increasingly respected science which studies and compares the behavioral patterns of animal species. Sociobiology assumes that each species has its own “biogram” or innate behavioral tendencies which were developed through evolutionary selection. That is, any trait that enhances the individual’s survival and reproductive success will become increasingly common in future generations and may finally characterize an entire population.

In the case of Homo sapiens, the raw material of the evolutionary process lived primarily in scattered bands of no more than a few dozen men, women and children, most of whom probably had close kinship ties. Under primitive conditions, survival prospects would almost always have been enhanced by cooperation within the group and usually would also have been improved by hostility toward an out-group competing for the same necessities, such as food and shelter. Over countless generations, the survivors would have become increasingly capable of cooperating with each other and of doing whatever was necessary to repel outsiders. The end product of such a long evolutionary process is a social being living and identifying with small related groups and viewing outsiders with hostility and suspicion or, at best, relative indifference.

Evolutionary theory thus views group conflict as an adaptive mechanism that promotes in-group survival. This explanation is not incompatible with the “realistic” explanation that group conflict results from rational competition for limited
resources. Sociobiology actually supports the realistic explanation, implying that intragroup identification and intergroup hostility were so crucial to in-group survival through most of history and pre-history that both tendencies have been “wired in” through evolutionary selection. Sociobiologists are not always in complete agreement about the extent to which such species characteristics can be modified or controlled by culture, but most do appear to believe that some genetic basis exists for near-universals of human behavior, such as in-group identification, intergroup conflict, xenophobia (hostile feelings toward out-groups) and ethnocentrism (a belief in the superiority of one’s own group).

The sociobiological view is strongly supported by research findings in both cultural anthropology and ethology. Cultural anthropologists have traditionally devoted themselves primarily to the study of small non-Western peoples, while ethologists study the behavior of animal species in their natural environments. The notion of genetic underpinnings for ethnocentrism and xenophobia is compatible with the widespread existence of such sentiments in primitive human groups, as well as in social animals. Primitive peoples are prone to kill all strangers or at least to regard them with suspicion and fear, according to summaries of the field research of several generations of anthropologists. 34

The result for primitive peoples frequently has been seclusion, isolation and “pseudo-speciation,” as well as ignorance of other tribes and great variation in culture and language. For example, the American Indians spoke several thousand different languages when the first white men arrived. Even now, more than 700 mutually unintelligible languages exist in New Guinea. Among primitive groups the most fundamental relationship is biological kinship; anyone not a blood relative is often defined as a stranger and enemy. The name for an in-group is very often synonymous with the term “human,” while out-group humans are sometimes classified along with game.

The near universality of such attitudes in primitive peoples around the world strongly suggests that they are reflections of “wired-in” behavioral tendencies. It seems equally likely that the similar attitudes and actions of modern ethnic groups also stem in part from inherent human characteristics and thus will resist efforts to eradicate them. In Vine’s words, the “cultural ubiquity” of ethnocentrism “provides a prima facie reason for hypothesising that at least some of its facets reflect genetically rooted features of our species-specific nature, as this was shaped through natural selection among our hominid ancestors.” 35 McGuire concurs: “... it appears possible for specific attitudes of hostility to be transmitted genetically in such a way that hostility is directed towards strangers of one’s own species to a greater extent than toward familiairs of one’s own species or toward members of other species.” 36

Strengthening the argument that ethnocentrism and xenophobia are genetically-based species characteristics of homo sapiens is voluminous ethological research showing that broadly similar traits are shared by numerous animal species whose behavior is shaped largely by inherent tendencies rather than by culture. The strongest known stimulus to aggressive
behavior in animals is the sight of a stranger. Sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson says: “This xenophobic principle has been documented in virtually every group of animals displaying higher forms of social organization.” Conversely, nothing so encourages group unity and cooperation as the presence of an intruder which must be repelled. A newcomer is perceived as a threat to the status and welfare of every member of a group, and is likely to be greeted by a violent and united front.

The xenophobic principle extends to man’s closest relatives, the primates. In this context, laboratory experiments have refined and supported conclusions based on field observations. One series of controlled experiments determined that the introduction of strange rhesus monkeys into confined groups caused a fourfold to tenfold increase in aggressive interactions. Likewise, in the wild, the aggression displayed when two rhesus groups meet or when a stranger attempts to enter a group far exceeds that seen in the normally stressful daily life of these exceptionally aggressive animals.

Some of the most stomach-turning passages in the ethological literature refer to the killing of an outsider by members of an existing group. One writer describes how a group of caged rats literally tore to pieces a strange rat placed in the cage. The intruder did not resist, apparently exhibiting horrified resignation to his fate. Similarly, a strange chicken added to an existing flock may be harassed to death by repeated attacks day after day.

In some species, notably chimpanzees, groups of related males may form murderous gangs which roam the jungle searching for lone strangers to attack. Jane Goodall has described a protracted chimpanzee “border war” in which a gang of five males defended their territory against male intruders, sitting each day at the boundary and waiting for their quarry. A Goodall research associate reported that, at the sound of other chimps, the waiting five became very excited, hugging each other and touching each others’ genitals prior to streaming down from their hillside observation post toward the strangers.

If the five chimps encountered two or more neighbors, both sides were likely to retreat after a noisy but rarely fatal display. But if a single stranger appeared, the gang descended upon him, possibly with two members holding the victim while a third pounded on him. Or two males might kill the unfortunate intruder by dragging him over rocks. In an unsettling example of animal genocide, a group of about 15 chimpanzees wiped out a smaller neighboring group by killing off one male at a time over a period of months.

The flip side of xenophobia is identification with one’s own group. Here again, ethological data supports the case for the genetic underpinnings of a trait characteristic of many species, including *homo sapiens*. One amazing finding is that members of a number of animal species show an ability to detect their degree of genetic similarity to others and to modify their behavior appropriately, even when dealing with individuals they had not previously encountered. If such a capability is inherent in such animals as ground squirrels, what about humans? Russell et al. have suggested that people can likewise identify genetic similarities and that this presumed
fact accounts for a number of empirical findings indicating that interpersonal attraction is related to similarity in a number of dimensions.

Like animals, humans show a strong tendency to live in groups comprised of individuals with similar characteristics. Sociologists have defined a society as a group of people sharing a comprehensive culture with a common language, common goals and common values and attitudes. These shared characteristics encourage national unity and tend to minimize the degree and divisiveness of disagreements over public policy. The significance of a common culture is revealed in sociological writings about “anomie,” an undesirable societal condition in which individuals are confused, depressed and demoralized by normlessness, conflicting values or a lack of respect for traditional values.

Sociologist Ian Robertson says the result of such normlessness “is a deep psychological disturbance at the individual level . . . and if individual anomie is widespread, disorder at the societal level.” A precondition for the individual’s successful integration into his society is that social norms “should form a consistent and coherent value system.” Robertson says. The popular terms “alienation” and “identity crisis” are somewhat similar to the sociological concept of anomie. The highly diverse multicultural country resulting from uncontrolled immigration to the United States would seem to be a fertile breeding ground for conflict, anomie and alienation, but not for the “consistent and coherent value system” needed for individual and social integration. Part III of this monograph will explore some of the present and possible future consequences of our deliberate attempt to create a society based on scores of ethnic groups with widely differing cultures, languages and religions. Part II details conflicts in divided societies elsewhere.

Part II: Ethnic Conflict Around the World

Afghanistan. With world attention focused largely on the “cold war” aspects of the recent upheaval in Afghanistan, many observers remain unaware of the relevance of internal ethnic conflicts. Professor Jerry J. Hough of Duke University and the Brookings Institution has commented that the Afghanistan war grew out of a 1978 revolt of army officers from the majority Pathan ethnic group (Pashto-speaking and also called Pushtun) against a Farsi-speaking elite with a Persian cultural orientation. The antipathy was so intense that the new regime unleashed a bloodbath against the elite, and the ensuing disorder facilitated the consolidation of Russian control.

Although practically all Afghans are Moslems (80% Sunnis and 18% Shiites), the pieces of the national ethnic mosaic vary greatly in culture, language and physical appearance. A half-dozen languages and scores of recognizable dialects are spoken in various parts of the country. The persistence of such differences, particularly in physical appearance, suggests that relatively little intermarriage or cultural assimilation occurred among the groups that coexisted in the same area for hundreds or thousands of years.
The tall, dark-haired, dark-eyed Pathans, who are often called the only "true Afghans," constitute about 50% of the population. The Tajiks (25%), with lighter skin, hair (10% blonde) and eyes (15% blue), speak Persian and have been conspicuous in business and trade. This group is possibly descended from Alexander the Great's Greek legions, which conquered the region in the fourth century B.C. The Hazaras (9%) are a Mongol people, probably descendants of those left behind after the invasions of Genghis Khan and other Mongol conquerors in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The Uzbeks (9%) are a Turkish or Turko-Mongol group. Smaller ethnic elements include various Turkish or Turko-Mongol tribes as well as the Kafirs or Nuristanis, a relatively fair-haired people, probably descended from the original population.

The mujeheddin guerrilla fighters have been united only in their struggle against the Soviet Union. The seven major groups facing a common enemy have often battled each other as fiercely as they do foreign invaders. Some of the disputes stem from disagreements over the place of Islamic fundamentalism in a post-Soviet society.

Paradoxically, Afghanistan's ethnic division also underpinned the determined resistance of the guerrillas. A Western diplomat explains that the only governments capable of long survival in the country are weak ones that threaten no one but look out for tribal interests. Aside from religious reasons, he argues, the tribes hate the Soviets because their push toward centralized control endangered ethnic group power. Frustrated by continuing opposition, the Soviet Union still has its own important ethnic-related goal in Afghanistan -- to assure enough stability to keep the country from becoming a conduit of Western influence to the USSR's Moslem populations via Pakistan or of Islamic fundamentalism via Iran. Meanwhile, after the 1978 pro-Soviet coup, three million Afghans -- one-fifth of the total -- fled the country, with most going to Pakistan, where the refugees have ethnic kin. The Afghan flight has been called "migratory genocide," apparently encouraged by Soviet occupiers glad to be rid of the most uncooperative elements of the citizenry.

The tendency of Afghans to identify with ethnic group more than with country made national unity difficult to achieve and contributed to external problems after World War II. When the British were preparing to leave India in 1947, Afghanistan, with its Pathan majority, urged in vain that Pathan tribes in India be allowed self-determination instead of being forced to become part of either India or Pakistan. Later, Afghanistan appealed to Pakistan to create an independent state of Pakhtunistan for the Pathans in its North-West Frontier Province. In the early 1960s, the two countries broke diplomatic relations for more than a year over the issue. After the dispute heated up again in the 1970s, Pakistan in 1975 accused Afghanistan of training and arming guerrillas in the area. In September, 1986, five thousand dissident Pakistanis attended a rally in Kabul protesting the division of the Pathan tribes between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

With Afghanistan located along a well-travelled invasion route, from ancient times foreign empires alternated rule with
local kings and emirs who were often weakened by tribal wars. A unified kingdom was not established until the middle of the eighteenth century, after a tribal rebellion against a Persian governor had inspired a national awakening. Even then, the kings of the newly freed Afghans had to devote much time to quelling tribal warfare and rebellion. However, in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, a forceful ruler made considerable progress in diminishing the power of the war-like tribes and promoting a greater spirit of national unity.

During the same period, greater religious uniformity was attained following violence against a non-Moslem ethnic group, the Kafirs. In 1895 an emir sent a military force to the mountain valleys of eastern Afghanistan and forcibly converted the people to Islam. Inhabitants of the area had been pejoratively labelled Kafirs and their land called Kafiristan, meaning “land of the infidels.” The Kafirs were animists whose distinctive culture accorded prestige to any man who had killed a Moslem.

**Algeria.** Algeria was granted independence from France in 1962 as a result of a conflict not unlike those seen in many other colonial areas after World War II. The fight by Algerian nationalists for self-determination grew out of dissatisfaction, with the impact of Western civilization on Moslem life and sharp differences between the political and economic statuses of Europeans and Moslems. At the time of colonization, the best lands had been given to European settlers. Although the natives had been allowed to vote, their political influence was diluted by a system giving equal power to the Moslems and to the much smaller number of Europeans.

The independence movement was countered by 500,000 French troops and by the Secret Army Organization (OAS), a terrorist group created by French military men and French residents of Algeria. However, France eventually grew weary of continued warfare and a large majority of its voters approved proposals to end 132 years of French control. While retaining close ties to France, the newly freed Arabic nation entered the Arab bloc and joined the war against Israel in 1967. Fearful of Moslem domination, most of the one million Europeans in Algeria fled the country soon after independence. Joining the exodus were many Jews, some of them descended from families that had been in Algeria before the French conquest. The three groups could find no way to continue their century-old life in the same land.

At least one ethnic problem remained after the flight of the Europeans. The Berber minority, a non-Arabic, probably Mediterranean people descended from the first known residents, makes up about one-sixth of the population and has periodically protested the government’s suppression of its language and culture. The government’s response to an uprising in April, 1980, left 30 dead.

**Australia.** The early pattern of race relations in Australia resembled that of many other areas where people from an advanced society settled in a region sparsely populated by less advanced groups. The newcomers displayed little regard for any territorial claims of the natives, who offered violent if
sporadic resistance to encroachments. Clashes were often marked by atrocities, but the inevitable result was defeat for the natives. Tribal contact with Western ways led to cultural deterioration and decimation of the population, the latter partly because of exposure to new diseases, adoption of an unbalanced diet obtained from the settlers and unhygienic use of unaccustomed clothing and blankets.

When British settlers arrived in Australia in the late 1700s, they found an estimated 150,000 to 300,000 aborigines, dark-skinned Australoids (a racial group distinct from both Caucasoids and Mongoloids), living as hunters and gatherers, completely dependent on nature. The newcomers appropriated the better lands and eventually rendered impossible the Stone Age way of life of the indigenous people, who were divided into about 500 nomadic tribes, each speaking its own dialect.

Although official British policy was to treat the natives with "amity and conciliation," early contacts led not to cultural assimilation but to a rapid population decline. Because of the natives’ apparent inability to adjust to their sudden emergence from the Stone Age, protectionist policies were adopted in the mid-1800s to ease what was expected to be their "inevitable passing." Nevertheless, some Australoids survived into the twentieth century on reservations and about 2,000 remained in nomadic bands.

From the late 1950s, new assimilationist laws extended numerous rights, including the franchise, to the remaining often racially-mixed aborigines, now numbering 227,000 (1.4 percent of the population). In 1966, an Australian university granted the first degree to an aborigine. New friction arose, however, over the government’s award of mining concessions to foreign companies in areas for which the aboriginal population had land rights but not mineral rights. The land rights problem remained an irritant in the latter half of the 1980s. An aboriginal lawyer with ties to revolutionary forces abroad demanded total sovereignty for the aborigines. In the following year, aboriginal protest marred Australia’s bicentennial celebration of the arrival of the first British settlers.

After World War II, Australia’s immigration and minorities policies responded to ideological currents sweeping the Western nations, as well as to a new perception of its own potentially threatened position as an underpopulated white continent on the doorstep of Asia. This perception, as well as economic considerations, led to a determined effort to increase immigration. Enthusiasm for population growth was such that, for the first time, the traditional preference for British immigrants was relaxed and other Europeans were sought. Non-British migrants included significant numbers from Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Poland and Yugoslavia.

A further departure from tradition occurred in 1966. the "white Australia" policy, in effect since the nineteenth century, was abandoned, partly in response to discussions of the country’s need to live on good terms with its Asian neighbors. It was anticipated that the new laws would apply mostly to Asians with special skills and would not increase non-European immigration much beyond the 700 a year already authorized. The "white Australia" policy was based on the fear that the billions of Asia could sustain a non-violent
invasion that would transform Australia into an Asian country.

The old policy was also breached by the admission of considerable numbers of Vietnamese “boat people,” which government and media urged on humanitarian grounds after several Asian countries had closed their doors to the refugees. This occurred despite the opposition of more than two-thirds of the population, according to opinion polls. By 1984, Asians constituted 33 percent of the immigrants arriving in Australia. At that time, a Gallup poll suggested that 62 percent of Australians believed the intake of Asians was too high, and a majority favored across-the-board cuts in immigration.

Anti-Asian slogans began to appear in bus shelters and phone booths in Sydney, Melbourne and Perth. “Asians out” signs were daubed on the walls on campuses, particularly at the University of New South Wales, by groups complaining that too many slots went to Asians. Anti-Asian organizations sometimes blamed communists for conspiring to “swamp” Australia with Asians. Here, as elsewhere, the postwar one-world euphoria did not lead directly to the anticipated color-blind, multicultural utopia.

Austria. The current image of Austria as a small inconsequential country characterized by Strauss waltzes, ski lifts and scenic views contrasts sharply with its historic position as a great European empire, exceeded only by Russia in territorial size and often exceeded by no other country in influence over European affairs. Austria was a dynastic state, whose history for centuries was the history of the House of Hapsburg, which, after the fifteenth century, produced most of the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire. Through numerous marriages into other royal lines, the Hapsburgs extended their control to Spain. The Netherlands. Italy and even Spanish America.

Austria was the historic defender of the Germans against the French and the defender of Europe against the Turks, who were eventually driven from east central Europe. Expansion of the Austrian state added to a largely Germanic population many other ethnic groups, including Italians, Magyars (Hungarians), Slovenes, Slays, Bohemians, Serbians, Poles and Ruthenians. At the outbreak of World War I, the Austrian-Hungarian empire included parts of the present territories of Austria, Hungary, Poland, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania.

Many parts of the empire were under Austrian control for almost 400 years and some for more than 500 years. Yet the people, who were not divided by truly major racial, religious or cultural differences, clung stubbornly to their subracial or regional identities. Through the centuries, the Magyars remained Magyars, the Slays remained Slavic, and the Italians remained Italian. The great Austrian empire consisted of an ethnic patchwork with no common consciousness or purpose. Finally, the conglomerate fractured along ethnic lines, leaving a modern Austria with a population overwhelmingly German-speaking (98-99%) and Roman Catholic (89%), and a territory about one-fourth the size of the Austrian half of the Austrian-Hungarian empire.

During the final century of the imperial period, the Austrian rulers sought diligently -- even desperately -- for methods of
dampening the rising spirit of ethnic chauvinism that swept their lands, kindling nationalistic and other disruptive demands, such as Hungarian laws making Magyar the state language. Magyars, Italians and Slavs clamored for equality with the Germans. In 1848, revolts broke out in Hungary, Italy, the Tyrol and Vienna. During the same year, the emperor granted a constitution for his non-Hungarian lands, but a second constitution in 1849 changed course and provided for a strongly centralized state. After arousing great opposition in Hungary, that constitution was revoked in 1851, but the contemplated centralized government was nevertheless installed and administered by a German-speaking bureaucracy and a greatly expanded police force.

Trying to meet the demands of various national groups, the emperor less than a decade later granted more powers to local diets (parliaments). When that did not satisfy nationalistic demands, the emperor almost immediately reversed himself and called for a centralized government with a legislature, to which the Hungarians, Czechs and Poles refused to send delegates. In an attempt to end Hungarian disaffection, the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 established a dual monarchy, an empire of Austria and a kingdom of Hungary, each with its own parliament and ministry but with a common sovereign and certain common bodies. After 1867, Austria and Hungary managed their own internal affairs separately.

A series of laws enacted in 1867 limited the power of the central parliament in favor of provincial diets. Among other provisions, these laws accorded equal status to all nationalities and languages. During the last several decades of the empire, the government made important concessions to various nationality groups which had formed coalitions in opposition to the Germans.

From the late nineteenth century, short-term ministries succeeded each other while the emperors and cabinets governed mostly by emergency legislation. Bitter ethnic conflicts reduced the parliament to impotence.

The empire’s ethnic conflict provided the flashpoint for World War I, which was unintentionally ignited in 1914 when a Serbian nationalist assassinated Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne. Austria declared war on Serbia, blaming the assassination on its government, which was thought to wish to unite into a single state all Serbs, including those living in Austria-Hungary. What the Austrians conceived as a local conflict of limited scope quickly engulfed most of Europe. Large segments of the Austro-Hungarian population, especially the Bohemians and South Slavs, opposed the war from the beginning and, as it dragged on, internal dissension grew. Ethnic conflicts hastened a political collapse and armistice application in 1918. Shortly afterward, Emperor Charles issued a manifesto announcing that the empire would be transformed into a federal state.

That manifesto offered a peaceful basis for dismemberment of the great empire, which passed into oblivion along with the 10,000,000 combatants killed during the conflict. After the war, the territory of the empire was divided among Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland and Romania. The political slogan of the day was “self-determination” for
minorities, and many ethnic groups gained independence after centuries of foreign control. Weary of ethnic conflict, the new Austrian republic chose as its name Deutsch-Österreich (German-Austria) and inserted in its basic laws a provision that it would form a part of the German republic. This merger of Germanic peoples, however, did not come until 1938, being vetoed by the victorious Allies, who did not extend the privilege of self-determination to the vanquished.

Besides nationality group friction, Austria was preoccupied with religious conflict for more than a century during the periods of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. At various times and places, Protestant writings were banned, Protestant churches were closed, all worship except Roman Catholic was forbidden, Protestant clergymen were expelled, and Protestants were ordered to accept Catholicism or leave the country. Such measures led eventually to the predominance of Catholicism in a country where several major provinces once had Protestant majorities of up to 90 percent. Suppression of a rebellion by Bohemian Protestants initiated the Thirty Years' War, which ravaged many parts of Europe. In that war, the Austrian Hapsburgs played a leading role as champions of the Catholic cause. Austria's union with Germany in 1938 led to the persecution of another religious group, the Jews, who previously had dominated Viennese intellectual and cultural affairs from about 1880 on.

After World War II, one difficult ethnic problem remained for the now highly homogeneous Austrians. A dispute with Italy arose over the merger of the German-speaking South Tyrol province of Bolzano with the Italian-speaking province of Trento. Austria charged that this and other Italian policies denied the South Tyrolese the autonomy promised by an Austrian-Italian agreement of 1946. Although Austria took the disagreement to the United Nations Assembly, no satisfactory solution emerged. Another issue has centered around the possible loss of identity by Austria's small minorities, such as the Slovenes. Americans of recent European extraction have made heated claims that Austria is practicing "ethnocide" against such groups.

Bahamas. The Bahamas, a tropical British Commonwealth mini-state with a population of only 250,000, has witnessed several kinds of intergroup conflict, one of which completely eliminated the original natives, the Arawak Indians. In the decade following Columbus' arrival in 1492, Spanish raiders carried off about 40,000 natives to work in the mines of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The islands had been uninhabited for more than a century when the first English settlers landed in 1648. No Arawak survives there today.

The early years of the nineteenth century were dominated by local efforts to thwart British attempts to improve the condition of slaves. This struggle climaxed with the United Kingdom Emancipation Act of 1834. The next 35 years were taken up by a struggle for full recognition by dissenters from the established church, which was supported by the government and the upper classes. This divisive conflict ended with disestablishment in 1869.

In recent years, the two major political parties in the Ba-
hamas have been informally divided along racial lines, with one mostly black and the other mostly white. Despite some 250 years of European control, black Bahamians have kept alive elements of their ancestral African culture. An example familiar to tourists is goombay music, sometimes featuring calypso-like narratives but often consisting of simple couplets sung to the accompaniment of drums, maracas and guitar.

**Bahrain.** A tiny island off Saudi Arabia’s coast, Bahrain is ruled by Sunni Moslems, who have arrested leaders of protest demonstrations conducted by pro-Iranian members of the majority Shiite Moslem sect.

**Bangladesh.** Once a part of British India and, after 1947, of Pakistan, Bangladesh gained independence through a separatist movement and a bloody civil war in which an estimated one million Bangladeshis were killed in the fighting or later slaughtered. An additional ten million took refuge in India, creating serious economic and health problems.

The former East Pakistanis shared their Moslem religion with West Pakistanis, but were separated from them by culture, physical appearance and 1,000 miles of Indian territory. Despite differences in religion, the East Bangladeshis of East Pakistan had for well over a thousand years retained a cultural and linguistic unity with the West Bengalis of India.

As a part of Pakistan for almost 25 years, the Bangladeshis unsuccessfully sought greater autonomy. In the country’s first general elections in 1970, East Pakistan’s independence-minded parties won control of the National Assembly with about 170 seats out of a total of 300. When convening of the Assembly was postponed, general strikes and widespread rioting followed in East Pakistan.

The Pakistani president then ordered the national army into the province to crush the separatist movement and arrest its charismatic leader as a traitor. The next day, the leader, Sheikh Mujib, declared the independence of Bangladesh. The national army’s East Bengal Regiment immediately defected to join the Bangladeshi armed forces. The army was pinned down for several days before mounting a successful military campaign of great ferocity, which quickly defeated the Bangladeshis.

A few months later, India launched an attack in Bangladesh and recognized the Bangladeshi provisional government. After a whirlwind Indian campaign, the Pakistani forces surrendered on December 16, 1972. Freed from jail in Pakistan, Sheikh Mujib became prime minister of an independent Bangladesh.

**Belgium.** A dominant theme in Belgian history is conflict between the two major ethnic and linguistic groups, the Dutch-speaking Flemish, a Germanic people, and the French-speaking Walloons, of Celtic antecedents. Friction between the two groups was partly responsible for delaying Belgium’s independence until 1830, when it revolted against the Netherlands, and has since interfered so seriously with national unity that the small country is increasingly divided into semi-autonomous regions. In the 1980s, the prospect of Belgium actually
breaking up was being openly discussed.

The major ethnic groups are generally separated into geographical areas, which are defined by law as linguistic, cultural and administrative units. These “cultural communities” were established by a constitutional revision of 1970 in an attempt to reduce ethnic tensions. However, in 1972, the national government fell when a major clash erupted over the transfer of six small hamlets from Flemish to Walloon control. In 1980, the government granted a still greater degree of autonomy to the Flemish and Walloon areas. Nevertheless, in the mid-1980s, still another national government was toppled by a festering dispute -- which sounds ridiculous to outsiders -- about a local mayor’s refusal to take a language test.

Political parties are typically divided into Flemish and Walloon wings, making it almost impossible for any single group to attain a parliamentary majority. The results have been unstable coalitions, frequent leadership crises, and 32 governments in the 40 years after World War II. The most divisive issues of the 1970s involved the degree of control ethnic councils would be allowed over educational, cultural and economic affairs.

In recent years, political discussions across the “linguistic frontier” became even more divisive by focusing attention on the questions, “Who pays?” and “Who benefits?” as a result of government taxing and spending policies. The answers appear to be that the prosperous Flemings pay a disproportionate share of taxes while the minority Walloons receive a disproportionate share of benefits, such as subsidies for their outdated steel and coal industries. The different economic perceptions of the two major ethnic groups have further fragmented and confused political parties. In 1985, the Socialist regional prime minister of Wallonia commented ruefully that he felt “closer affinity” with a Walloon capitalist than with a Flemish socialist.

Legislated linguistic zones mean that, on one side of the dividing line, all public signs and most advertisements are in French; a few yards away, the words become Flemish, a Dutch dialect. The linguistic boundary has remained distinct with only minor modifications for 1400 years. Particularly bitter controversy has centered around what the language of instruction should be in schools and universities. Demands for Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteenth century and eventually led to a 1932 law stating that schools should use the language of the region of their location. In 1930, Flemish-language schools began in the nineteen
Despite strong Flemish support and both plebiscite and parliamentary votes in his favor, King Leopold, who had remained in Belgium during the World War II German occupation, was forced in 1950 to accede to Walloon and socialist calls for his abdication. During the 1930s and other critical periods, Belgian defense posture was weakened by the desire of soldiers to serve under military commanders who spoke their own language, and sometimes to fight for Flemish or Walloon soil rather than Belgian.

Although Belgium is now 97 percent Roman Catholic, religious division and persecution occurred sporadically during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as the Reformation and Counter-Reformation preoccupied Europe. However, many Protestants were allowed to migrate northward and the Catholic Counter-Reformation was triumphant.

In the 1980s, another type of ethnic problem surfaced in Belgium, as well as in neighboring countries which had imported workers from outside of Western Europe during the boom years of the postwar recovery. Exacerbated by the high unemployment of the 1980s, ethnic group tensions mounted. In what it described as a move to cut its 14 percent jobless rate, Belgium in 1985 offered unemployed immigrants from outside of the Common Market countries financial incentives to return home. The Labor Ministry said those who had been unemployed for more than a year would get a bonus equal to one year of unemployment benefits if they left and did not settle in another Common Market nation. The cost of the program was estimated at $5,000 per immigrant. Many of Belgium’s unemployed immigrants were “visible minorities” from Turkey and North Africa.

In October, 1987, Joseph Michel, the Belgian interior minister, caused a furor by commenting as follows on the situation in Brussels, where immigrants make up 25 percent of the population: "We risk being, like the Roman people, invaded by barbarians, who are the Arabs, Moroccans, Yugoslavs and the Turks, people who come from far away and who have nothing in common with our civilization.” Daniel Ferret, a Brussels doctor who founded the new National Front political party, expressed this similar worry: "We are afraid that in the year 2000 the immigrants will be in the majority in this country and they will be the masters.” Meanwhile, in Belgium as elsewhere in Western Europe, public resentment continued to sharpen toward Third World immigrants, who are often blamed for such urban problems as crime, drug addiction and AIDS.

Bermuda. A self-governing British dependency, Bermuda has racially divided political parties, the predominantly white United Bermuda party and the black-led Progressive Laborites. The predominantly white party retained power through three recent electoral contests against the opposition, although the population is 60% black. The mostly black party has sought independence for Bermuda.

Serious rioting broke out and British troops were called in to restore order in 1977 after two blacks were hanged for a series of murders, including the 1973 assassination of the governor,
Sir Richard Sharples.

**Bolivia.** After the Spaniards conquered the Incas in the 1600s, the predominantly Indian population was reduced to virtual slavery, with many sent to work in the silver mines. Bolivia was one of the first of the Spanish colonies in the New World to revolt. Defeat of Spanish forces led to a proclamation of independence in 1825, ending almost 300 years of rule by the Spaniards. Wide social and economic gaps still remain between the Andean Indian peasants and miners and the urban minorities of European origin.

**Botswana.** Tribal identification remains so strong in this African nation of one million people that the constitution provides not only for a unicameral National Assembly, but also for a House of Chiefs, which has a voice on all legislation relevant to tribal affairs.

**Brazil.** As Brazil attempted to open its huge undeveloped areas along the Amazon River in the 1970s, ethnic group behavior was reminiscent of comparable periods in the American West. Indians wearing war paint attacked settlers and highway construction workers encroaching on their territory. In turn, the Indians were often mistreated or even killed with little provocation. Although one to five million Indians once lived in Brazil, only 200,000 now survive. Brazilian law deems them “relatively incapable,” putting them on a par with adolescents, making them wards of the state and placing their interests in the hands of the National Indian Foundation. One draft of a new constitution under discussion in 1987 describes the Indians even more negatively as “absolutely incapable.”

**Bulgaria.** Bulgaria, with a population derived from Slavs and Turkic-speaking Bulgars, was conquered in the fourteenth century by the Ottoman Turks and remained under their control for five centuries. Still retaining their ethnic identity, the Bulgarians revolted against the Turks in 1876 but were crushed by the brutal reprisals of the “Bulgarian Massacres,” during which Turkish irregulars slaughtered between 10,000 and 15,000 people and burned villages and churches. With Russian support, however, Bulgaria achieved a degree of autonomy in 1878, and thirty years later declared its independence. In return, Bulgaria has thus far remained the least restive of the USSR’s European satellites. Significantly, the Russian and Bulgarian languages use the same alphabet and are so similar that both can be understood by an educated person in either country.

During the centuries of Ottoman control, the Bulgarians suffered discrimination more as a Christian religious minority than as a nationality group. Subjects of the Ottoman Empire could escape second-class status by converting to the Moslem faith of their conquerors. Those who did not were required to submit to many restrictions, including disproportionately high taxes and limitations on manner of dress and type of buildings constructed.

One of the most severe special taxes was the *devshirme*, a
tax on children. About every five years, 25% of the Christian boys between the ages of 10 and 20 were selected by Ottoman officials for conversion to Islam and special schooling, after which they were sent into government administration or to the Janissaries, an elite Ottoman army corps. Although this system was the major avenue of upward social mobility open to Christian children, it was greatly hated by parents who lost their sons.

Reports of new horrors involving Bulgarians and Turks have recently emerged from the communist bloc. The goal appears to be to deprive ethnic Turks, who make up 10% of the Bulgarian population, of both their Moslem religion and their Turkish names.

At least 200 Turks have reportedly been killed in fighting Sofia’s “Bulgarization” program. Assimilation is said to be encouraged by rolling tanks into villages with high proportions of Turks and ordering people at gunpoint to change the offending names. Resistance is met by stripping women in public and beating men. In some areas the Bulgarians have outlawed the Turkish language, destroyed mosques, and forced practicing Moslems from their jobs.

Efforts at forcible assimilation appear to have been inspired in part by anti-government bombs exploded in Plovdiv, the center of a Turkish area. Some observers have speculated that a longer-term consideration may be that the Moslem Turks reproduce faster than the officially godless Bulgarians and thus could eventually be a larger and more troublesome minority unless the pace of assimilation quickens.

Burma. During World War II, when Burma was a part of the British Empire, Burmese nationalists helped the Japanese expel the British from most of the country. Under the Japanese, the Burmese developed a small national army and in 1943 were granted independence. British rule was restored in 1946, but in 1947 a constituent assembly voted for complete independence.

After Burma became independent in 1948, it soon faced armed uprisings by Karen tribesmen, who constituted about seven percent (two to three million) of the population. The British had considered creating a separate Karen state before their departure, but were unable to reach a generally acceptable agreement about territorial boundaries. The Karens opposed independence, and afterward occasionally ran up the Union Jack after capturing a piece of territory from the Burmese government. This group was similar to minorities in many other areas in preferring colonial rule to domination by a distrusted national majority. The Karens won a substantial degree of autonomy in 1949, but launched new rebellions in 1971 and 1976.

A revolutionary council established in 1962 by General Ne Win drove Indians from the civil service and Chinese from commerce. Both ethnic groups were relatively small, but under British rule Indians had run the lower levels of government and they, along with the Chinese, had dominated commerce. The replacement of Indians and Chinese by Burmese was politically popular but economically inefficient, at least in the short run. Earlier, Indians had been attacked in the severe
riots of 1938.

Burundi. One of Africa’s worst tribal wars, which ended in genocide, was touched off by the 1972 invasion of Burundi by Hutu exiles. Although the Bantu Hutus (Bahutus) made up 85% of the population, they had been dominated for centuries by the minority Tutsi (Watusi) tribes, the descendants of earlier invaders. After the Hutu invasion failed, the victorious Tutsis massacred as many as 200,000 -- about five percent of the population -- and drove another 200,000 into exile. Many of the dead were reportedly killed because their education and skills might enable them to compete with the ruling clans. An earlier massacre of Hutus occurred in 1965, following unsuccessful attempted coup against the Tutsis.

Cambodia. In Cambodia, a deadly mixture of ethnic hatred and ideological fervor led in the mid-1970s to one of the grisliest bloodbaths in history. Of a population of seven million, an estimated two to three million perished at the hands of the communist Khmer Rouge. In addition to mass murder and oppression of Cambodians (Khmers), the communist leaders launched a genocidal campaign against ethnic Vietnamese living in Cambodia, killing thousands and driving tens of thousands to seek refuge in Vietnam.

Khmer hostility toward the Vietnamese had a long history extending back to the time when attacks by Vietnamese and Thais had ended a Khmer kingdom that had dominated most of Southeast Asia for many centuries. In the twentieth century Khmer nationalism was rekindled in Cambodia, the remnant of the old kingdom, partly by the Japanese during their World War II occupation. Resurgent nationalism and communism then combined to permit the Cambodians and Vietnamese to cooperate in expelling, first, their French colonial masters and then the American military forces.

Once the foreign threat was removed, the two ancient enemies turned on each other and on each other’s ethnic minorities. By 1979, Cambodia was under Vietnam’s control, although relatively low-level warfare continued in certain areas. After the Vietnamese invasion, a second wave of fleeing ethnic refugees included Khmers and also Chinese, many of whom made their way to China. At the same time, an estimated 250,000 Vietnamese civilians arrived and settled in Cambodia. Among them were many ethnic Vietnamese who had fled or been expelled earlier by the Pol Pot or Lon Nol regimes in Cambodia.

The Vietnamese determination to control Cambodia was fueled by historic memories and apparently by a feeling that they should inherit the position of the French colonizers, a sentiment not uncommonly seen in newly independent colonies. The warring Indochinese communists, like the Chinese and Russian ones earlier, are reminders of the primacy of historical, cultural and ethnic tensions over shared ideology.

Canada. The central fact of Canadian life has long been the country’s division into two major ethnic groups. English-speaking and French-speaking. As early as 1839, a famous
A report by the Earl of Durham described "two nations warring in the bosom of a single state." In the 1960s, a Canadian professor offered this concurring opinion: "The history of Canada is, to a large extent, the history of the tensions, conflicts and compromises between its two contesting partners -- English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians." In the 1970s, ethnic conflict led to a separatist crisis which, for a time, threatened to dissolve the political ties between French-speaking Quebec and the rest of Canada. Capturing control of the Quebec provincial government, the separatist Parti Quebecois promised to seek independence for the province. Its leader, Rene Levesque, shocked English-speaking Canadians with a speech in which he declared that the question was not when but how Quebec would achieve independence.

The provincial government voted in 1974 to make French the exclusive official language of Quebec. A later law required the use of French for all public signs. (A Montreal stationery store owner was convicted of the crime of displaying a sign in English outside his shop.) Conflict over the language issue, particularly its application to schools, kept separatism in the forefront as a national issue. While the controversy raged unabated, Quebec lost many businesses, including the nation's largest insurance company, which cited the language law as the reason for moving its headquarters to Toronto. One hundred thousand English speakers, 14 percent of the total, left Quebec. Such economic pressures apparently helped to dampen separatist sentiment, and the immediate crisis passed.

Secession was averted partly through the efforts of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, a French Canadian, whose election was facilitated by fears of national dissolution. Trudeau supported increased bilingualism and greater provincial autonomy, but declared in 1978 that he would use force to prevent a declaration of independence by the Quebec government. In 1979, the Canadian Supreme Court voided a French language law, while 58% of Quebec voters opposed independence in a 1980 referendum on the issue.

Nevertheless, when Queen Elizabeth signed the new Constitution severing the ties between Britain and Canada in 1982, Quebec Premier Levesque refused to attend the ceremony and told a Montreal crowd, "We are no longer Canadians." Meanwhile, French-speaking Canadians had been assured of French-language education and federal services anywhere in the country. Earlier, provinces had been given the right to "opt out" of any federal programs in which the national and provincial governments shared costs, and to receive equivalent federal grants instead. Nevertheless, the 1987 death of Levesque and the emergence of an articulate new leader of the Parti Quebecois rekindled Quebec's dreams of a New France. The slogan on auto license tags in Quebec says "I remember." Meanwhile, the beginnings of a new separatist movement appeared in western Canada, which had long felt the weight of eastern dominance.

The separatist crisis of the 1970s had been building since the establishment of an independence party in Quebec in 1963. During the same year, young separatists created a general reign of terror in Montreal, bombing federal buildings and
placing bombs in mailboxes in English-speaking areas. This twentieth-century separatist movement was only the most recent major phase of continuing conflict between Canada’s two largest ethnic groups. Four rebellions and numerous other controversies -- large and small, regional and national -- occurred over the centuries, many centering around language use, especially in schools, and the status of denominational schools.

Prior to the British military conquest in the 1760s, French Canada was religiously and ethnically homogeneous and had developed its own political, judicial and social institutions. These were threatened by foreign political control, as well as by the immigration of large numbers of English-speaking people, from both Europe and the United States. Two unsuccessful insurrections broke out in the region of Montreal in 1837 and 1838. The Metis ethnic group, descendants of early unions between French men and Indian women, mounted two other insurrections in 1869-70 and 1884. Execution of the Metis leader, Louis Riel, created a martyr for French Canadian nationalism and led to an outburst of ethnic feeling that shook the Dominion.

Successive crises arose -- in 1870 in Manitoba, in 1905 in the Northwest provinces, and in 1913 in Ontario -- over the establishment of French schools. French Canadian resentment flared in three other major crises when many concluded that Canadian foreign policy was too intertwined with British imperialistic aims. These controversies were inspired by Canadian participation in the Boer War in South Africa in 1900, the creation of a Canadian navy in 1910, and the use of conscription to build military forces during World War I. The “conscription crisis” left a legacy of bitterness among French Canadians who, despite devotion to their language, religion and culture, had no strong emotional ties to France itself.

Chiefly because of the early presence of two large and distinct ethnic groups, Canada never embraced a “melting pot” ideology, as did its southern neighbor, but accepted the permanence of a multicultural “ethnic mosaic.” Increasingly variegated, that mosaic now comprises more than 75 cultural groups in addition to people of British or French descent, who constitute, respectively, about 45% and 30% of the population. Among the sizeable European immigrant groups were the Germans, Ukrainians, Italians, Dutch, Poles and Jews. Since liberalization of immigration laws in the 1960s, immigrants have come increasingly from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. In recent years, a majority have been from the Third World, mostly nonwhite.

This demographic change is not occurring without substantial social upheaval. Even government officials favoring large increases in Third World immigration have admitted that new residents often bring with them social unrest that originated in their native countries. Most conspicuously, many Sikhs in Canada have continued anti-Hindu activities. These have included violent anti-Hindu demonstrations and, allegedly, an assassination plot against Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and two bombings of Air India flights out of Canada, one of which killed more than 300 passengers near the coast of Ireland.
Canada has attracted large numbers of illegal aliens -- an estimated 100,000 in the Metropolitan Toronto area alone -- and has only a slow, cumbersome legal system to deal with the problem. A number of illegals have reacted violently and sometimes murderously to attempts to apprehend or deport them.

Efforts to absorb the new “visible minorities” have led to various restrictions on the traditional rights of native Canadians. Among them are affirmative action employment policies favoring new immigrants, which are specifically permitted by the recent Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and “anti-hate laws” which restrict speech that can be construed as derogatory toward an identifiable group. Extension of similar goals to the printed word appear also to have restricted freedom of the press.

Some Canadians, often in official positions, have advocated still stronger restrictions on freedom of speech and the press to combat “racism.” A lack of public unanimity on the subject was reflected in this reply by Claire Hoy, columnist for a major newspaper: “I’m beginning to think the only solution to racism is that all white Anglo-Saxons are going to have to leave. Apologizing, it seems, isn’t enough.” Minority spokesmen have attempted -- with some success -- to ban textbooks that gave historically accurate but unflattering pictures of various groups and areas ranging from the Huron Indians to India and Africa. As in the United States, zealous minority rights advocates have protested the singing of Christmas carols in schools and the observance of Christmas as a statutory holiday.

Other byproducts of the ethnic stew have been demands by several minorities for economic compensation for past discrimination. The federal government resolved one complaint by turning over waterfront parkland to an Indian band. Calling the act a “nutty giveaway,” columnist Doug Collins pointed out that applying the same logic to the country as a whole would mean “the whole damned place would have to be given back.” Collins’ utterances prompted the picketing of his offices by the Aboriginal Support Committee and calls for a boycott of his newspaper by both readers and advertisers.

Many Canadians have expressed generalized concerns about the future of their nation, often fearing that white Canadians would eventually be outnumbered in their own country. A 1985 survey of white Canadians found that a majority feared being thrust into minority status. A 1987 Gallup Poll showed 77.6 percent of Canadians opposed to immigration that upsets the ethnic balance. Newspaper columnist Barbara Amiel asked if the white Canadian would finally become an “endangered species” in a population largely of East Indian and African stock. Under intense public pressure, the Mulroney government in 1987 recalled Parliament to pass bills designed to crack down on illegal aliens claiming to be political refugees. Public opinion had been inflamed by several incidents, including a rash of gang-style killings linked to Asian youth gangs which appeared to be broadening their recruiting patterns beyond Chinese or Vietnamese immigrants to form broader alliances with other Third World ethnic groups. 10

Earlier Canadian history was marked by three dramatic incidents of ethnic expulsion, one unrelated to the English-
French conflict. During World War II, Canada, like the United States, interned persons of Japanese descent in locations away from the Pacific coastal areas where they had been concentrated. In 1628, all Protestants, including French Huguenots, were banished from New France to avoid religious controversy, which Cardinal Richelieu had concluded would make successful colonization improbable if not impossible. Ethnic conflict thus dates back to the first French settlements on the North American continent, where Catholics and Huguenots attempted to work together in the establishment of a French empire.

The expulsion of French Acadians -- movingly described by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow in his poem “Evangeline” -- drove them from an eastern coastal area which had long been contested in wars between France and England. In 1755, with a war imminent and the neutrality of the Acadians in doubt, the British demanded of them either a binding oath of loyalty or withdrawal to French territory. With the encouragement of French officials and priests, many Acadians refused both alternatives. As a result, 6,000 out of a total of 10,000 were forcibly deported in a move accompanied by much hardship and deprivation. Some made their way to Louisiana, where George Washington Cable wrote about their subsequent life, and 2,000 eventually returned to Nova Scotia and became subjects of the British crown.

Chad. After gaining independence from France in 1960, the north African nation of Chad alternated between periods of internal warfare and “national unity” government. The major groups contending for power differed in race, religion and region, with the north dominated by Arab-oriented Moslems and the south by Christian-led but largely animistic black tribes. The nomadic or semi-nomadic northerners bitterly resented control by the Negroid agricultural peoples, whom the Arabs traditionally scorned as slaves.

In 1963, a state of emergency was declared and Moslem leaders were arrested after an abortive coup d’etat. From 1968, Arab guerrillas rebelled against the Bantu-dominated government, and in 1980 rival guerrilla groups fought each other in street battles utilizing tanks, rockets and artillery. Foreign troops intervened sporadically after independence, with France supporting the Bantu government and Libya, Egypt and Sudan assisting fellow Moslems.

The Moslem leader, Hissen Habre, seized power in Chad in 1982 after his troops routed the army of a Moslem opponent. Southern tribes then threatened to secede, and de facto division into northern and southern regions became a reality in a country onceoptimistically referred to as “Africa's melting pot.” Between 1965 and mid-1987, more than 21,000 were killed in ethnic-related violence.

China. China is among the world’s most ethnically homogeneous countries, with 96 percent of its billion-plus people comprised of Han-Chinese who share a common history, a common culture and a common written language. Yet the land has been stained by the world’s bloodiest civil war, led by a non-conformist religious sect, as well as by ethnic revolts and
a rebellion directed toward religious and ethnic minorities.

Through it all, for thousands of years, China waged a sometimes losing battle against foreign control. The 4,000-mile-long Great Wall, built over 2,300 years ago to protect the Chinese from the invading Hsiung-nu (Huns), symbolizes the country’s determination to maintain its identity. Even two long periods of foreign rule, by Mongols (1271-1368) and Manchus (1644-1911), did little to alter the underlying culture.

A quasi-Christian religious sect led by Hung Hsiu-ch’uan, who purported to be a younger brother of Jesus Christ, touched off the world’s bloodiest civil war (1853-1864) in which 20,000,000 to 30,000,000 died, according to most estimates. Rapidly attracting large numbers of disaffected peasants in southern China, the uprising swept across the Yangtze province and captured Nanking, which became a rebel capital. More than 100,000 were later killed by government forces in the sack of Nanking, which fell in July 1864, largely ending the T’ai-p’ing (“Peace”) Rebellion.

Diverse ethnic minority groups, found chiefly in border areas or on marginal agricultural lands, have presented persistent problems. The Chinese Communists have attempted to ease traditional minority-related tensions by creating autonomous regions and districts where ethnic groups could preserve their own cultural traditions. However, the government also inundated such areas as Tibet and Inner Mongolia with so many Chinese that sheer numbers overwhelmed the native cultures, controlled elections and influenced the choice of minority leaders. In Inner Mongolia, Chinese settlers outnumber Mongols four to one. The Manchus, earlier in this century a distinct subracial and cultural group, are outnumbered by Chinese 25 to one in Manchuria. In Tibet and East Turkestan (Sinkiang), Chinese make up more than half of the total populations.

An uprising of the Tibetan minority within China in 1956 spread to Tibet in 1959. Revolts continued in 1965-66, and fighting was reported as late as 1976. In 1987, six people were killed and 19 policemen seriously injured in rioting following a pro-independence demonstration in Lhasa. The International Commission of Jurists charged the Chinese regime with genocide in Tibet in 1961. Earlier internal revolts in China from 1855 to 1873 had involved Moslem minorities in the Southwest and Northwest.

In the long fight for cultural autonomy, hundreds of recorded anti-Christian incidents occurred in the nineteenth century after treaties with Western nations forced China to accept missionaries. At the turn of the twentieth century, hostilities peaked in the Boxer Rebellion, during which armed bands of peasants attacked Christian missionaries and their converts in a desperate popular attempt to eliminate foreign cultural influence.

Two types of disregard for human life not seen in the modern world were displayed by the ancient Chinese, and usually directed toward non-Chinese. During the Shang dynasty (1523-1028 B.C.) human sacrifice, especially of prisoners of war, was common. Similarly, the slaves of a deceased king were often buried alive with him.
**Comoros.** The Comoros Islands in the Indian Ocean declared their independence from France in 1975. However, the most populous island, Mayotte, with a Christian majority, twice voted against joining the three predominantly Moslem islands in the move to self-rule and remains French.

**Costa Rica.** The whitest and richest Central American country, Costa Rica regards itself as a slice of Europe, while others sometimes describe it as the most racist nation in its region. Costa Rica’s small black and Indian minorities have always occupied positions outside the societal mainstream.

Before 1948, Caribbean blacks were not granted citizenship even if born in Costa Rica, and as recently as the 1960s were not permitted to live in the capital city. Although such laws have been repealed and blacks have made economic and political gains, most remain somewhat geographically isolated in towns along the Atlantic coast. Blacks constitute an estimated two percent of the Costa Rican population, while only about 2,000 Indians survive, principally on reservations in rural areas.

When Spanish settlers arrived in 1563, they found that the ferocious indigenous Indians, numbering about 25,000, could not be successfully used as plantation laborers. Large numbers were then shipped off to Panama or to Peruvian mines. The mass expulsion partly accounts for the present predominantly white population of Costa Rica. Since the Indians were gone, no large mestizo (mixed Indian and white) group emerged there, as it did in so many other Latin American countries.

**Cuba.** After the Castro regime seized power in 1959, it declared victory over racism and announced that henceforth only undifferentiated “Cubans” would live in Cuba. However, there as elsewhere, the law could not easily eradicate the historical experience of peoples. Describing Castro’s regime as racist and negrophobic, sociologist Carlos Moore says it has denigrated Afro-Cuban culture and explicitly tried to extinguish it from the Cuban population.

**Cyprus.** Despite more than 400 years of coexistence, Cyprus’ two major ethnic groups remain intensely identified with their mother countries and cultures. Both groups regard themselves first as Greeks or Turks and Orthodox or Moslem, and only secondarily as Cypriots. Their mutual antagonism led in 1974 to a de facto partition of the island into a Turkish northern area and a Greek southern zone.

The Greek group, constituting 78% of the population, has for centuries sought self-determination and reunion (enosis) with Greece, while the Turks prefer partition or cantonization of the island. After Turkish rule from 1571, Cyprus was annexed by Great Britain at the outbreak of World War I. The Greek Cypriot demand for enosis erupted into violence in 1931 and again in 1954, followed by a terrorist campaign in 1955–

Cyprus became independent, but not unified, in 1960. In an effort to balance the interests of the two major ethnic groups, the Cyprus constitution required a Greek president, a Turkish vice president, and an elected house of representatives with a
ratio of 70 percent Greek and 30 percent Turkish members. Civil service posts were to be allocated in the same proportions. On that basis, the republic came into existence in 1960, but the Greeks bitterly resented the disproportionate advantage given to the Turks relative to their numbers. Proposals to amend the constitution were, however, rejected by minority spokesmen.

Civil war broke out in 1963, requiring a United Nations peace-keeping force to separate the two warring factions. In 1974, pro-enosis Greeks led a coup which overthrew the president, Archbishop Makarios III, head of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus. Five days later 40,000 Turkish troops invaded Cyprus, asserting their right to protect Turkish Cypriots. About 180,000 Greeks were driven from their homes in northern Cyprus, and most of the 45,000 Turks from the southern region eventually fled northward. U. S. Ambassador Rodger P. Davies was fatally shot during the Greek Cypriot riots in 1974.

After the restored President Makarios offered self-government to the Turkish minority, the Turkish Cypriots in 1975 proclaimed a separate state in the island’s northern section and elected officials. The dispute escalated again in 1983, when the Turkish Cypriots in the north declared their independence from the government controlled by Greek Cypriots. Subsequent attempts to reconcile the two ethnic groups have been plagued by the same intractable antagonisms that created the de facto division of the island.

**Czechoslovakia.** Czechoslovakia has been called a “synthetic state” because its two major ethnic groups, Czechs and Slovaks, have never achieved a broadly-based sense of national unity. The people never became Czechoslovaks, but retained their separate identities, although they are ethnically similar western Slavic groups who lived side by side for 1500 years and shared a common language until the mid-1800s. Their inability to cooperate fully contributed to the failure of national endeavors at critical points in Czechoslovakia’s tragic history.

That history of two small peoples totalling only 15,000,000 strikingly illustrates a surprising range of ethnic interaction, including autonomous, ethnically-based regional government within a federation; expulsion of large minorities; population exchange between two countries; irredentist demands by neighboring countries; recruitment of immigrants and subsequent antagonism toward the newcomers; severe religious persecution; religious war; rebellion against foreign rulers; partial loss of ethnic identity under foreign control; and revival of ethnic culture and language after centuries of submergence.

The Czechs and Slovaks joined other Slavs in the Great Moravian Empire in the ninth century, and then parted politically for a thousand years when the Empire disintegrated under German and Magyar (Hungarian) attack. The Slovaks fell under Magyar control, while the Czechs created the Bohemian kingdom, a powerful political and military force in medieval Europe. In the thirteenth century, the kingdom invited large numbers of German immigrants to settle in Bohemia, bringing with them superior skills in crafts, commerce, agriculture and
Bohemia in the fifteenth century was the scene of what the Czechs consider the “first Protestant reformation.” Its most important leader, Jan Hus, was burned at the stake in 1415, although the emperor had guaranteed his safety. The Hus martyrdom provoked a mass revolt that was both anti-Catholic and anti-German in that Germans dominated the church hierarchy in Bohemia. After defeating five great armies of “crusaders” mustered by the emperor and the pope, the Hussites arranged an uneasy truce with the Catholic Church and preserved their religion for almost two more centuries.

The Czechs came increasingly under the control of the Austrian Hapsburgs and under the influence of a Counter-Reformation pushed by zealous Jesuits. After 1620, under the unsympathetic Hapsburgs, the Czechs lost their independence, their religion, most of their native leadership, which was executed, exiled or encouraged to emigrate, and often their lives. The Thirty Years’ War -- a bitter, largely religious conflict -- reduced the population of Bohemia-Moravia by two-thirds, a loss made up by massive German settlement. The Czech language was largely replaced by German, except in the speech of servants and peasants.

During the eighteenth century, Hapsburg attempts to hasten the total absorption of Bohemia finally aroused nationalist resistance, led by a coalition of Bohemian nobles and intellectuals. Compiling grammars and dictionaries and publishing periodicals and newspapers, these men revived the Czech language and Czech national consciousness by the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1848, a year of revolutions throughout Europe, the Czechs demanded not only a restoration of their historic rights, but also a federalization of the Hapsburg empire into ethnic units having political and cultural equality. This plan visualized the reunion of the Czechs and Slovaks into one unit.

From then until World War I, political concessions were granted only slowly, but Czech cultural and economic progress accelerated. These advances frightened the Bohemian German minority, the Sudeten Germans, who developed strong identification with other Germanic peoples. During World War I, great numbers of Czech soldiers deserted the Hapsburg army and fought with its opponents, while within Bohemia an underground passive resistance movement appeared.

These efforts led in 1918 to the proclamation of an independent Czechoslovak republic. Joined again with the Czechs were the Slovaks, who for 1,000 years had been incorporated into the kingdom of Hungary. Nationalist stirrings, including creation of a native literary language, developed in the eighteenth century among the Slovaks, as among the Czechs Simultaneously, the Hungarians intensified their policies of Magyarization, which included the closing of all Slovak secondary schools.

The country’s greatest problem was the existence of large dissatisfied national minorities. Czechs and Slovaks constituted only two-thirds of the population, which also included
Germans, Magyars, Ruthenes, Jews and Poles. The new state rejected the notion of a federation of nationalities and established a highly centralized government. The Germans, Magyars, Ruthenes and Poles all began agitating for union with their neighboring motherlands. The Slovaks were also dissatisfied to the point of considering secession because they found themselves in a Czech-dominated regime rather than in the autonomous Slovak state they had been promised.

Germany and Hungary made irredentist claims for incorporation of their separated peoples within their own boundaries and ultimately achieved their aims. A Great Powers conference in Munich in 1938 agreed to Adolf Hitler’s demand that Czechoslovakia cede western border areas to Germany. Soon afterward, Hungary and Poland also seized frontier areas and the Czechs granted autonomy to the Slovaks and Ruthenes. In 1939, a German invasion led to the establishment of the "Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia" and an independent Slovak republic.

After World War II, the Czechs and Slovaks voluntarily reunited and reduced the size of the national minorities that had presented such problems between the two wars. About three million Sudeten Germans were expelled, 700,000 Ruthenes were transferred to the Soviet Union and a population exchange was begun with Hungary. However, the new Czechoslovakia soon passed behind the Iron Curtain. In 1969, its constitution was amended to provide at last for Czech and Slovak local autonomy within a federal state. The House of Nations, one body of the bicameral Federal Assembly, consists of equal numbers of representatives from the Czech Republic and from the Slovak Republic.

Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The three Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, have been joined in various ways during their long intertwined histories, but each union disintegrated under the pressure of conflicting interests. Nordic history recounts bitter “wars of the north,” rebellion by one country against rule by another, the rise of nationalist feelings, independence movements and a counter-productive massacre of nationalist leaders. Yet the three nations, separate only since 1905, have populations highly similar in many critical respects. They are predominantly physically similar Nordic peoples who are overwhelmingly Lutheran and whose languages are mutually understandable. Moreover, the combined population of the three countries is so small (under 20,000,000) that union would appear to offer considerable advantages in joint defense planning, a larger economic market and a greater role in international affairs.

For brief periods in the tenth and eleventh centuries, Denmark controlled most of Norway and Sweden. In the fourteenth century, the three Scandinavian countries were united under the Danish monarch. However, the Swedes were in continual revolt. Danish kings at times invaded Sweden with their troops. The final chapter began in 1520, when King Christian II of Denmark opened his reign in Sweden with the beheading of 80 national leaders who had gathered for his coronation. Within three years after this Stockholm bloodbath, the Swedes had driven out the Danes and achieved
independence, although struggles continued for 50 years as the Danes tried to restore the Scandinavian Union. The last Danish provinces on the Swedish mainland were not recaptured by the Swedes until the Swedish-Danish war of 1655-58.

Denmark and Norway remained united from the fourteenth century until 1814, although peasant uprisings erupted occasionally. From the late 1700s, nationalist aspirations arose in Norway. An independence movement developed in the early 1800s. Upon attaining independence from Denmark in 1814, Norway entered into a union with Sweden. Sweden expected a complete amalgamation of the two countries, but Norway considered itself autonomous with a personal union under the Swedish king. Friction quickly appeared, often about issues related to the degree of union. Squabbles centered around Norway's flag, national celebrations and titles of nobility as well as details of financial affairs, foreign relations and institutional bonds.

In 1905, Norway's national legislative body unanimously resolved that the union with Sweden was dissolved. In a general plebiscite on the subject two months later, only 184 Norwegians voted to retain their ties to Sweden. After some discussion of forcible maintenance of the union, Sweden agreed to its dissolution.

A persistent problem that has plagued Denmark for at least 800 years is the status of Danes and Germans living in areas near the German border. Although the two groups of Germanic peoples have lived together for centuries, sometimes under Danish control and sometimes under German rule, each has retained its own language and ethnic identity. Separatist and irredentist sentiments with respect to each group have appeared at irregular intervals.

From the twelfth century Denmark controlled large areas of Northern Germany, but fought sporadic wars with Holstein in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries over Schleswig. The problem continued to fester after Schleswig was lost to Germany in 1864 in the wake of a revolt by the Germans in Schleswig and Holstein and two wars between Denmark and Prussia. The final peace treaty provided that the Danish-speaking areas of North Schleswig might vote to return to Denmark, but, in 1878, Germany and Austria abrogated that stipulation.

The fate of the Danish minority in German Schleswig again became an issue after World War II. Many people, both Danes and Germans, urged that the border be moved south to conform more nearly to the ethnic identities of the residents. However, a majority opposed change, and Germany and Denmark settled for an agreement establishing the rights of minorities on both sides of the border.

**Egypt.** Religious tensions have threatened the political stability of Egypt and motivated the assassination of a recent president, Anwar Sadat. The Egyptians are predominantly Sunni Moslems, but are seriously divided in degree of religious fundamentalism. Economic problems, resulting in part from slumping oil prices and rapid population growth, have encouraged the dissatisfied to turn away from Westernized leaders and toward Islamic fundamentalism.

Sadat was gunned down by militant Moslem soldiers after
he had jailed hundreds of fundamentalists and other political foes. The assassins charged that the president had forsaken God. His successor, Hosni Mubarak, was forced to deploy tanks and army commandos in 1986 to check police rioting that left 15 dead and 300 wounded. A fundamentalist role in the disturbances was suggested by the rioters’ concentration of their destructive actions on luxury hotels and restaurants that offered such religiously-banned pastimes as disco dancing, gambling and drinking. The rioting was preceded by street marches demanding the imposition of strict Islamic laws. The goal of the most fanatical fundamentalists was a regime similar to the one established by the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.

Another symptom of religious intolerance was the 1985 “war of bumper stickers.” For weeks, Moslem car owners displayed stickers declaring “To God, religion is Islam.” The minority Christian Copts replied with the message, “The Lord is my shepherd,” and with pictures of their religious leader. The Interior Ministry finally ordered removal of all bumper stickers to avert the threat of violence.

In its earlier history, Egypt survived under the control of a succession of foreign rulers. The last dominant foreign power, Great Britain, declared Egypt independent in 1922 under the pressure of growing Egyptian nationalism, but left troops in the Suez Canal Zone. These were withdrawn in 1957 in the wake of Egypt’s 1951 abrogation of previous agreements with the British and attendant rioting and attacks on foreign troops, during which a number of Europeans were killed.

After expelling the British and French, Egypt, with Syria, formed the United Arab Republic, in which they were joined by Yemen. The union of the three Arabic and Moslem countries disintegrated three years later when the Syrian army, resentful of Syria’s inferior position in the UAR, overthrew the government and declared its country independent.

**Fiji.** Racial tensions rose sharply in Fiji, the former “Cannibal Islands,” when a 1987 election effectively transferred government control from Fijians to Indians. Voting divided along ethnic lines, with only 10% of the Fijians but 85% of Indians voting for the winning coalition, which gave most major offices to Indians. Declaring that they were losing control of their own land, the Fijians massed in angry demonstrations and set up roadblocks. Mob attacks on Indians and their property followed. The overwhelmingly Fijian army then deposed the recently elected government by marching into Parliament and arresting the Prime Minister and 27 members of his government. Fiji later declared itself a republic, ended the reign of Queen Elizabeth II as head of state and let its Commonwealth membership lapse. The military coup was particularly shocking in a tropical “paradise,” whose purported racial harmony had led Pope John Paul II to describe it a year earlier as “a symbol of hope for the world.”

Dark-skinned ethnic Fijians, mostly Melanesian, constitute 46.2% of the population of 715,000. The Indians, descendants of indentured laborers imported by the British in the nineteenth century, make up 48.6%. Most of the remainder is of either European or Chinese ancestry. The Indians seldom intermarry with Fijians and largely retain their traditional language, reli-
Fiji. The milestone election shattered ethnic Fijians’ comforting assumption that they would always rule, and brought into focus a question often raised elsewhere; i.e., how can democratic self-determination be reconciled with an ethnic group’s claims for special treatment on the basis of descent from an area’s early inhabitants? In numerous areas -- including Australia, New Zealand and various parts of the Americas -- native peoples did indeed lose control of their lands.

Finland. Like many other small population groups, the Finns suffered under foreign rule for centuries, during which their language came to be spoken only by uneducated peasants and written mostly in religious works. In 1809, Russia wrested control of the country from Sweden, which had begun its conquest of Finland in the twelfth century. Under Russian domination, a great gulf remained between the Finnish-speaking masses and the Swedish-speaking upper classes.

Russian repression, however, encouraged a Finnish patriotic movement that had been non-political and directed toward a revival of Finnish tradition and folklore when it arose in university circles in the late 1700s. By the 1820s, the movement turned nationalistic and found expression in the slogan, “I am a Finn and nothing else.” The output of poets and philosophers helped to arouse the “sleeping nation.”

Around the end of the nineteenth century, Russian attempts to crush Finnish institutions began to meet stiffer resistance. Many Finns drafted for the Russian army refused to serve, a number of patriots were exiled, the governor general was assassinated in 1904, and soon afterward a general strike created disruption. When the Russian Revolution overthrew the Czar in 1917, the Finns were prepared to seize the opportunity to declare their independence.

Reminders of earlier centuries of Swedish control are pockets of Swedish-speaking citizens who comprise about 7.5 percent of Finland’s population. These are concentrated in certain coastal and island areas, where they are allowed to use their own language in schools, churches and local government offices. The Swedish-speaking Aland Islands, the subject of a dispute between Sweden and Finland after World War I, were guaranteed considerable autonomy and local self-rule within the Republic of Finland under a 1920 agreement endorsed by the League of Nations.

France. “Will We Still Be French in 30 Years?” This provocative title of an article published in 1985 by the French magazine, Le Figaro, reflects the fears that have made ethnic relations increasingly tense in France. The article points out that, because of their higher birthrates, people of non-European descent could soon outnumber the French natives in their own country. Some demographers have predicted that immigrants will make up 25 percent of the population within 20 years.\(^{16}\)

In France, as in several other European countries, rising public resentment is directed against the sizeable numbers of
immigrants who cannot be easily assimilated because of physical, cultural and religious differences. Among the 4.5 million immigrants, the most conspicuous are 1.5 million mostly Moslem families from France’s former North African colonies of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Many who arrived and found work in the prosperous 1950s and 1960s faced deteriorating prospects when the unemployment rate turned up in recent years.

During the 1986 political campaign, Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the right-wing National Front, drew huge crowds to rallies with cries of “3 million unemployed with 3 million foreigners.” Comparing the birthrates of Western and less developed countries, Le Pen called immigrants a “question of life and death” and expressed fears that European peoples will disappear, submerged in a sea of Third World peoples. The 1986 election tally revealed that Le Pen’s followers had won almost 10 percent of the vote and captured 33 seats in the French National Assembly. National Front support increased to almost 15 percent of the vote in 1988. Its strength tends to be greatest in such cities as Marseilles and Aix-en-Provence, where inner-city Arab ghettos are associated with problems familiar also to urban Americans -- drugs, gang fights, underachievement by minority school children, purse-snatchings and other crimes that make people afraid to go out alone at night. Moreover, as the Arab population increases in urban areas, many immigrants living in their own ethnic enclaves feel less need to adopt French ways. This, in turn, creates more resentment.

Uneasiness over a large unassimilated immigrant population is not limited to fringe groups, nor is it based entirely upon unemployment and crime statistics. Traditionally, the French have seen themselves as a homogeneous people with shared historical and cultural roots. Xenophobia erupted with the recognition that the North African “Beurs” or Arabs are changing the face of France. The Arabs’ popular slogan, “Beur is beautiful,” indicates the immigrants’ desire to retain their own religion and customs; in short, to live on French soil permanently as Arabs. To many French, the immigrant population threatens their own cultural identity and the very “Frenchness” of France. A 1985 public opinion poll in France found that 20 percent of respondents admitted feeling antipathy toward Arabs and 45 percent expressed hope that they could avoid having their children marry Arabs.

Such attitudes toward immigrants have influenced public policy. Even the Socialist government of Francois Mitterrand, which legalized thousands of illegal immigrants when it took office, reversed its stand and not only tightened immigration controls, but also reached an agreement with companies and unions to offer grants of up to $11,800 to immigrant workers willing to leave their jobs and go home. However, relatively few workers rushed to accept the incentives. New regulations require airlines to verify that international passengers have proper entry documents, make it more difficult for immigrants to bring in relatives, and authorize expulsion of illegal immigrants and prohibition of their return. Stronger enforcement efforts attempt to prevent employers from hiring illegal aliens.
The immigration problem will undoubtedly continue to preoccupy politicians and public alike into the indefinite future. Prime Minister Jacques Chirac was quoted as saying we cannot accept any new immigrants, and we must clamp down on illegal immigration. While wrestling with the problem of large-scale North African immigration, the French are entitled to a sense of deja vu. It was an ancestral group, the Germanic Franks, led by Charles Martel, who prevented a Moslem conquest of Europe by defeating the Arabs at the crucial Battle of Tours in 732. (Martel was the grandfather of Charlemagne.)

Meanwhile, the contemporary French face another persistent ethnic problem: a separatist movement in Corsica, an island province which France conquered in 1768. In the mid-1970s, Corsican nationalists demanded independence and punctuated their statements with a series of demonstrations and terrorist acts. The Mitterand administration replied in 1982 with a plan for regional "devolution" or partial autonomy, which gave a 61-member Corsican assembly wide responsibilities for economic, educational and cultural affairs. However, economic development continued to lag, and separatist bombings were counted in the hundreds per year in the mid-1980s. In March, 1986, the Corsican nationalists also seized hostages to call attention to their demands for independence.

A different and far bloodier type of majority-minority conflict raged through France during the religious struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The degree of religious persecution directed toward the Protestant minority, known as Huguenots, was often partially dependent upon political considerations. Henry IV’s Edict of Nantes was the first document in the history of Christianity to grant religious toleration in a country. But the 1598 Edict was preceded and followed by religious wars which devastated the country during the latter half of the sixteenth century and most of the seventeenth. Among the well-known events were the St. Bartholomew’s massacre of Protestants, which led to the killing of additional thousands, in 1572, and the 1685 revocation of the Edict of Nantes, following which 400,000 Huguenots were driven out of France.

Germany. The often tragic history of the German people has cast them at various times as unwelcome minorities expelled from lands they had occupied for centuries, as victims of Europe’s most destructive religious wars, as oppressors of despised ethnic groups, as unwilling subjects of a foreign conqueror, and recently as uneasy hosts to four million unassimilated foreign workers.

Germany was torn by religious strife from 1517, when Martin Luther precipitated the Protestant Reformation, until the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648. During that confla- gration -- a German civil war as well as a European war fought on German soil -- at least a quarter of the population perished by sword, plague or famine. The chronicler, Merian, wrote: "Many hundreds of cities, even thousands of villages, were so devastated that not even a dog, not to mention a man, could survive there. Only wolves dwelled there in great numbers."
The land was not cultivated . . . pestilence, poisonous fevers, and other hideous and deadly diseases reigned . . . dark teeth-blackening hunger raged among men. In truth, a very tragic and also terrifying spectacle it was, when 10 or 12 starving men fought over the half-rotten carcass of an animal, and finally consumed one another.

During the Nazi years, ethnic pride and prejudice were partial causes of one of the world’s bloodiest wars. The period was marked by the persecution and virtual elimination through death or emigration of unpopular minorities, especially Jews and Gypsies. These events, which gave a new meaning to the word “holocaust,” have been so widely and repeatedly reported that further discussion here is unnecessary. What is less well known is that Germany’s ethnic antagonisms predated the National Socialist Party. Alfred Low has attempted to show that, long before the Nazi period, German-Jewish co-existence was largely an illusion. Concentrating on the period from 1750 to 1890, Low asserts that anti-Semitism had gained wide acceptance even in academic, Catholic and socialist circles.19

The Nazi period was also characterized by a pan-German movement rooted in beliefs about the superiority of the Nordic peoples. George J. Stein has noted that such beliefs were accepted by German scholars, as well as by the man in the street.20 Responding to the pan-German philosophy, Hitler, prior to World War II, annexed the Germanic citizens of Austria as well as Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland, home of three million Bohemian Germans. It will be remembered that Austria and Germany were linked together in their earlier history, and that the two Germanic countries would have merged after World War I except for a veto by the Allies.

In the aftermath of World War I, Germany lost its territories with non-German populations. After World War II, it lost additional territories which had been settled by Germans in the later Middle Ages. All lands east of the Oder-Neisse line were separated from Germany, and the 10 million Germans living there were expelled and forced to migrate to their homeland. Postwar agreements ultimately left Germany split into the two parts popularly known as East Germany and West Germany.

Since the forcible division, West Germany’s foreign policy has been dominated by a burning desire for reunification of what Chancellor Willy Brandt described as the “two states of the German nation.” Its constitution states that it is a transitional document to serve until all Germans can freely decide upon their form of government. Each June 17, the West Germans observe the Day of German Unity, featuring bonfires whose symbolic light can be seen in East Germany. Even East German leader Erich Honecker commented in 1981 that German reunification might eventually be possible. Meanwhile, the West Germans reclaimed some of their own through a 1976 treaty with Poland authorizing the emigration of ethnic Germans living there.

Contemporary West Germany’s most intractable ethnic problem is the presence of 4.1 million foreign workers, mostly Turks. These are so unassimilated that many children grow up in neighborhoods where German is seldom spoken. A 1979 government study warned of “uncontrollable social con-
flicts” which might stem from the foreign worker problem. In 1973, Germany banned the recruiting of additional workers from outside the Common Market but, unlike neighboring Switzerland, did not embark on wholesale extradition. During a political campaign meeting in 1980, a German crowd roared its approval when Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said, “Four million is enough.” Surprisingly, a similar sentiment was voiced in the same year by a West Berlin Jewish leader, Heinz Galinski, who supported measures intended to reduce the flow of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union. “We can’t any longer cope with the stream of refugees,” he said. “We have taken more than our share.”

**Ghana.** No sooner had independence been achieved than the new government of Ghana was confronted by a separatist movement supported by the Ewe ethnic group in the Trans-Volta region. In 1966, the Ewes played prominent roles in a coup which overthrew Kwame Nkrumah. Afterward, political parties crystallized along ethnic lines and deep ethnic cleavages have contributed to continuing governmental instability.

In 1969, the Ghanian government expelled 500,000 “aliens,” including Chinese and East German teachers and technicians, giving them two weeks’ notice of their forced departure. In the grip of such “anti-foreign” feelings, a number of other African nations have also expelled sizeable minority groups.

**Greece.** After World War I, Greece and Turkey were involved in a massive population exchange which greatly reduced the size of ethnic minority groups in both countries. Upon Greece’s abandonment of claims to territory in Asia Minor, Turkey insisted that all Greek Christians in Turkey and all Moslems in Greece be returned to their own homelands. With great suffering, 2,000,000 people were uprooted; 1,300,000 Greeks went home from Turkey, 353,000 Moslems returned to Turkey, and several hundred thousand Armenians also fled from Turkey to Greece in fear of persecution.

Greek Christians had previously suffered religious persecution at the hands of the Turks, who ruled Greece for almost four centuries. Liberation came in 1927, after provincial revolts and a war of independence. These followed several decades of development of a strong sense of national consciousness.

**Guatemala.** A basic national characteristic of Guatemala for centuries has been the division of the population into two groups referred to as Indian (55%) and Ladino (40%). Ladinos are usually of mixed Spanish-Indian ancestry, although they may also be classified partly on the basis of culture (Europeanized), language (Spanish), and dress. Only four percent of the population is white, but these retain power and influence disproportionate to their numbers.

Some historians believe that, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Spanish conquerors killed millions of Central American Indians in what may be one of the worst examples of genocide. In Guatemala, the surviving natives and their
descendants were treated in almost feudal fashion by planters. Today, most live in poverty and are unable to read or write the Spanish language. Furthermore, many resist efforts to teach them Spanish, fearing the loss of their culture along with their language.

Thus, the Indians remain culturally and often geographically isolated, tenaciously clinging to their traditional customs, languages and dress. These cultural and linguistic differences separate the Indian groups from each other as well as from the Ladinos. The division of Guatemala into virtual Indian and Ladino nations has placed serious obstacles in the path of modernization and economic development. A Guatemalan legislator says that “the two cultures are so completely different that it is difficult, if not impossible, to integrate and reconcile the two.”

During the recent decades of political upheaval in Central America, many Guatemalan Indians were caught between government forces and the guerrillas, with whom they often sympathized. As many as 45,000 Guatemalan Indians were said to be refugees in Mexico in 1985. Leftist critics have charged that government forces killed thousands in a new wave of genocide.

**Haiti.** The relatively short history of Haiti describes the virtual extinction of two racial groups. The original population of Arawak Indians perished under the stress of oppressive labor forced upon them by Spanish settlers, who arrived soon after the island was discovered by Columbus. The Spaniards began importing African slaves in the early 1500s. Spain was forced to cede Haiti in 1697 to the French, who developed vast and profitable plantations. After many unsuccessful revolts, some marked by localized massacres of whites, Haitian blacks united in 1798 under Toussaint L’Ouverture, a freed slave. His successor, Jean Jacques Dessalines, proclaimed Haiti’s independence in 1804 and massacred almost all of the remaining white inhabitants.

The predominantly black country has since been controlled largely by light-skinned mulattoes, who constitute no more than 10 percent of the population. The “color line” between light- and dark-skinned Haitians, a factor in several revolts and political upheavals, continues to exist, although its caste-like rigidity has been reduced, partly by American efforts to improve the lot of lower-status Haitians.

The widespread practice of voodoo, religious customs brought from Africa during the colonial period, is an interesting illustration of the fact that ethnic cultural traits can survive for centuries in a population under the domination of a different cultural group. Similarly, although Haiti’s official language is French, 90 percent of the population speaks Creole, which combines African dialects with other words and languages, including seventeenth-century French.

**Honduras.** Among the numerous worries of the Honduran government in 1987 was the Miskito Indians’ agitation for some form of self-rule. The Indians reportedly were so dissatisfied with the Honduran authorities that almost 30,000 were beginning to prepare for armed rebellion.
The roots of the problem go back centuries. Indians along the east coast, known as the Mosquito Coast, originally identified with English sailors rather than with the Spaniards, who colonized most of Central America. The Indian and Honduran cultures developed separately, with mutual mistrust. Honduran Miskito aspirations for autonomy have been encouraged by the Nicaraguan government’s offer of limited autonomy to its Miskitos, many of whom lived among the Miskitos in Honduras after fleeing their own country. In the early 1980s, the Miskitos of Nicaragua were among the first to take up arms against the Sandinistas.

India. Indian police fired on mobs torching shops in Ahmedabad in July. 1986, on the sixth day of Hindu-Moslem rioting that killed at least 50 people and injured 150. Hindu mobs burned alive seven Moslems, two of them after they had been beaten into unconsciousness and thrown from hospital windows. Among those burned by an angry mob were a Moslem mother and her three-year-old daughter. Police arrested 700 persons and imposed a round-the-clock curfew in an attempt to halt the fighting.

This horror story is but the latest bloody chapter in the history of Indian ethnic groups, whose differences have often persisted throughout centuries or even millennia of living side by side. Ironically, the often-criticized British rule gave the subcontinent the longest period of internal peace it had ever known. The “Pax Britannica” was broken most conspicuously by a mutiny in 1857 by native troops who became convinced that the cartridges issued with their new Enfield rifles were greased with the fat of cows and pigs. Cattle are sacred to Hindus, while Moslems abhor the pig.

Although the mutiny was put down, the British rulers withdrew ninety years later in the face of a nationalist movement that had emerged in 1885 in the form of the National Congress, organized by Indian intellectuals to seek independence. Peaceful nationalist agitation, broken occasionally by political crimes and assassinations, led to reforms, including the establishment of a partially elective legislative council in 1909 and the granting of full provincial autonomy in 1935. But by the 1920s, the nationalist movement was marred by serious Hindu-Moslem conflict, reflecting Moslem fears of domination by the Hindu majority.

The Moslem League in 1929 publicized 14 demands for a post-independence nation, including separate Moslem electorates, adequate Moslem representation in both provincial and federal governments, and a three-fourths majority requirement in legislatures on all “communal” questions where the population divided along ethnic lines. In 1940, the League went further, endorsing the idea of a separate Moslem state of Pakistan. After World War II, the British hoped to leave a unified India with considerable autonomy for Moslem-majority provinces.

Finally accepting the depth of ethnic hostilities, the British agreed to partition British India into two separate countries. Independence led quickly to bitter ethnic conflict in which 200,000 people were killed and hundreds of villages burned. In the biggest refugee movement in history, 12 million Hindus
and Moslems crossed the Indian-Pakistan borders to live with
their own groups. Another huge and related movement of 10
million refugees into India occurred in 1971, when Pakistani
troops began attacks on Bengali separatists in East Pakistan.
After independence, Hindu-Moslem hostilities also led to In-
dia and Pakistan’s undeclared war over Kashmir, which was
subsequently partitioned between the two countries.

Besides the Hindu-Moslem enmity, many other ethnic con-
flicts have disturbed modern India. A number have assumed
the form of separatist movements calling for provincial inde-
pendence or autonomy. In recent years, the most violent
protests have emanated from the Sikhs, whose religion was
founded about 1500 as a reform offshoot of Hinduism. In
support of an independent state of Khalistan, to be created
from the Sikh-majority Punjab, Sikh extremists assassinated
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 and are suspected of
plotting the death of her son and successor, Rajiv, and of
planting time-bombs aboard two airliners, one of which ex-
ploded in mid-air off the Irish coast in 1985, killing 329
persons.

During widespread rioting following Mrs. Gandhi’s assas-
sination, Hindus massacred 3,000 Sikhs. Hundreds have died
since in Sikh-related riots and terrorism which intensified in
1988 because Sikh secessionists found not only new recruits
but also more lethal weapons -- Chinese AK-47 assault rifles
and Soviet antitank rockets. Many Hindus have fled the Pun-
jab and others have formed a radical organization to launch
violent counterattacks against the Sikhs. Government reaction
to Sikh terrorism has been inconsistent, partly because leaders
seemed to worry more about election pressures than about the
national interest.

A number of other ethnic groups launched their own post-
independence separatist movements, among them many of the
30 million tribal peoples living outside the Indian mainstream.
Some of these clung to exotic customs most people encounter
only in anthropology textbooks, such as polyandry, reckoning
of descent through the maternal line, “slash and burn” ag-
riculture and even headhunting. The Naga tribes won a sepa-
rate state, Nagaland, and another new state, Haryana, was
created after persistent separatist agitation. Bombay was split
into two states to silence the separatist rhetoric of two language
groups. In southern India, separatist sentiment also appeared
among the Dravidians, descendants of the earliest known
Indians.

More generalized post-independence ethnic conflict cen-
tered around language, particularly proposals to establish Hin-
di as the official language. A plan to use it throughout the
educational system was especially unpopular, as might be
expected in a country with four major languages and more than
800 dialects. Still another recent ethnic conflict pitted Indians
against Bengali immigrants. In 1980, a two-day massacre left
dead the 700 Bengalis living in the village of Mandal in
Tripura state. Likewise, in Assam state, severe and continuing
pressure has been directed toward Bengali immigrants.

Prior to British rule, numerous invaders seized control of all
or part of India, but uniformly failed to create cultural, lin-
guistic or religious unity. One Moslem invader put to the
sword those who refused to embrace Islam and also carried off large numbers of Indians as slaves. These conquerors included Arabs, Turkish Moslems, Moguls, White Huns, Aryans and Greeks led by Alexander the Great. Many empires established by foreigners eventually declined, leaving in their wake variable numbers of independent principalities. Rulers and residents of such principalities often preferred to fight each other rather than to unite to repel an intruder. Nevertheless, rebellions against conquerors occurred frequently.

A unique aspect of Indian ethnic division was a rigid caste system founded in the law and religion of the Aryans, who conquered the Dravidians about 1500 B.C. The caste system separated the conquerors and the conquered socially and occupationally by establishing the major castes of Brahmans (priests), Kshatriyas (warriors), Vaisyas (farmers) and Sudras (laborers), the last consisting of the conquered non-Aryan peoples. Scholars say that perhaps two percent of the population still consists of relatively unmixed Aryans distinguished by tallness, relatively light skin, and long Nordic-type heads. In modern times, about 60 million or more Indians were outcasts or untouchables, whose very shadows were said to defile a Brahman. Although the Indian constitution prohibits “untouchability,” most former untouchables remain near the bottom of the social ladder.

**Indonesia.** After independence, a series of ethnic rebellions, including major revolts in 1958, compounded the difficulties of the new Indonesian government. One group, the Ambonese, like the Karens in Burma, was loyal to the colonial rulers (the Dutch) and was so suspicious of Javanese and Sumatran nationalists that it attempted secession in 1950. After the military defeat of the ethnic rebellions, the majority Javanese, constituting about half the population, established an “ethnocracy,” with political and military leadership dominated by their own group.

International organizations have criticized Indonesia for removing millions of people from the densely populated island of Java to other already occupied islands, killing the original inhabitants, driving them out by military force or pushing them out by burning their crops. Relief workers charged that when Javanese were resettled on the island of East Timor, 150,000 of 700,000 earlier inhabitants were killed or left to die of starvation.

**Iran.** Thousands have been killed since 1979 in connection with demands by the Kurds, who constitute 3% of the population, for autonomy or independence in Iran’s northwestern region.

**Iraq.** For decades, Iraq’s Kurdish minority has emphasized its demand for self-rule with periodic flareups of rebellion, civil war and irregular fighting, broken occasionally by cease-fires and temporary agreements. The Kurds, who live in a northern mountainous area and constitute about 20% of the population, are non-Arabic people with ethnic ties to the neighboring Iranians. In 1920, the Treaty of Sevres provided for an autonomous Kurdistan for the Kurds of Iraq, Iran and
Turkey, now numbering about ten million, but the terms of the treaty never became effective.

Civil war flared in Iraq in 1961 as Kurdish tribesmen rebelled to push their demands. A cease-fire was declared in 1964, but fighting soon resumed. Sporadic warfare was ended in 1970 with the official granting of autonomy to the Kurds. However, dissatisfied with their lack of independence, the Kurds took up arms again in 1974, with military support from Iran. The revolt collapsed in 1975 when Iran ended its support, but a two-week cease-fire permitted tens of thousands of Kurds to flee to Iran, after which Iraqi troops moved into the border area previously held by the Kurds.

A charge that the Iraqi government was systematically destroying the Kurdish minority was made in a 1977 report to the United Nations by the International League for Human Rights. Refugees said in 1977 that scores of Kurdish villages had been destroyed and thousands of Kurds seized for forced labor. Fighting broke out again in 1979, leading to Iraq’s bombing of Kurdish villages in Iran and the consequent deterioration of relations between Iran and Iraq. Since 1980, the Kurds have expanded their anti-government attacks on oil installations and military facilities.

In 1985, Amnesty International publicized shocking new charges of Iraqi repression of the Kurds. Witnesses reported that as many as 1,000 or more children between the ages of nine and 14 had been, arrested, detained in prison camps behind barbed wire and subjected to beatings and torture which sometimes led to their deaths. The ostensible purpose of the arrests was to obtain information from the children about the political activities of their parents and villages at a time when Iraq was engaged in a large-scale war with the Kurds’ Iranian supporters and ethnic kinsmen. With the bitter war still dragging on in the late 1980s, Iraq was forced to deploy as many as 100,000 troops to contain the Kurdish insurrection and prevent guerrilla destruction of roads, bridges and government installations in the northern region. Particularly worrying was evidence of cooperation between left-wing Kurdish rebels and Iranians in attacks on such vital economic targets as Iraq’s oil export pipeline.

Ireland. One hundred thousand Protestant demonstrators, probably the largest number in Northern Ireland’s history, massed in Belfast in November, 1985, to protest a British-Irish agreement giving the Republic of Ireland a direct input into the control of Ulster. The Presbyterian Church, Northern Ireland’s largest, condemned the agreement as “a complete denial of open democratic government.” A public opinion poll quickly confirmed that 75% of Ulster Protestants would vote against the pact if granted a referendum. A dozen years earlier, Protestant opposition had torpedoed a similar proposal, the Sunningdale Agreement.

The 1985 British-Irish initiative sought to end almost two decades of intensified sectarian violence, which followed the rejuvenation of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in connection with civil rights protests by Ulster’s Catholic minority. Northern Ireland’s Protestants outnumber Catholics by a ratio of about two to one. Since the late 1960s, the bitter conflict in
Ulster has killed 2,500 people and injured 24,000. (Proportionate to population, the death toll would equal more than 300,000 in the United States.) Related events included the assassination of Lord Mountbatten, the suicides by starvation of ten imprisoned IRA activists and bombings in London and Brighton, the latter apparently intended to wipe out the British Cabinet. Aside from the human loss, sectarian violence in recent years has slowed Northern Ireland’s economic growth and cost an estimated $5 billion in lost investment and $1.5 billion in lost tourism.

Recent violent actions are the latest episodes in eight centuries of conflict between neighboring peoples, both of whom are predominantly white North Europeans with Western values and related Christian religions. The cycle of violence was touched off in 1171 by an invasion of Ireland launched by the Normans, who had conquered England a century earlier. The following centuries saw horrible cruelties on the part of both English and Irish, including massacres perpetrated by each group.

Several thousand English Protestant settlers were massacred or died of disease or starvation after being evicted from their homes during the Irish rising of 1641. Six years later, Cromwell massacred almost the entire garrison of 4,000 Irish after the siege of Drogheda. During the unsuccessful Irish rebellion of 1798, several hundred rebels were burned alive by the military, and 100 Protestants were massacred by rebel pikemen. The centuries of ethnic conflict also saw the forcible deportation of several thousand Irish to America, population expulsions from one part of Ireland to another, land confiscation, resettlement of Northern Ireland by people sent by the British government from England and Scotland (sometimes known as the Scotch-Irish), laws prohibiting intermarriage, suppression of the Irish language, exile of the Catholic hierarchy, the banning of religious orders and statutes barring Catholics from voting or holding public office.

The failed Easter Monday rebellion of 1916 was followed by guerrilla warfare and harsh reprisals by British troops. Finally, dominion status for both Northern and Southern Ireland came in 1922 and independence for Southern Ireland in 1949. After independence, the Republic of Ireland, almost entirely Catholic, continued to call for control of Northern Ireland, while the Ulster Protestants remained fearful of Catholic domination and adamantly refused to be separated from the United Kingdom. Three years after the latest British-Irish agreement, the Emerald Isle seems little closer to abandoning its burdensome memories of martyrs.

Ethnic conflict in Ireland has often spilled over into other countries besides England. Near the end of the sixteenth century, French officials, concerned about the number of indigent Irish in France, expelled the entire Irish colony from Rouen. In 1606, an additional two boatloads of Irish were shipped home from Paris. At least three times, Irish dissidents seriously sought help from enemies of England — from Spain in the seventeenth century, from France in the eighteenth century and from Germany during World War I. These largely unsuccessful attempts merely confirmed English opinion about the “treacherous nature” of the Irish. Currently, Irish-Americans
donate about 75 percent of the $1.5 million received annually by the IRA, despite the efforts of Irish officials to discourage such support.

Israel. Israel and its occupied territories contain places sacred to three major religious groups, Christians, Moslems and Jews. Yet few modern countries better illustrate the intractability of ethnic group hatreds and hopes. Dispersed from their homeland after an unsuccessful rebellion against their Roman rulers in 66 A.D., the Jews settled in many countries, frequently prospering, but maintaining much of their separate identity through the centuries. Moslem warriors captured Palestine in 636 A.D. and retained control until World War I, except for an interval during which European crusaders founded an empire.

A nineteenth-century Zionist movement promoted Jewish migration to the land lost almost two thousand years earlier. Immigration -- often illegal -- accelerated during the period of Nazi control of Germany and in the years immediately following World War II. The Holy Land was also the homeland of the Palestinian Arabs, who feared displacement or domination by a rival ethnic group. Increasing tensions led to serious Arab riots in 1929 and a revolt in 1936-38.

The British government, which had ruled Palestine since World War I under a League of Nations mandate, attempted to slow the Jewish inflow to protect the interests of the Palestinian natives. The British and, later, the United Nations, made repeated efforts to solve the Palestinian problem in a manner acceptable to both Arabs and Jews. Because of the incompatibility of rival claims to the same territory, both the British and a UN special committee recommended the partition of Palestine into separate states for Moslems and Jews. An alternative suggested was cantonization.

Zionist success in establishing the new state of Israel in 1948 also created a new stateless people, the Palestinian Arabs, almost two million of whom registered as refugees with United Nations officials. In 1983, about 730,000 remained in refugee camps which were described by Secretary of State George Shultz as “sinks of misery and despair.” The frustrations of refugees and of Arabs living in occupied lands have led to typically small-scale attacks on Jewish soldiers and settlers. In a repetitive cycle of violence and counter-violence, the Israelis have often retaliated with aerial bombing raids on alleged guerrilla bases, sometimes killing innocent bystanders. Palestinian and other Arab militants have staged terrorist bombing attacks and highjackings. These, too, have sometimes killed or injured innocent persons, including American soldiers.

Israeli-Palestinian problems have had repercussions far from the Holy Land. The Israeli military has launched multiple invasions of Lebanon, most destructively in 1982, when a coordinated land, sea and air attack, including massive bombing of West Beirut, forced the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In the United States, support of American Jews for Israel has strongly influenced American politics and foreign policy. For a number of years, the greatest beneficiary of American foreign aid and military
assistance has been the tiny state of Israel. This support has frequently complicated U.S. relations with other nations, particularly the predominantly Moslem states.

Even for the Israelis, their achievement of a homeland has not been without psychic cost. Within Israel, such critics as the Peace Now movement have asked if the misery of the Palestinians stains the Israelis’ self-image as a just and humanitarian people with respect for minorities. They have also asked if the textbook of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been written in human blood. Haunting questions have arisen, particularly after the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the slaughter of hundreds of Palestinians in two refugee camps by Lebanese Christian allies of Israel. Rabbi Meir Kahane, the American founder of the Jewish Defense League and a member of the Israeli parliament, has touched raw nerves with strident demands for the expulsion of all Arabs from Israel and the occupied territories. A number of Israelis demonstrated against a political party congress led by Kahane in February, 1986, chanting, “Nazi, Nazi, Nazi.”

Meanwhile, the Westernized Jews who helped to bring the new nation into existence now find themselves outnumbered in Israel by Middle Eastern Jews with different cultural backgrounds. This demographic development seems likely to breed new national and international tensions. As one observer notes: “In political and social terms, the evolution of Israel into a Mideast country is already taking place.”

Italy. “Italy exists. Now we have to create Italians,” commented statesman Massimo Dazeglio soon after the unification of the area in 1861. Statehood came late to Italy because, historically, the region had contained a variety of more or less independent provinces, cities and islands, most of whose citizens identified passionately with their regional culture and soil rather than with the entire peninsula. The regional diversity of Italy was in part an outgrowth of its numerous waves of settlers and conquerors, who included many Germanic peoples, as well as Moslems and ancient Greeks. After the country was pieced together, each constituent part kept its own interests, traditions and loyalties.

A recent resurgence of separatist sentiment suggests that the task of creating Italians remains incomplete after 125 years. The leader of a party demanding autonomy for the island of Sardinia became head of the regional government in 1984. During the same year, the president of the Sicilian regional government borrowed words from Austrian Chancellor Prince Clemens Metternich to differentiate his area from the adjacent territories: “Italy is no more than a geographic label, whereas Sicily is a nation.”

Meanwhile, attachment to the area’s Austrian heritage runs deep in the northern region of Trentino-Alto Adige, once the southern Tyrol. At an Innsbruck rally marking the 175th anniversary of the Southern Tyroleans’ revolt against Napoleon, banners likened Italian rule to that of the French conquerors. A leading citizen declared, “For us the state is Italian, but the homeland is Austrian.” Four powerful bomb blasts at government offices and housing projects in 1988 were attributed by Italian nationalists to pro-Austrian secessionists. The bombings revived memories of a terrorist campaign con-
ducted by pro-Austrian separatists in the 1960s.

The southern Tyrol was transferred from Austria to Italy in 1919 by the Treaty of St. Germain. The transfer of the area, which contained many German-speaking people, owed much to the efforts of the Italian irredentist movement established about 1878 to seek incorporation of regions mostly Italian in speech and identification. Such places were called Italia Irredenta (unredeemed Italy). Alto Adige was promised to Italy by the allies as part of a secret treaty that in 1915 brought Italy into the war against Germany and Austria. The territorial transfer made area residents, who had never been under Italian rule, part of the booty of war. New laws then made privileged citizens of Italians who relocated in Alto Adige, giving them priority for government jobs, housing and education. Seven decades later, the province stubbornly remains more Austrian than Italian. Women often wear Austrian dirndls and the men lederhosen; they eat bratwurst rather than pasta and drink beer, not wine.

Religious persecution appeared in Italy during the Inquisition, when heretics were sought out and burned. Many others who escaped execution were expelled. Prior to World War II, religious intolerance manifested itself again in new laws attempting to limit the professions and occupations open to Jews.

**Ivory Coast.** In one of the early occurrences in a wave of population expulsions that eventually swept through many black African nations, the Ivory Coast in the mid-1960s expelled 16,000 Beninese. The country has also been disturbed by unsuccessful separatist insurrections mounted by two different ethnic groups -- the Agni and the Bete -- as well as by ethnic rioting. In 1969, the Mossi were attacked by Ivorians in an Abijan riot attributed in part to the competition of ethnic group members for jobs. The Mossi immigrants had been imported by the French from the Upper Volta.

**Jamaica.** Much of the history of Jamaica is that of ethnic conflict. After the Spaniards settled Jamaica in the early 1500s, the native Arawak Indians soon died out from disease and overwork. The Spaniards then imported small numbers of African slaves, whom they freed when England captured Jamaica in 1653.

The former slaves fled to the hills, and their efforts to remain free gave rise to many decades of repeated fighting. These so-called “Maroons” were finally granted independence and land in 1739, but the English brought in numerous new African slaves to work on sugar cane plantations. After a slave uprising in 1831, slavery was abolished, dealing a severe blow to the plantation economy and leaving a poverty-stricken, predominantly black population. Planters received £19 for each of their slaves, but most of the money was needed to pay creditors.

During another black rebellion in 1865, nineteen whites were killed. The violence required imposition of martial law, followed eventually by a change in the form of British rule.

**Japan.** Most Japanese attribute their country’s spectacular
postwar economic gains in part to the unity of a monoracial, monocultural society with one of the world’s most homogeneous populations. The largest minority ethnic group, the Koreans, constitutes about one-half of one percent of the population, and another minority, the Ainu, numbers only about 15,000. Nevertheless, considerable ethnic tension has centered around these two relatively small groups.

The Japanese-Ainu experience is somewhat reminiscent of the American settlers’ relationship with the earlier inhabitants of the land. The northward migration of the Japanese while settling their islands involved centuries of sporadic conflict with the Ainu before final pacification of the survivors in the northern area of Hokkaido. The Ainu, who may be related to the Australoid aborigines of Australia, still live outside the mainstream, retaining their own language and a way of life similar to the hunting and gathering culture of their ancestors.

Another Japanese minority, the Burakumin, who physically appear similar to other Japanese, have traditionally occupied a caste-like position. Their negative image was reflected in their earlier name, Eta, which means ‘full of filth.’ Group members were stereotyped as unintelligent, dirty, rude, violent and sexually loose.

Little admixture with outsiders has occurred in Japan for a thousand years or more. After some tentative dealings with Westerners, Japan early in the seventeenth century closed its doors against Europeans, banning Christianity, executing Christians and denying its citizens permission to leave the country. A strong sense of national unity developed during the next two and a half centuries, a period ended by Commodore Perry’s forcible opening of the “hermit nation.” Although Japan quickly modernized aspects of its economic and social systems, the feeling that all Japanese are members of a unique extended family persists.

Homogeneity was most diluted by the twentieth-century importation of Korean laborers, whose number peaked at two million during World War II. With the postwar liberation of Korea from Japanese control, most Koreans in Japan returned home. In the decolonization process, the Japanese government classified as “aliens” the 600,000 remaining Koreans, leaving them subject to deportation and ineligible for most welfare and pension benefits. Unlike those of the United States, Japanese nationality laws extend alien status beyond first-generation immigrants to include children. However, some 125,000 Koreans have acquired citizenship through naturalization.

Second- and third-generation Koreans, who now make up about 90% of the minority total, still face social and economic discrimination. As aliens, they are seldom employed by large Japanese companies and are ineligible for government employment. However, a small-scale civil rights movement originating in the 1970s alleviated some types of legalized discrimination. Current nationality law grants citizenship to a person with one Japanese parent and one Korean. With assimilation made easier, some Koreans now worry about their extinction as a distinct ethnic group and attempt to promote pride in Korean identity and culture.

In recent years, Japan has received much American criticism for its reluctance to accept Indochinese refugees. In
1981, it agreed to give homes to a total of 3,000 while the United States admitted 14,000 per month. Significantly, most of the Indochinese refugees who reached Japan indicated their desire to resettle again in the more “internationalized” United States. Further criticism came in 1986 when Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone suggested in a speech that the presence of racial minorities in the United States drags down educational standards.

**Jordan.** Modern Jordan’s most serious ethnic problem is in large part a byproduct of the continuing Israeli-Arab conflict outside its own borders. The country became the chief destination of Palestinian refugees, who virtually took over sections of Jordan after fleeing various upheavals in their former homeland. Although the Palestinians, like the Jordanians, are Arabs and Moslems, they were resented by many native Bedouins. Furthermore, their presence complicated Jordan’s political and foreign policy problems.

Eventually, King Hussein was persuaded by army leaders to permit attacks on Palestinian guerrilla forces, and civil warfare broke out in 1970. Despite the intervention of Syrian tanks, Hussein’s Bedouin army defeated the Palestinians, but suffered heavy casualties. By mid-1971, Hussein had crushed Palestinian strength in his country and transferred part of the problem to Lebanon, where many guerrillas had fled. The king dissolved the Jordanian parliament from 1974 until 1976 to lessen the political influence of the Palestinians.

During 1955 and 1956, rioting in Jordan against British and American interests was inspired by Western support of Israel. Pro-Egypt riots occurred in 1963. Today, Jordan remains caught between its powerful neighbor, Israel, and the rising Arab nationalism of other Middle Eastern countries.

**Kenya.** After achieving independence, Kenya tried to end domination of its retail trade by its Indian community of 188,000. In 1968, it began an anti-Asian drive and 20,000 left the country. In 1972, Kenya ordered out all Asians with Kenyan passports, charging them with foreign currency manipulations. Kenya also expelled almost 5,000 refugees between 1979 and 1981.

Donald L. Horowitz says the emergence of a one-party state in Kenya was a response to the growth of ethnic-based political parties which “challenged the multiethnic inclusiveness of the ruling party and threatened to produce an ethnic party system.” In *Mottled Lizard*, set in colonial Kenya, Elspeth Huxley shows the utter contempt that Kikuyu tribesmen felt for the Kavirondo, the Masai distrust of the Kikuyus and the hatred various black tribes felt for Indian and Pakistani traders. Independence did not eliminate these ethnic antagonisms.

**Kiribati.** After the Gilbert Islands, formerly under British protection, became the independent state of Kiribati in 1979, the population of approximately 62,000 remained divided. The former residents of Banaba (Ocean Island) opposed being part of Kinbati and reasserted their claims to their original homes, from which they were relocated following World War II because mining had despoiled their island. Kiribati has
resisted Banaban separatist demands.

In 1978, the Ellice Islands separated from the Gilbert and Ellice Islands colony to become independent Tuvalu, with a population of 8,000. Kiribati’s population is practically all Micronesian, while Tuvalu’s is Polynesian.

**Korea.** Like Japan, Korea shut its doors to the outside world and remained a “Hermit Kingdom” for two and a half centuries, until it was forcibly opened by the Japanese in 1876. At the peak of the anti-foreign period, the Catholic religion was proscribed as subversive of the social order. Suspected converts to Catholicism were dealt with harshly and a number of French priests were martyred in the “persecution of 1866.”

Partly because of its closed-door policy, Korea’s population remained ethnically homogeneous and developed its own distinct culture. After Japan annexed the country in 1910, its repressive colonial administration tried with little success to stamp out nationalist sentiment. Koreans were ordered to take Japanese names and forbidden to speak their native language, celebrate their customary holidays or wear traditional festival costumes. School children were taught the Shinto religion, which venerated the Japanese emperor. A nonviolent nationalist uprising in 1919 led to the reprisal killing of hundreds of Koreans by Japanese officials.

Freed from Japanese control after World War II, Korea was tragically divided into two countries, under the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Korean War of the early 1950s reflected North Korea’s desire to reunify the country on its terms. Despite the incompatibility of their political and economic systems, the two Koreas have retained considerable sense of identity and a desire for reunion. In 1972, North and South Korea issued a mutual declaration establishing a goal of peaceful reunification.

**Kuwait.** With an estimated 20 percent of the world’s oil reserves and a native population under 500,000 in 1965, Kuwait imported large numbers of foreign workers, mostly fellow Moslems. In recent years, non-Kuwaitis have constituted a majority of the population and 70 percent of the work force. Although non-Kuwaitis are not permitted to vote, their ethnically-based identifications have created problems for the government. The attempt of Palestinians to force the government toward a stronger stand against Israel was cited as a reason for dissolution of the National Assembly for a five-year period beginning in 1976. Kuwait’s support for Iraq in its war against Iran sparked terrorist attacks by Shiite Moslem supporters of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini. Car bombers damaged the American and French embassies in 1983 and drove into a motorcade of the ruling sheik in 1985. After the embassy bombings, Kuwait tried and convicted 17 Shiite Moslems of Iraqi origin, handing down death sentences for three and prison terms for the others.

**Lebanon.** Devastation in Lebanon has been a horrifying staple of journalists throughout the Western world since 1975. Civil war, massacres, terrorist bombings, foreign interventions and street firefights erupted in rapid succession, broken
intermittently by hundreds of cease-fires. By the mid-1980s, one reporter likened Lebanon to “a vision of hell,” while another commented with grim humor that Lebanon “used to be a country,” but recently “became a state of chaos.”

The root cause of the death and destruction is a rivalry between two religious groups -- Christians and Moslems. In the religious kaleidoscope, the Lebanese Moslems are divided into three major sects, Sunni, Shiite and Druse, which sometimes fight each other. Three nationality groups, Palestinians, Israelis and Syrians, also stir up the explosive mixture, the Palestinians as refugees and, later, sometimes as guerrillas living in Lebanon, and the Israelis and Syrians as foreign intervenors with their own political and/or territorial aims. The Israelis have armed and assisted Lebanon’s Maronite Christians, while Syrian troops have fought both Christians and Palestinians.

Although Lebanese violence exploded comparatively recently on American TV sets, the underlying ethnic divisions spawned clan warfare going back for centuries. In the wake of mid-nineteenth-century civil war and massacres of Maronite Christians by the Druse, European powers forced the Ottoman overlords to turn Lebanon into an autonomous province with a pro-Christian government. Traditionally, the area had been a semi-autonomous part of Greater Syria, which was part of the Ottoman Empire. After World War I, Lebanon came under French rule, which favored the Maronite Christians. When Lebanon achieved independence at the end of World War II, Maronite Christians continued to dominate the government under a power-sharing agreement reached in 1943. Members of Parliament represented religious rather than political groups, and Christians were guaranteed a 6-to-5 majority, as well as the office of president.

Ethnic tensions remained high and civil war broke out again in 1958, at which time American troops restored order at the request of the Lebanese government. By the mid-1970s, the fast growing Moslem population apparently outnumbered the Christians by a ratio of 6 to 4 and demanded political changes to reflect the altered demographic reality. Christians were naturally reluctant to relinquish their dominant role. Moreover, change was made difficult by fundamental differences in values, with the Christians generally oriented toward the West, the Moslems emotionally attached to the Arab world, and many Shiites yearning for an Iranian-style religious state.

A new and bloodier civil war broke out in 1975, killing 40,000, wounding 100,000 and causing damage assessed in the billions of dollars. Large-scale fighting ended with Syrian intervention in 1976, but genuine peace remained elusive. Two Israeli invasions occurred; the second in 1982, causing massive destruction in Beirut, followed by the massacre of hundreds of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by Christian militiamen, whom the Israelis had permitted to enter the camps.

More than a decade after the outbreak of civil war, the fighting and killing continued between religious groups and sometimes within each major group. Hopes for peace seemed brightest in December, 1985, when, with Syrian mediation, Druse, Shiite and Maronite militia chieftains signed a pact
ending Christian political domination. But President Amin Gemayel, a Maronite, scuttled the pact, complaining that it made too many concessions to the Moslem majority, and shortly thereafter his supporters crushed followers of the Maronite leader who had signed the agreement, leaving 350 dead.

Hostilities continued, and seven car bombings in the first seven months of 1986 killed 66 and wounded 140 in East Beirut. Americans will remember that earlier suicide car bombings had killed 260 U.S. Marines and about 60 French soldiers, part of a multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon. Left unanswered in the Lebanese wreckage is the question of how to heal one of the world’s most intractable ethnic conflicts, ironically based on two great ethical religions.

**Libya.** After seizing power in a 1969 coup, Col. Muammar Qaddafi proclaimed a cultural revolution intended to establish a government based on Moslem doctrines. The Qaddafi regime “encouraged” many Westerners to leave Libya and others left voluntarily. In 1985, Libya also expelled 29,000 of its 92,000 Tunisian workers. Tunisia responded by calling home all of its emigrant workers and terminating trade ties with Libya.

**Malawi.** Upon becoming an independent country in 1963, Malawi pressed for “Africanization” of property and jobs held by Europeans and Asians. An estimated 200,000 Asians had their businesses “Africanized.” However, Malawi has maintained friendlier relations with South Africa than many other black African countries, largely because South Africa has been a major employer of Malawi men.

One of the first Europeans to reach the present territory of Malawi was David Livingstone, the famous Scottish missionary and explorer. Arriving in 1859, Livingstone was appalled to find warring native tribes taking many slaves and selling them to foreign traders. Attention focused on the problem by Livingstone and other Scottish missionaries led to the establishment of a British protectorate over the area in 1891. British gunboats and British officers leading Sikh troops from India then stamped out the slave trade in the region.

**Malaysia and Singapore.** Ethnic tensions and conflicts have plagued Malaysia ever since it came into existence in 1963 as a result of a federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah (North Borneo), and Sarawak. Two years later, the Malay-dominated government expelled a reluctant Singapore, with the avowed goal of preventing racial outbreaks directed toward the Chinese residents of that city. Nevertheless, in 1969, several hundred people were killed in Kuala Lumpur in race riots directed against ethnic Chinese and Indian residents. Although the native Malays are the largest population group, with 51 percent of the total, the wealth of the country is disproportionately held by the Chinese, who make up 35 percent of the population. The Indians, constituting 10 percent, tend to occupy an intermediate economic position.

Shortly after the 1969 riots, the government launched a 20-year program designed to give Malays and the aboriginal tribes employment proportional to their numbers, along with a
30% ownership of corporate shares. The share-ownership plan particularly frightened the economically dominant Chinese, who have charged economic and political discrimination. The Malaysian constitution recognizes the “special position” of the native Malays and authorizes special rights to public service positions, certain lands, scholarships and other educational benefits, and some types of business permits. The private business sector has been pressed to aim at a 50% Malay work force at all levels. Such “affirmative action” preferences have heightened job competition among non-Malays and enhanced the career prospects of Malays. The economy probably has suffered, at least in the short run, as a result of the relatively low productivity of workers hired because of ethnic rather than occupational qualifications. Ethnic preferences also bred some dishonesty and corruption as non-Malays tried to devise schemes for avoiding the relative disadvantages imposed on them by preferences for a favored ethnic group.

Interestingly, the Malay head of government in the 1980s has been Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, author of a book, The Malay Dilemma, which argues that native Malays are poorer than the ethnic Chinese residents because of inherent racial differences. “The Malays are spiritually inclined, tolerant and easy-going,” he writes. “The non-Malays, and especially the Chinese, are materialistic, aggressive and have an appetite for work.” The book, banned for many years, was back in circulation after its author became prime minister.40

Malay-Chinese antagonism was largely responsible for Malaysia’s well-publicized reluctance to accept “boat people” fleeing Vietnam. In 1978, the government banned landings of the mostly ethnic Chinese refugees and reversed the order only after several hundred drowned when their fragile boats were towed offshore by Malaysian police. Two years later, the number of refugees in Malaysia had dropped to 20,000 from a high of 76,500.

The native Malays also resisted the intrusion of another foreign group, the Indonesians, in the 1980s. A 1984 accord between their country and Indonesia pledged that Indonesian laborers would return home after two years in Malaysia. At that time, an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 Indonesians -- half of them illegal aliens -- lived in Malaysia. Many Malaysians feared that their presence would upset the nation’s delicate racial balance, as well as take jobs from native workers.

Malaysia’s chronic ethnic group tensions took on a new dimension in the last decade with the rise of Moslem extremism in a society where Islam is the official religion, despite the deep religious divisions in the population. Four men were killed in 1978 as they tried to desecrate a Hindu temple. Two years later, 15 members of a fanatical Moslem cult took long knives into a police station and slashed at everyone in sight, wounding 23 policemen and bystanders. Government officials have expressed concern not only about such violent incidents, but also about a broad Malay tendency to turn toward Islamic conservatism and thus to advocate a fundamentalist Islamic state, which would undoubtedly be unacceptable to the ethnic minorities in Malaysia. In recent years, enrollments in Moslem religious schools have increased, many new mosques have been built and more women
have taken to wearing the traditional Islamic veils. The Islamic resurgence appears to be in part an ethnic movement born of a desire to preserve some of the trappings of the traditional rural Malay lifestyle in a rapidly changing multiracial country.

The growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia is also disturbing to two neighbors, Indonesia and Singapore, which fear the development of similar movements among their own Moslems. Meanwhile, Singapore continues a “speak Mandarin” campaign to get its largely Chinese population to feel like a single community, although it is split into speakers of Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka, Hainanese and Foochow. The latest governmental slogan admonishes: “Start with Mandarin, speak it more often.”

**Mauritius.** Violent race riots in 1968 accompanied Mauritius’ independence, which occurred despite the protests of minorities opposed to Indian-Hindu domination. Intense ethnic rivalries continued to divide the Hindu majority and sizeable minorities of Africans, Europeans (mostly French) and Creoles (an African-French mixture). Small numbers of Moslems and Chinese add to the complexity of the ethnic mix of the island country, located in the Indian Ocean, east of Madagascar.

Prior to 1948, the Hindus had remained politically powerless because of a limited franchise based on property qualifications. A new constitution then eased voting requirements and political dominance passed from the French-Mauritians to the Indians, arousing the fears of other ethnic groups.

**Mexico.** The early history of Mexico records exploitation of the indigenous Indians in a manner reminiscent of various other Spanish colonies. Before they were conquered by the Spaniards in 1519-21, the then dominant Aztecs had oppressed neighboring tribes with a horrifying cruelty never equalled by the white colonists. For more than a century after the Spaniards seized power, the native population declined -- possibly to little more than one-quarter of its Original size -- as a result of the conquest itself plus exhausting labor and epidemic diseases such as smallpox, measles and typhus.

The Indians were first enslaved and later remained in a state of peonage, often compounded by indebtedness to their masters. Once their control had been firmly established, the Spaniards tried systematically to eradicate the Indian cultures in order to prevent a resurgence of the subject peoples, as well as to impose the Catholic religion, the spread of which had been the moral justification for the conquest. Nevertheless, widespread unrest was manifested in numerous mutinies and rebellions.

The early mestizos (of mixed Indian and white ancestry) were well accepted, even to the point of being admitted to the Spanish nobility, but were relegated to an inferior status as their numbers increased. Mestizos thus felt humiliated by the whites but, at the same time, they looked down on the Indians as a conquered people. The ruling Spaniards were never numerous, totaling only 7,904 persons in 1793, but maintained a status superior to the native-born whites (Creoles), as well as to Indians, mestizos and the few blacks.
Racial and ethnic tensions were related to many aspects of Mexican history, including the drive to gain independence from Spain in the period between 1810 and 1821. The first assertions of local sovereignty came from the Creoles and were opposed by the Peninsulares or Spanish-born Spaniards, who did not wish to relinquish their dominant positions. When the political stirrings led to an uprising of the oppressed masses, the Creoles saw no alternative other than to support the existing government. The peace plan called for a union of the Peninsulares and the Creoles, which gave the latter some of the gains they had coveted.

The population of modern Mexico is about 60 percent mestizo, 30 percent Indian and 9 percent whites descended from Spaniards or other Europeans. Social distinctions are not entirely racial but are partly cultural and geographical, with those defined as Indians tending to live traditional lifestyles in rural communities and those defined as Ladino living in urban areas and speaking Spanish rather than an Indian language. In some areas, the relationship between Indians and Ladinos is said to approach a caste system. In other areas, a class relationship exists, making it possible for Indians who achieve middle-class lifestyles to pass into the Ladino group. Nevertheless, most Indians remain at the lower levels of the Mexican society.

In the early 1500s, tribal conflict between neighboring Indian groups was one key to Cortez’s incredible feat of conquering the militant one-million-strong Aztec Empire with 508 Spanish soldiers, 16 horses, 14 cannons, and a few greyhounds. The Aztecs had previously defeated numerous neighbors, afterward imposing heavy taxes and carrying off many prisoners to be sacrificed to their gods. An estimated 100,000 persons were killed annually in barbaric rituals, which were sometimes followed by eating the flesh of the victims. At a single event, the dedication of the great pyramid temple in Tenochtitlan, 20,000 captives were slain by chiefs and priests, who took turns in slitting open the bodies and tearing out the hearts. Such practices made the Aztecs hated and feared by other Indian groups, two of which joined forces with Cortez and aided him significantly in the battle against Montezuma and his Aztec warriors.

The Netherlands. The Protestants of the Netherlands suffered severe religious persecution during the sixteenth century at the instigation of their foreign ruler, King Phillip II of Spain, who believed his mission in life was to extend the power of Spain and the Roman Catholic Church throughout the world. Phillip sent the Duke of Alba with an army to stamp out the Protestant Reformation in the Netherlands and to crush its adherents. Inaugurating a genuine reign of terror, Alba set up a special tribunal, nicknamed the Council of Blood, which ordered wholesale executions. Thousands of Protestants fled to England or Germany to escape torture and death. An army headed by Alba’s son also committed atrocities at Mechelen, Zutphen and Naarden.

The Dutch continued to struggle for religious and political independence under the leadership of William the Silent, Prince of Orange, and declared themselves independent from
Spain in 1581. The northern provinces, led by William, established a confederation in which the members retained individual sovereignty, but the Dutch fight for independence did not entirely achieve its goal until 80 years after it began in 1568.

Complete religious freedom is guaranteed in the modern Netherlands. A sizeable minority (38%) of the population is Roman Catholic and political parties have traditionally tended to follow religious lines. The major religious groups are geographically somewhat separate, with Protestant influence dominant in the northern area and Catholicism strong in the south.

Racial and cultural minorities also exist, primarily as a result of non-white immigration from Dutch colonies after World War II. The unassimilated state of one group of immigrants was dramatically illustrated in 1977 by Moluccan terrorists’ seizure of a train and a school and their holding of 53 hostages for 20 days, ended only by commando action. The Moluccans have attempted to force the Dutch government to help them gain their homeland’s independence from Indonesia. In support of their demands, the Moluccans again seized hostages in 1978, for the fourth time since 1975.

New Caledonia. As separatist crises go, New Caledonia’s is a small one because the island’s total population is only 146,000. Yet it has inspired a visit by French President Francois Mitterrand, a special session of the French parliament, widespread coverage on the front pages of French newspapers and violent upheaval in New Caledonia itself. The French National Assembly voted in 1984 to grant internal autonomy to the overseas territory and apparently contemplated complete independence. Then it discovered one complication -- a majority of the population definitely was not yearning to be free.

The independence movement found supporters largely among the native Kanaks, black Melanesians who constitute 43 percent of the people. Opponents included most of the Europeans (37 percent), some Kanaks, and most of the remaining 20 percent, which is largely Polynesian, Vietnamese, Indonesian and other Asians. French loyalist parties outpolled independence parties 61 percent to 35 percent in 1985 elections.

In response, a Kanak separatist spokesman suggested that only Kanaks and long-time residents be allowed to vote in a promised referendum on independence. The Kanak rebels demanded total political power for “the historic first occupants,” who would then consider the role of what they call the “outsiders,” some of whose families have lived in the territory for generations. In the face of irreconcilable views, French Socialist party leaders began to talk of dividing the island into two loosely federated territories, one Kanak and the other non-Kanak. President Mitterrand said France would grant independence but retain control of New Caledonia’s internal security, defense and foreign policy.

Meanwhile, more than 20 people were killed in ethnic conflicts in a single three-month period between November, 1984 and February, 1985. Twenty bombs exploded in a year,
which also saw strikes, sabotage and stonings. The Kanak rebels blockaded about half of the territory, forcing many whites to abandon outlying areas. Attempting to maintain order were 6,000 French policemen and soldiers -- one for every 24 islanders -- whose numbers Mitterrand said would be increased.

The saga of the French territory began violently more than 135 years ago when New Caledonian natives killed the crew of a French surveying ship. The French retaliated by seizing the island and have remained there ever since. Their tenure was extended by a 1987 referendum, yielding a vote heavily in favor of retaining French rule. Probably anticipating an unfavorable outcome, large numbers of Kanaks declined to vote.

**New Zealand.** When Queen Elizabeth visited New Zealand early in 1986, an assailant with a grievance about Maori land rights pelted her with an egg that hit her in the face and oozed downward onto her clothing. This small indignity was the latest episode in a racial conflict that has flared sporadically since the early 1800s, when white settlers began to arrive in significant numbers.

At that time, the native Maoris were a Stone Age Polynesian people prone to fighting tribal wars hand-to-hand with sticks and clubs. They soon acquired muskets, which made possible much more destructive tribal battles. Wars between whites and natives erupted in 1834-35 and continued intermittently during the decade between 1860 and 1870. Less violent disputes also arose at other times. Hostilities were ended in 1870 by a conciliatory governmental policy that provided schools for aboriginal children and gave the Maori adults separate electorates and parliamentary representation as well as land guarantees.

Like many other native peoples, those of New Zealand suffered a population decline after their early contacts with whites, reaching a low of 20 percent of their original size by the close of the nineteenth century. Thereafter, the Maoris increased rapidly and doubled their numbers during the first two decades of the twentieth century. They now constitute 10 percent of the nation’s people. Most still live in one geographical area and retain much of their original culture.

**Nicaragua.** Both the United States and Honduras have accused Nicaragua of trying to exterminate the Miskito Indians, an unassimilated people inhabiting a swampy Atlantic coastal area. Although the Miskitos number only 70,000, about 20,000 had fled the country by late 1985, many going to Honduran refugee camps. The Sandinista government executed hundreds or possibly thousands of the Miskitos, who refused to join the revolution, and forcibly relocated 10,000 of them.

A particularly savage wave of repression was unleashed in 1982, with well-documented massacres of civilians occurring. Thousands of Indians are unaccounted for and many were apparently buried in mass graves, one of which has been photographed by a Western newsman. About 50 Indian villages were destroyed, and the former occupants were forced to leave behind almost all of their possessions as they were
moved to guarded collectives. An important Nicaraguan defector, a former government official, reported that in March, 1984, Nicaraguan officers sacked houses in the Miskito community of La Pan, locking up the men and raping and manhandling the women.44

During the two decades following Nicaraguan independence in 1838, the Miskitos caused serious internal strife. An interesting aspect of the Miskitos’ current problems is the support offered by the American Indian Movement, of Wounded Knee fame. An AIM leader announced in 1986 that 200 members would join the Miskitos in battling the Sandinistas. AIM has also given at least verbal support to Indian political or separatist movements elsewhere in Latin America.

Nigeria. Tribal animosities and widespread fears of being dominated by other groups delayed the independence of Nigeria for seven years after British-Nigerian agreements were reached in 1953. The new government faced the overwhelming challenge of unifying 250 tribes, each with its own distinct language and customs. Within a decade, ethnic conflicts led to a tribally-based coup and counter-coup, riots, a massacre of the Ibos by the Hausas in 1966, the flight of thousands of Ibos back to their eastern regional homeland, secession in 1967 of the Ibo-dominated region which became the ill-fated Republic of Biafra and the consequent 31-month-long civil war. During the war an estimated one million people died, many of them of starvation caused by a severe famine which international aid could not contain.

In addition to continuing tribal friction, Nigeria’s short history has also been marked by large-scale governmental actions detrimental to aliens within its borders. The government took over thousands of foreign-owned businesses in 1974 in compliance with a decree prohibiting foreigners from owning 55 types of businesses ranging from publishing companies to dry cleaners.

One of the biggest population expulsions of recent years began in Nigeria in 1983, when the government ordered the removal of two million illegal immigrants from Ghana, Niger and other neighboring nations. Aliens in the country were given two weeks to pack their belongings and get out. The angry reactions of neighbors forced minor concessions, but the edict created chaotic conditions as desperate Ghanians sought to board the grossly inadequate numbers of available ships. When refugee columns up to 10 miles long headed toward neighboring states, many evacuees fell prey to violence and robbery and a few reportedly died of starvation. Another 700,000 illegal immigrants were ordered to leave Nigeria in 1985.

Pakistan. Pakistan was born as a separatist state in 1947, when ethnic conflicts forced the departing British to split the Indian subcontinent into two parts, one of them intended to provide a national homeland for Moslems fearful of Hindu domination. For centuries, clashes between Hindus and Moslems had led to periodic blood baths. At the time of partition, hundreds of thousands of people -- possibly as many as one million -- were massacred and 12 million were transformed
into refugees as pent-up ethnic hatreds found outlets in murder, looting and burning. Masses of Moslem refugees poured into Pakistan while Hindus fled to India.

Since that time, the new nation has been disturbed by numerous separatist crises and violent ethnic conflicts. One separatist movement, accompanied by riots, strikes and massacres and eventually supported by Indian intervention, led to the secession of East Pakistan, which became the independent nation of Bangladesh in 1971. The Bengalis of East Pakistan and the West Pakistanis had been separated by culture, physical features and 1,000 miles of Indian territory, and had virtually no common bond other than Islam.

Chronic political instability afflicted Pakistan from the beginning as conflicts arose within and between ethnic groups. Ethnic conflict probably would have been more destructive but for the fact that the major groups tended to be more or less geographically separated into relatively homogeneous provinces, with the Panjabis in Punjab, Pathans in the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchis in Baluchistan and Sindhis in Sind. This often resulted in political agitation in one province against the others, or protest in the three numerically smaller provinces against the largest group, the Punjabis. The most violent ethnic clashes of recent years have occurred in Sind, the province with the most ethnically mixed areas. There, in November, 1986, at least 40 people were left dead in four days of bloody ethnic clashes between Pathans, sometimes armed with automatic weapons, and the Muhajirs.45

Another element in the ethnic rivalry is the division between Sunni and Shiite Moslems, which often breaks out into violence on the country’s college campuses. Open violence also came in 1952-53 with persecution of the Ahmadiyah sect, which orthodox Moslems consider heretical. Quieting this outbreak involved declarations of martial law in parts of the country in 1953.

The Pakistani problem with the most serious international ramifications may be the recent separatist movements of the Pathans and the Baluchis. These came to the forefront in 1974-75, with the backing of Afghanistan, which wanted to create a new state of Pakhtunistan. Some observers believe Afghanistan and the Soviet Union have encouraged these separatist activities in line with the long-term Russian goal of a warm-water port on the Indian Ocean.46 In September, 1986, Kabul hosted a rally of 5,000 dissident Pakistanis who protested the division of the Pathan tribes between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Further complicating the problem are the estimated 5,000,000 Afghans now living in Pakistan. The Baluchi tribesmen are also divided between two countries, Pakistan and Iran, and have their own separatist ambitions.

Panama. A new Panamanian constitution imposed in the 1940s took away the citizenship of 40,000 blacks of West Indian origin. A president of Panama reportedly asked the United States to deport the blacks, who had worked on the Panama Canal, in order to “purify” the country’s “racial structure.” Further immigration of West Indian blacks was restricted, with cultural differences cited as a factor. The present population of Panama is 14 percent black, 10 percent
white, 6 percent Indian and 70 percent mestizo.

**Papua New Guinea.** This nation has one of the world’s most heterogeneous populations, consisting of tribal groups divided by customs, traditions and about 700 languages, which are often unintelligible outside the tribe. Tribal wars have occurred frequently and unpredictably. A three-day war of vengeance between tribes armed with spears, axes and bows and arrows broke out in June, 1977, when the Minister of Education accidentally killed a five-year-old girl in an automobile accident.

Two weeks before it attained complete independence in 1975, Papua New Guinea faced a secessionist crisis when nationalists on the offshore island of Bougainville declared their own independence as the Republic of the Northern Solomons. After some violent conflict, secessionist and government leaders reached an agreement in 1976 which promised increased powers for a restored provincial government.

**Philippines.** For 400 years, the Moslem Moro tribesmen of Mindanao and the Sulu Islands have resisted control by outsiders, including several ruling foreign powers and the Philippine government. The bloodiest fighting between government troops and the Moros occurred between 1973 and 1976, when a ceasefire was mediated by Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi. Although the agreement granted autonomy to Moslem areas, some leaders continued to demand an independent nation. Moro guerrilla activities intensified in the mid-1980s with the abduction of an American missionary and 10 nuns and the rebel occupation of a city, during which 19 government soldiers were killed. Rebel leaders say the ethnic conflict has cost 100,000 lives, while government estimates exceed 50,000.

The Moros, who constitute 5 percent of the population, are generally of the same Malayan stock as other Filipinos, but are very different in culture and religion. Prior to Philippine independence, the Moros, like a number of minorities elsewhere, preferred continued colonial administration -- American in this case -- to dominance by the majority in a unified, independent country. They later expressed hope for a return by the Americans.47

**Poland.** Despite long and recurring periods of foreign control, Poland retains a strong sense of national identity and now has a highly homogeneous population with only tiny non-Polish and non-Catholic minorities. Once a great European power, the country disappeared from the map of Europe for more than a century after three partitions by Russia, Prussia and Austria between 1772 and 1796. Of the conquering powers, Russia particularly made great efforts to eradicate the Polish language and culture and to distort the history of Poland in the minds of its youth. In its “russification” drive, Russia closed Polish universities and required the use of the Russian language in schools, courts and administrative offices.

The Poles never ceased to desire independence and mounted unsuccessful insurrections in 1830, 1846, 1848 and 1863. Secret patriotic groups and struggling private schools kept the Polish culture alive. In the early 1900s, lessened Russian
oppression, along with promotion of pan-Slav sentiment, encouraged some to accept the idea of uniting all Poles in an autonomous region within the Russian empire. This proposal, however, was aborted by the opposition of irreconcilable Polish revolutionaries and renewed Russian oppression.

Partly because of the international support gained by tireless Polish nationalists who had united all the organizations of the 4,000,000 Poles in the United States, the country was resurrected after World War I. Re-establishment of an independent Poland, encompassing all territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, was the thirteenth of President Woodrow Wilson’s famous Fourteen Points. Reconstructed Poland faced numerous problems, including different legal systems in various areas and powerful minority groups often preoccupied with their own interests. Poles constituted only 69 percent of the population, which also included 14 percent Ukrainians, 9 percent Jews, 3 percent Byelorussians, and 2.4 percent Germans.

The minorities organized into a bloc for political purposes and elected enough members of parliament to become an important and occasionally decisive factor. This bloc supported leftist parties in electing as the first president of the republic a man opposed by Polish nationalists, who were infuriated by the election of a president through the votes of national minorities. The president, Gabriel Narutowicz, was soon assassinated by a fanatic. The next government was resolutely opposed by the leftists and minorities and survived for less than a year; a period marked by serious unrest and riots in Cracow in November, 1923. Governmental instability continued until General Joseph Pilsudski overthrew the democratic regime in 1926 and established a virtual dictatorship which continued until his death in 1935.

By that time, Poland was again threatened by neighboring powers. Its partition by Russia and Germany touched off World War II. The Polish population suffered severely during the war, with 2 million deported to Germany and 1.7 million to Russia. The Jewish population almost disappeared under German persecution. Many other Poles were also executed by the Germans, and 15,000 Polish officers were murdered by the Russians. A 1985 film, Shoah, by a French-Jewish director, Claude Lanzmann, has aroused controversy with its implicit charge that, because of pervasive anti-Semitism, many Poles condoned the Nazi treatment of Jews.

When the wartime horrors were finally over, Poland was awarded previously German territory to compensate it for Russian seizure of Polish areas in the east. The victorious powers agreed that ethnic Germans remaining in Poland would have to be transferred to Germany. Five million had already fled in advance of the Russian army, and the rest were quickly expelled. Three million Poles then moved into the territories abandoned by the ethnic Germans. Boundary changes left practically all of Poland’s ethnic Ukrainians and Ruthenians within the new borders of the Soviet Union. Thus, the most catastrophic war in Poland’s history left the country again under Russian control, but with a homogeneous population whose sense of unity has helped maintain its religion and much of its culture in opposition to Soviet desires.
Romania. Romania has been accused of conducting a cultural genocide campaign against its 1.8 to 3 million Hungarians through the exile of the ethnic group’s intelligentsia, suppression of its language, official curtailment of its educational and religious activities and deliberate intimidation of its cultural and religious leaders. The New York-based Committee for Human Rights in Romania charged in 1985 that “over the past two years physical brutalities, imprisonments, house searches and beatings against minority-rights advocates have markedly increased.” In recent years, at least seven Roman Catholic priests and other clergymen reportedly died during or after interrogation by government security agents. Romanian authorities “corrected” a construction error of one meter on a church by leveling it with a bulldozer.

Hungarians living in Romania face employment discrimination, and the open dislike of the majority. A prominent emigre asserts that even Romanian intellectuals tend to believe the media propaganda against the Hungarian minority. A distinguished Hungarian writer, Gyula Illyes, describes the plight of ethnic Hungarians in Romania as “unbearable.” Hungarians in Romania were relegated to ethnic minority status through border changes following the world wars. Hungary lost one-third of its territory after World War I and a few more pieces after World War II. As a result, a third of the Hungarian population suddenly found itself living in a foreign country without ever moving. Nevertheless, the Hungarians have clung to their own language, culture and identity.

Demands of the Hungarian minority in Romania were spelled out in a 1982 letter to the Hungarian Council of Ministers. They include self-administration for those living in areas with concentrations of Hungarians and the right to speak their own language outside the home. At that time, the official pressure toward linguistic conformity was demonstrated by signs posted in Hungarian regions saying, “Speak Romanian.” In February, 1988, Hungary began an unusual policy of advertising its willingness to provide a haven for people fleeing the repressive conditions of its Warsaw Pact ally, causing a steady stream of refugees to flow across the border between Hungary and Romania.

South Africa. Since 1984, racial conflict has escalated in South Africa as the black majority has attempted to transform a society rigidly divided along color lines. The “unrest” has manifested itself in marches, riots, bombings, strikes, much property destruction and numerous deaths, including 500 during the first five months of 1986. Although world attention has been concentrated on the black-white conflict, the South African ethnic mosaic is far more complex than a simple dichotomy. The population is about 18 percent white, 68 percent black, 10 percent colored (mixed) and 3 percent Indian. The blacks consist of 10 major tribal groups with very different languages and cultures. The Bushmen still maintain a Stone-Age way of life, while some blacks practice subsistence farming and others work in South Africa’s modern industrial economy. The whites are largely divided between the Afrikaners or Boers (about 60 percent), primarily of Dutch descent, and an
English-speaking group, mostly of British descent.

Not only have the whites and blacks fought each other over the centuries, but each group has seen bloody internal conflict along tribal or nationality lines. In late 1985 and early 1986, about 120 people were killed in sizeable tribal clashes, one involving thousands of blacks brandishing knives, sticks, spears and homemade guns. In another incident, Zulus, the largest tribal group, razed 4,000 shacks occupied by Pondoys on Zulu-claimed land. A Zulu mob also burned and looted an Indian neighborhood in 1985 in an attempt to drive out the inhabitants.

A significant proportion of the "unrest" killings have been attributed to black-on-black violence, many victims being policemen or government employees regarded by radicals as "collaborators" or informers. A number of these unfortunate blacks were murdered by "necklacing," a practice in which a gasoline-soaked automobile tire is tied around the victim and set afire. Some observers have commented that black majority rule could lead to a bloodbath, with blacks fighting each other along tribal and ideological lines.

The cleavage within the white society is virtually equivalent to tribal differences, reinforced by historic events. The Afrikaners are descended from the original white settlers who, in 1652, found an almost empty land, sparsely peopled by nomadic black tribes. In many ways, the area was not unlike colonial America, where white settlers found a small, more or less nomadic Indian population. The first Dutch colony took root in South Africa a year prior to the founding of New York half a world away.

The Afrikaners tried as early as 1795 to establish an independent republic, but came unwillingly under British control in 1814. In 1833, in the face of growing Anglicization, 12,000 Boers made the "great trek" north and east, where they created the republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Discovery of gold and diamonds several decades later brought an influx of outsiders and stirred British expansionist aims, which led to the outbreak of the Boer War in 1899. During that war, the Afrikaners suffered their own holocaust, with the loss of an estimated 20 percent of their population -- most of them women and children -- in the area of conflict. Although the Boers eventually joined their conquerors in the Union of South Africa, their two disposessions possibly encouraged a tendency to "circle the wagons" in the face of any new perceived threat.

Meanwhile, as South Africa became the continent's most prosperous industrialized area, blacks from surrounding territories flocked in, some to escape tribal violence and others fleeing dire poverty. While resisting pressure to surrender power to the black majority, South African whites have made significant concessions. In the 1980s, governmental decisions eliminated bans on sex and marriage across color lines, desegregated sports, established black workers' rights to union representation, repealed "pass laws," which restricted where blacks could live or work, and struck down influx control laws, which checked movement from rural to urban areas. The new constitution of 1984 brought Indians and coloreds into a racially-divided Parliament having a separate chamber for
each of the three groups, but still excluded blacks. Earlier, South Africa created four nominally independent black states within the country, as well as 10 Bantustans or black homelands, with unicameral legislatures elected by blacks. Under present policy, the people of the black units retain South African citizenship and many actually live permanently or temporarily in white areas. In the black units, tribal chiefs typically have a considerable role in government. Mindful of these developments, a number of foreign observers have suggested that South Africa may eventually evolve into a Swiss-type confederation of a dozen or so autonomous provinces, most of them black, with a central government concerned largely with defense and economic coordination. Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, the most influential black political leader, sometimes seems to be asking for a constitutional system of shared power, possibly involving a confederation of provinces.

The militant African National Congress continues to demand an immediate transfer of power from whites to blacks on a “one man, one vote” basis. Contemplating such a prospect, white South Africans are not reassured by the history of modern sub-Saharan Africa, where white rule has too often been replaced not by liberal democracy but, as cynics say, by a “one man, one vote, one time” prelude to a despotic system little concerned about equitable treatment for white, Asian or tribal minorities. The deep roots and large size of the white minority, compared to those elsewhere on the continent, along with the high value of South Africa’s natural resources and industrial development, suggest that a complete transfer of power may be bitterly resisted.

Hardening white attitudes were indicated by South Africa’s 1987 parliamentary elections, which gave the status of official opposition to the growing Conservative Party. Conservative leader Andries Treurnicht immediately called for a “volkstaat” or segregated state, declaring that the white community will “refuse to be treated as a minority” in its “own fatherland.” Another Conservative spokesman, Connie Muldur, told journalists that if his party comes to power, it will partition South Africa into 13 mini-states, with the largest reserved for whites and the remainder for 10 black tribes, Indians and Coloreds. Meanwhile, a South African best-seller, *South Africa: The Solution* by Leon Louw and Frances Kendall, advocates a strictly limited federal government with decentralization of power to 306 existing local communities.

Spain. Much of the history of Spain is a tragic chronicle of ethnic and religious strife. Although some great conflicts ended in earlier centuries, the problem of the “nations within the Spanish nation” persists. One of Western Europe’s most heterogeneous, the Spanish population consists of a Castilian majority (72 percent) and the following other major ethnic and cultural groups: Catalans in the northeast, Galicians in the northwest, Andalusians in the south and Basques in the north. Basque and Catalan separatism and the regionalism of other ethnic groups have long troubled the Spanish nation and, in the opinion of some historians, constituted serious obstacles to the development of democracy or even constitutional govern-
ment. Pressure from Basque and Catalonian nationalists led to the granting of home rule in their areas in 1979, after referendums on autonomy showed overwhelming support. Three years earlier, the Basque, Catalan, Galician and Valencian languages had been officially recognized for legal purposes. Nevertheless, the Basques, who constitute only 2.3 percent of the population, continue to create disproportionate disruption with their escalating campaign for independence.

In 1986, the Basque terrorist arm, the ETA, mounted increasingly bloody attacks, including bombings of the armed forces and police in Madrid, one using 12 self-propelled anti-tank grenades. Basque separatists have been responsible for about 500 deaths since 1968. A foreign observer has expressed fears that such terrorism might actually threaten the structure of the young Spanish democracy. The Basques, who speak a language of unknown origin, call themselves Iberians rather than Spaniards and claim as their homeland four Spanish provinces, in addition to the three already granted an autonomous parliament.

Ethnic divisions played a role in the fanatically fought Spanish civil war of the 1930s, during which the Basques and Catalans supported the anti-Franco Loyalists. In 1970, six Basque separatists were the focal point of an international controversy, their death sentences being commuted in the face of world outcry and a plea from Pope Paul. Another chronic problem plaguing authorities in both Spain and France is the tendency of French and Spanish Basques to cooperate in such activities as smuggling and evading capture by crossing national boundaries.

In earlier centuries, Spain’s almost interminable intergroup hostilities were painted on a much larger canvas. The ancient Iberians were invaded by Carthaginians, Celts, Romans, Vandals, Visigoths and Moors. The Vandals, who gave their name to Andalusia, were largely killed or driven out by the Visigoths, who were in turn conquered by the Moors (Moslem Berbers). The Moors ruled much of Spain for five centuries, but the unconquered Spaniards, particularly those in northern mountain areas, nibbled at the Moorish provinces bit by bit in a long battle to “free Spain from the infidel.” The battle of the plains of Tolosa in 1212 practically broke the Moors’ power and left them in control only of the small southern kingdom of Granada. The forces of Ferdinand and Isabella completed the reconquest by recapturing Granada in 1492, the historic year in which Columbus gave the New World to the Spanish crown.

The newly unified Spain established Roman Catholicism as the state religion and expelled many Jews in 1492 and many Moslems in 1502, although final expulsion of the Moorish remnant was delayed until 1608–9. The 1500s saw the tremendous burst of exploration, colonization and wealth accumulation that marked Spain’s “golden century.” Spain ruled the seas and had the strongest military force in Europe, as well as an empire that included nearly all of South America, the southern part of North America and the Philippines. The Spaniards also controlled Naples, Sicily, Milan, the Netherlands and Germany.

After freeing itself from the “infidel.” Spain became a bulwark of Roman Catholicism and weakened itself with in-
cessant wars, some motivated largely by a determination to halt the march of the Protestant Reformation through Europe. However, Protestant England defeated the Spanish Armada in 1588, after which Spanish power declined. The country never again played a major role in European politics. Spain’s colonial empire vanished in wars and nationalist revolutions during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Spain also tarnished its golden age by reviving the Inquisition in 1480, originally to seek out secret Jews among those who had been converted to Christianity under pressure. Persecution eventually extended to heretical sects, liberal theologians, Protestants and those guilty of serious moral offenses. Spain’s infamous inquisitor general, Tomas de Torquemada, headed tribunals which conducted 100,000 trials, 2,000 of which resulted in executions, often by burning. Other convictions, sometimes based on confessions obtained by torture, led to various punishments, including fines, imprisonment, excommunication and confiscation of property, the last condemning to poverty the family of the convicted person. Some historians believe that Spain’s use of the Inquisition to achieve a unified society was an overreaction to centuries of Moslem rule, a costly one that hampered initiative and economic, social and intellectual development.

**Sri Lanka.** Years of escalating ethnic violence and guerrilla warfare inspired a *Newsweek* writer to bestow a new label -- “the Lebanon of South Asia” -- on Sri Lanka, the “resplendent island” once known as Ceylon.58 The problem is rooted in friction between the island’s mostly Buddhist Sinhalese majority (about 70 percent of the population) and the mostly Hindu Tamil minority (about 18 percent). The two groups are divided not only by religion, but also by language and physical appearance. The Sinhalese, who went to Sri Lanka about 2,500 years ago from northern India, are a relatively light-skinned people who claim Aryan descent and speak an Indo-European language derived from Sanskrit. The Tamils immigrated from southern India and speak a Dravidian tongue different in alphabet, vocabulary and grammar.

The Tamils claim to have suffered increasing economic and other forms of discrimination since independence in 1972, while the Sinhalese fear being finally engulfed and driven into the sea by the Tamils. Exacerbating the situation is the presence of 50 million Tamils across the bay from Sri Lanka in India. A Sinhalese editor compares his group’s predicament with that of the Greek Cypriots, who eye Turkish Cypriots with the knowledge that Turkey is only 40 miles away.59

Most Tamils of Indian origin -- but not the Ceylon Tamils -- were deprived of their citizenship in 1949. Tamil separatist rioting broke out in 1958 and 1961, while Sri Lanka was still a British dominion. In 1964, India and Sri Lanka agreed to “repatriate” hundreds of thousands of “Indian Tamils” to India, a land most of them had never seen. In 1977, the Sinhalese attacked Tamils living in central and southern Sri Lanka, killing about 100 in 10 days. Some 15,000 minority group members fled northward. To impose order, troops were called out and a nationwide nighttime curlew established. Since 1983, violence has intensified with the rise of armed
guerrilla groups, rioting, several thousand killings, numerous bombings, including that of an Air Lanka jet, and the mass arrest and detention of suspected guerrillas.

At various times, the Sri Lankan government offered the Tamils a greater degree of self-rule, but minority militants insisted upon an autonomous or independent homeland in the country's northern and eastern provinces. The Sinhalese dreaded partition of the island and resisted extreme separatist demands. India offered to assist in negotiations, but at first kept a relatively low profile, apparently fearing the spread of separatist aspirations among its own Tamils. With violence still mounting, Sri Lankan and Indian leaders reached an agreement in mid-1987, promising the Tamils autonomy in their own area.

However, the hoped-for peace failed to arrive. Many guerrillas wanted not autonomy, but a state of their own, and refused to lay down their aims. In October, 1987, Indian soldiers sent to disarm the Tamil "Tigers" killed 500 rebels. The confrontation began with the suicide of 15 Tigers who, fearful of torture, swallowed cyanide capsules after being arrested and told they were being taken to the Sri Lankan capital, Columbo. In retaliation, their comrades killed eight captured Sri Lankan soldiers and butchered 100 Sinhalese men, women and children during a rampage in the east-coast town of Batticaloa. Stung into action, the Indians set out to destroy the Tigers' guerrilla organization, a task they had earlier prevented the Sri Lankan army from doing. Despite internal quivers about "another Vietnam," India obviously was intent on preventing the spread of separatist instability into its Tamil Nadu region.

Sudan and Ethiopia. Sudan's independence was accompanied by a 17-year civil war, one of Africa's bloodiest, which cost as many as 500,000 lives. The war began with an uprising in the predominantly black southern provinces against the "Arabization" policies of a government dominated by the country's Arab majority, which is concentrated in the north. Hostilities ended in 1972 with a peace agreement granting regional autonomy to the southern areas. However, in the mid-1980s, the country again faced rebellion in the south, as well as tribal conflicts. About 3,000 have been killed since 1983.

In 1987, Sudanese mobs in Kassala attacked Ethiopian refugees streaming into the border town to escape famine and disorder in their own country. Ethiopia's drought is compounded by separatist rebellion in the provinces of Eritrea and neighboring Tigre. Eritrea, governed as an Italian colony from 1890 until World War II, has a tribal makeup unlike that of the rest of Ethiopia.

Switzerland. Since the mid-1800s, Switzerland has achieved remarkable success in balancing the competing interests of a diverse population which contains roughly equal numbers of Protestants and Catholics, as well as four language groups: German (72%), French (20%), Italian (7%), and Romansch (1%). However, the relative peace of modern times was preceded by centuries of bitter ethnic conflict and may
now be threatened by a few ethnic clouds overhanging the Alps.

Switzerland’s comparatively harmonious ethnic relations can be attributed in part to certain unique factors. One is that many Swiss cantons are quite homogeneous, linguistically and religiously. Another is that Switzerland, unlike most advanced countries, is a confederation in which the central government has responsibility for foreign affairs and the cantons have almost complete independence in internal matters. These two factors decidedly limit the potential areas of group conflict. Moreover, practically all Swiss share broadly similar racial, religious and cultural backgrounds.

Nevertheless, as recently as 1979, the new French-speaking canton of Jura was created as a result of more-or-less violent demands by a French-speaking, Catholic minority which had felt its interests threatened by the German-speaking, Protestant majority of Bern. The division occurred after a 1974 plebiscite in the French-speaking Jura region resulted in a majority vote for the establishment of a separate Jura canton.

The current accommodation in Switzerland emerged only after several violent centuries. The First Civil War began in 1443, and thereafter internal hostilities erupted often enough that it is difficult to determine exactly how many additional civil wars followed. For three centuries after 1531, one historian writes, “religion so divided the Swiss people that cooperation was hardly possible.” Armed conflict over religious issues broke out in 1712. The Catholic rural cantons rebelled in 1847 against the growing influence of the Protestant cities over the federal government and formed a separate union named the Sonderbund. After the Sonderbund War, the new constitution of 1848 reunited the country, but contained an unusual provision specifically excluding the Jesuit religious order.

Switzerland now faces a new ethnic problem, which has also challenged most of the other advanced Western countries in recent decades -- the attempted settlement of large numbers of Third World peoples, most apparently seekers of economic benefits, who sometimes claim to be political refugees in order to qualify for asylum. In Switzerland, as in the United States, the distinction between economic and political refugees is not always clear. The issue has aroused passions on both sides, with many priests and ministers advocating more generous rights of asylum. In general, public opinion has supported strict immigration policies.

In 1981, about 80 percent of Swiss voters rejected a proposal that would have granted more civil rights to foreign workers hired on seasonal contracts. The proposal was sponsored by civil rights organizations and opposed by the government and most political groups, except the Socialist and Communist parties. In a 1985 secret ballot, 85 percent of the voters in Sonceboz, in Bern, voted against permitting six Tamils from Sri Lanka to remain in their little town.

Similarly, Swiss voters in April, 1987, approved by a 2-to-1 margin a new law tightening rules on immigration and political asylum, despite opponents’ warnings that such action would be construed as racist. Proponents said policy must be tightened because the country was being swamped by applicants
for political asylum, often from Zaire, Uganda, Sri Lanka or Ethiopia. Many Swiss seem to fear that their country has already reached the limits of cultural assimilation, and that a new influx of foreigners would threaten their cultural identity.

A renewed sense of identity on the part of the Swiss-German majority has been manifested in recent years by greater use of Schweizerdeutsch or Swiss-German, a dialect with local and regional variations, rather than High German. Dr. Heimutt Thomke, a Swiss-German professor who contributed to an official study of the phenomenon, describes it as a part of the general trend in Europe toward regional autonomy movements. The Swiss-German language cannot be understood by the German speakers among the linguistic minorities and thus increases the social distance between the majority and the minorities.

Turkey. Did the first major genocide of the twentieth century occur in Turkey in 1915? This alleged extermination of ethnic Armenians recently burst from the history books to motivate a world-wide terrorist campaign of bombings and assassinations, some directed toward Turkish diplomats in the United States. Although Turkey denies that genocide took place, Armenian groups charge that up to 1.5 million of their number died as a result of deliberate extermination policies. One scholarly researcher, Justin McCarthy, of the Institute of Turkish Studies, puts the casualties at 600,000 to 700,000, but agrees that half of Turkey’s Armenian population died, explaining that he believes the original size of the group was considerably smaller than the figure often cited.

Armenians say that when Christian Russians invaded the Moslem Ottoman Empire during World War I, the Turks ordered deportation of the Christian Armenians from their historic heartland, the eastern Anatolian provinces, which had become battlegrounds. Turkish authorities allegedly marched the exhausted, starving, and plague-ridden Armenians to the Syrian deserts, where marauding tribesmen plundered and massacred the columns. Support for Armenian claims comes from contemporary accounts, as well as from the fact that a short-lived liberal Ottoman government condemned to death in absentia three “Young Turks” charged in the century’s first “war crimes” trial. Furthermore, in the Turkish areas which had been the home of a million Armenians before World War I, almost none remained.

Nevertheless, the Turks dismiss many of the contemporary reports as wartime propaganda and insist that the most damaging documents used in the “war crimes” trial were forgeries and the trials sham proceedings put on by the vanquished for the victor. McCarthy also disputes the trial’s findings because he believes that Turkey’s postwar government wanted results “that would look good” to the victorious allies. The Turks argue that deportations were a wartime necessity justified by a threatened “stab in the back” from minority Armenians, some of whom had joined the Russian invaders as guerrillas. Armenians ascribe the tragedy not to World War I, but to the death throes of the 500-year-old Ottoman Empire, which had been sundered by an eruption of nationalism among the peoples of its ethnic mosaic.
The Ottoman Empire, the "spearhead of Islam," once ruled virtually the entire Arab world, as well as much of southeastern Europe. Faced with the loss of their subject peoples, the Armenians believe, the "Young Turk" reformers also espoused a fervent ethnic nationalism and eliminated the Armenians as standing in the way of a desired link with other ethnic Turks living under Russian rule in central Asia. Even prior to World War I, serious persecution of the Armenian minority spilled blood in Turkey. Inspired partly by the growth of Armenian nationalism and resultant Armenian terrorist attacks on Turkish officials, the Turks killed 200,000 Armenians in a series of massacres between 1894 and 1895 and burned and looted the Armenian quarter of Constantinople in 1876-1877.

Armenian activists in the United States define their goals as the "three R's," recognition of the genocide, reparations for the victims, and return of the land. However, with respect to the third "R," an official American investigation in 1919 reported that even before 1915, the Armenians did not constitute a majority in what they regard as their homeland of 1,000 years.

The population of modern Turkey is 90 percent ethnic Turkish and 7 percent Kurdish, with small numbers of Greeks, Armenians and Jews. With 98 percent Sunni Moslems, most Turks are unified by common religious, historical and cultural heritages. However, the Kurdish minority has resisted stringent Turkish efforts to force its complete assimilation. An Aryan people akin to the Iranians, the Kurds are not a religious minority but a subracial and cultural one with its own language (Indo-European) and a population concentrated in its traditional geographic area.

The Kurds, who once ruled a powerful kingdom, are now separated by the national boundaries of several countries, with the largest number in Turkey. For the past 60 years, this group has struggled to retain its roots in the face of determined efforts by successive Turkish regimes to deny and punish signs of Kurdish ethnic identity. The Kurds have been largely forbidden to use their language, to wear their traditional clothing and even to give their children Kurdish names. The minority fought back with rebellions beginning in 1925, 1930 and 1937 and, after these were suppressed by severe punitive measures, by guerrilla activity which continued in the mid-1980s.

Uganda. A decade after achieving independence, Uganda in 1972 expelled almost all of its 74,000 resident Asians in what was officially described as a longstanding policy of Africanization. About 23,000 of these claimed Ugandan citizenship and some were native-born citizens. However, through bureaucratic manipulation (and reportedly through the judicious use of a paper shredder), the government determined that 7,000 Asians had fraudulently acquired Ugandan citizenship. The expellees were allowed to take out little more than $100 per family. Businesses left behind were expropriated and distributed to government supporters. In the mid-1980s, many of the departed Asians were still seeking compensation for their seized assets.

Ethnic politics has been a dominant theme in the country’s bloody history. The infamous Ugandan leader, Idi Amin,
attained power in a coup supported by certain ethnic groups, particularly the Baganda tribesmen, who resented the attempts of Milton Obote, a previous head of government, to suppress the region's ancient tribal kingdoms. Besides expelling the Asians, Amin launched a reign of terror in which 300,000 may have died, according to a 1977 Amnesty International estimate. Many of the deaths were related to ethnic conflicts. After Obote was reinstated as president, his troops murdered an estimated 200,000 Bagandas.

Despite changes in government leadership, serious mistreatment of minorities continued in Uganda. A 1984 U.S. State Department report said the abuses -- "among the most grave in the world" -- included large-scale massacres and forcible starvation of dissident ethnic groups.

USSR. The Soviet Union, the "last colonial empire," is characterized by a mind-boggling diversity created by 130 ethnic groups speaking dozens of languages and divided into 15 national republics and more than 100 smaller political units. Shortly before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin described the Russian Empire as the "prison of nations" and promised self-determination to all nationality and ethnic groups that had suffered under Russian dominance. However, the Communist rulers never fulfilled the early promises. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn contends that the nationality problems are far more acute in the Soviet Union than they were in the old empire.

Although Soviet policies have shifted from time to time, the period since 1958 has generally seen increased efforts at "russification" of subject peoples, who are encouraged to speak the Russian language and to identify with Russia's history, literature and culture rather than with their own. However, the European minorities have been subjected to tighter political control and greater pressure to assimilate than the Central Asians.

The Great Russian group comprises about 50 percent of the population and holds about 75 percent of the policy-making and administrative positions, including many in the non-Russian republics. Their Russian Soviet Republic is by far the largest, with about 75 percent of the country's vast territory. Other population groups include the Ukrainians, another Slavic people (17 percent); Byelorussians or White Russians, also Slavs (4 percent); Georgians (1.6 percent); the once free Baltic peoples of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia; and a number of Asiatic peoples, many of whom are Moslems (90 percent Sunnis).

Political units tend to recognize ethnic divisions in that a national republic is often inhabited by a specific numerically predominant ethnic group, and a republic may also contain smaller ethnic units within its borders. The national republics have some limited control over internal affairs and administrative functions. Many of the Soviet nationality groups identify strongly with their own traditions and harbor deep-rooted dreams of independence or autonomy. In the words of Valery Chalidze, a charter member of the Moscow Human Rights Committee: "For the nationalities in the Union it is a Russian, alien regime." Historically, the Ukrainians have been the
largest and most potentially powerful minority group, but the rapidly growing Moslem population is emerging as an equally serious threat to Soviet stability.

After resisting the russification programs of their Czarist masters at great cost, the Ukrainians fought for their independence each time Russia was weakened by one of the twentieth century’s world wars. In 1918, a Ukrainian declaration of independence led to three years of ultimately unsuccessful war against Russia, after which the area became part of the Soviet Union. During the earlier civil war, the Ukrainian nationalist movement waged guerrilla war against both Red and White Russians. At the time of World War II, many Ukrainians were initially pro-German but became disillusioned when the Nazis rebuffed their aspirations. Ukrainian guerrillas continued to fight against the Soviets until the early 1950s, killing an estimated 35,000 after 1945.

In his famous 1956 de-Stalinization speech, Nikita Khrushchev stated that, “Stalin wanted to deport all Ukrainians, but there was no place to deport them.” Many were, however, sent to concentration camps or exiled to Siberia. In recent years, Ukrainians still constituted 40 percent of the Soviet Union’s political prisoners, a number more than twice their proportionate population size. The Ukrainians were among the chief victims of Stalinist terror in the 1930s. Up to seven million may have died of starvation in a famine (1932-1933) deliberately created by Stalin’s order that all grain be requisitioned for export during the forced collectivization of agriculture. After the “hidden holocaust,” Stalin accused Ukrainian leaders of “nationalism” and treason, and waves of arrests, exiles and executions swept the region in 1933-1940. The Stalinist terror was proportionately more devastating in the Ukraine than in Russia.

Numerous minorities suffered severely during World War II. Russian troops rounded up seven ethnic groups suspected of disloyal sentiments and deported them en masse to Siberia, where one-third of the more than one million people died within a year from hunger, cold and disease. The unfortunate victims were the Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushes, Balkars and Karachais. During the war, Russian troops prevented numbers of Jews from fleeing ahead of German armies, thus condemning many to death. The Russians attempted to justify their actions by saying that masses of civilian refugees would have interfered with troop operations.

Anti-Semitism was widespread in Czarist Russia, with Jews required to live in certain geographical areas (the Pale) and subjected to occupational restrictions. Later, Lenin acknowledged the Jewish contribution to the Bolshevik revolution. In 1922, ethnic Jews accounted for 28% of the top leadership of Russia’s Communist Party. Many of those surviving were purged by Stalin during the 1930s. Russian Jews have recently been more visible to the Western world as dissenters than as political leaders. Some of the desired rights denied to Jews, such as freedom to emigrate and to criticize governmental institutions, are, of course, denied to other Soviet citizens as well. Nevertheless, many American Jews believe that traditional Russian anti-Semitism lives on, now concealed behind a
facade of opposition to Zionism or to religion in general.

International attention has recently turned to Soviet Moslems as a possible focal point for future ethnic conflict. A 10-hour riot broke out in late 1986 in Alma-Ata, the capital of the Kazakh Republic, provoked by the replacement of a native Kazakh Communist leader by an ethnic Russian. Ten thousand angry Kazakhs poured into the streets, burning cars, looting stores, and attacking Russians and their property. Reportedly, about 30 police officers were killed.65

The Alma-Ata riot demonstrated the explosive potential of a restive young Moslem population growing up near the borders of other Moslem countries influenced by spreading Islamic fundamentalism. Increasing Russian concern is a stark demographic factor -- the Moslem population is increasing much more rapidly than the Great Russians. Within a few years, Russians will be a numerical minority in the Soviet Union. By 2050, the Moslem group alone will be almost as large as the Russian, which will then be a shrunken 40% of the total.

Following the Alma-Ata rioting, ethnic conflict and protest spread quickly to distant parts of the Soviet Union. For nine days in 1988, hundreds of thousands of Armenians demonstrated to push demands for the unification of the Armenian republic with an enclave of mostly Christian Armenians in the largely Moslem republic of Azerbaijan, which allegedly discriminates against the minority. The deaths of two Azerbaijani youths in clashes with Armenians spread violence to Azerbaijan, where residents reportedly went on a rampage of murder and rape against Armenians. Nationalist feelings flared in the Baltic states with an unprecedented number of defiant incidents, including anti-Russian demonstrations in Latvia and Estonia and, in the latter, the formation of a National Independence Party calling for, among other things, truthful teaching of Estonian history.

With nationalism seething almost everywhere underneath Russian dominance, many Western observers believe that in the long term the Soviet Achilles heel will prove to be its minorities unless some magic formula undiscovered by previous Soviet and Czarist regimes can give all a sense of belonging. Some Western observers wonder if the bitter ethnic fruit of glasnost will actually undermine the leadership position of Mikhail Gorbachev, providing ammunition for his conservative critics. Meanwhile, the persistent lack of national unity creates serious problems for both military leaders and economic planners. In Afghanistan, Moslem troops defected to the Afghan rebels sufficiently often to arouse uneasiness about an army expected to be one-third Moslem by the end of this century. The decentralization of decision-making needed to invigorate the Soviet economy is delayed partly by the knowledge that greater local control probably would intensify the ethnic identifications and separatist tendencies of non-Russians.

United Kingdom. The small island kingdom of Great Britain created the largest empire the world has ever known, the fabled empire on which "the sun never set." British dominance gave the world a century of relative peace, the Pax Britannica, which was finally terminated by World War I, a
struggle brought on partly by Germany’s increasing challenge to British supremacy. Afterward, the great empire gradually disintegrated, buffeted by the tidal waves of nationalism which swept over many ethnic and national groups around the world.

During the twentieth century, many parts of the empire became independent nations, although often retaining a loose association through the Commonwealth. Finally, Ireland, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, India, and Pakistan were all self-governing, as were several dozen other former parts of the British Empire. The real imperial jewel, the United States, had been lost much earlier when an unwise British government attempted to end abruptly the de facto partial autonomy the colonists had enjoyed for a considerable period of time.

Left with a sometimes almost irrelevant remnant of the old empire, the island kingdom also has another legacy of imperial days which has constituted a significant source of ethnic friction in recent decades. The 1.5 to 2 million African, Asian and West Indian immigrants from Commonwealth areas have been at the center of race riots, racial tensions and public debate about immigration policies, which were eventually tightened. In general, the nonwhite immigrants remain relatively unasimilated, frequently living and working in urban ethnic enclaves. Such areas are beset by problems seen also in American ghetto areas -- poverty, crime, welfare dependency, underachievement by school children and illegitimacy. (Black women give birth to almost half of Britain’s increasing numbers of babies born out of wedlock.)

Different reminders of the past are the current nationalist movements in the non-English parts of the United Kingdom, whose population includes about 47 million people in England. 5.1 million in Scotland, 2.8 million in Wales and 1.5 million in Northern Ireland. England conquered both Scotland and Wales 700 years ago. Wales was formally united with its conqueror in 1536 and Scotland voluntarily followed suit in 1707, after more than one hundred years as a separate country under the rule of the English king. For centuries before that time, English kings had tried to make Scotland part of England, but the Scots resisted, often with great bloodshed and, after the thirteenth-century conquest, regained their independence under the leadership of such national heroes as Robert Bruce and William Wallace. The Scots later took up arms against two English kings who were embroiled in other wars, Henry VIII against France and Charles Tin the English Civil War.

Nationalist sentiment never completely died in either Wales or Scotland and became more vocal after World War II. Seats in Parliament have been captured by representatives of both the Scottish Nationalist Party and the Welsh Nationalist Party, each of which held two in the mid-1980s. The discovery of offshore gas and oil fields in 1973 stimulated demands by Scottish nationalists for home rule under Scottish legislators and for a major share of the oil revenue. Neil Kinnock, head of the British Labour Party in the mid-1980s, promised the Scottish Labour Party that Scotland would have its own parliament and autonomy within eleven months of his becoming prime minister.
In the 1970s, the Welsh made gains in their demands for home rule and cultural integrity. Bilingual road signs replaced English-only signs and, in 1976 -- 440 years after English became Wales’ official language -- the Welsh language was restored to equal status with English in the public schools. The early Welsh and Scots were both Celtic groups who were pushed back by the Germanic and Scandinavian peoples who invaded Britain in wave after wave for many centuries prior to their own conquest in 1066 by another Teutonic people, the Normans. During the long conflict with invading Scandinavians the Scots sometimes joined the English in fighting the common enemy but at other times joined the Norsemen in opposition to the English.

The Normans, who settled in relatively small numbers, established themselves as rulers of the earlier ethnic groups who, likewise, were practically all Nordic peoples, including Saxons, Angles, Norse, Danes and Jutes. Descendants of the Normans are still heavily represented in the British upper classes. The British castles that so fascinate American tourists were built primarily to protect the Norman conquerors from their unwilling subjects. The castle-building period ended after centuries of institutionalization, as well as assimilation of related peoples, had rendered such extraordinary defenses unnecessary.

The English language is a product of that cultural assimilation, blending Anglo-Saxon and French words, often with one of each for the same object. Many British legends and literary works tell of the long conflict between Normans and Anglo-Saxons. Familiar examples include Sir Walter Scott’s novel, Ivanhoe, whose twelfth-century hero tried to prove that he did not abandon his noble Saxon heritage when he adopted the Norman chivalric code. Some versions of the Robin Hood legend describe their hero as the last of the Saxons, holding out against the Normans as late as the end of the twelfth century.

Great Britain’s history was also marked by centuries of sporadic religious conflicts which frequently involved bloodshed, although not on the same scale as the religious wars and oppressions of Continental Europe. Major adversaries in the British religious controversies were Roman Catholics, Church of England Protestants and the dissenters, other Protestant groups not affiliated with the Anglicans. The religious group conflicts were sometimes intertwined with nationality distinctions, as well as with the maneuvering of various contenders for the throne. The Scots both in Scotland and in Northern Ireland became predominantly Presbyterian, while the Irish obstinately remained Roman Catholic, creating a major religious cleavage superimposed on the original ethnic division.

When King Henry VIII broke with the papacy in 1534, he set the stage for Britain’s acceptance of the Protestant Reformation, although his original goals were more limited and tactical. Henry hanged and beheaded some “traitors” who upheld papal authority but, after his death, his daughter, Mary, a Catholic known to history as “Bloody Mary,” burned several hundred Protestants at the stake, among them the archbishop of Canterbury. Mary’s half-sister, Elizabeth I, permanently re-established the Church of England, which
took on its present form despite the resistance of both Catho-
lics and Puritans. Over a century passed before the English
agreed to allow more than one religion. The Puritan settlement
of New England was inspired partly by the persecution of
dissenters in old England.

While Britain remained overwhelmingly Protestant, some
Catholic rearguard actions occurred from time to time. The
aborted “Gunpowder Plot” of 1605 to blow up Parliament
involved Catholic extremists, notably Guy Fawkes. King
Charles II had Catholic sympathies and James II actually was
Catholic, but the former was forced by Parliament to retract his
1672 “Declaration of Indulgence” for Catholics and the latter
was driven from the throne after three years in the bloodless
“Glorious Revolution” of 1688. Only in the 1800s were many
civil disabilities lifted from the Catholic population, and the
Roman hierarchy of archbishop, bishops and priests permitted
in Britain for the first time in almost 300 years.

The Puritans waged a long campaign for acceptance. By the
reign of Charles I, they dominated the House of Commons and
the powerful new middle class. The English Civil War, which
transferred power from the executed Charles I to Puritan
General Oliver Cromwell, resulted from interrelated political,
religious and class conflicts with the royalist cause supported
by the Anglican aristocracy and the Catholics. After Crom-
well, the established Church of England never again tried to
encompass the entire population.

A British ethnic problem centering around a relatively small
group of 60,000, the Gypsies, has attracted increased attention
in recent decades. In 1968, Parliament passed the Caravan
Sites Act, requiring local government units, including London
borough councils, to provide adequate accommodations for
the Gypsies and to refrain from harassing them. The minority
remained dissatisfied and threatened to block highways unless
it received better treatment from local authorities.67

Vietnam. One of the most visible population movements of
recent decades was the flight of “boat people” from Vietnam.
U.S. officials say as many as 100,000 may have died during
their desperate journeys in flimsy boats. Most observers be-
lieve the flood resulted from a deliberate Vietnamese policy of
forced emigration or expulsion applied to the ethnic Chinese,
who made up 60 percent of the approximately 500,000 boat
people. However, much of the flight was instigated without
fonnaal expulsion edicts or mass denationalizations. Instead,
the government banned “bourgeois trade” in Ho Chi Minh
City (Saigon) in 1978, closing down and confiscating the
assets of 30,000 businesses, 80 percent of which were owned
by ethnic Chinese.

China angrily charged discrimination against ethnic Chi-
inese and cut off all aid to Vietnam. U.S. and British officials
chimed in with charges of extortion, noting that boat people
had paid up to $5,000 each in bribes to officials to facilitate
their flight. Besides the financial gain from bribes, the Viet-
namese government apparently had several motivations for
forcing out the refugees. These included ridding the country of
an unpopular ethnic minority unlikely to adjust happily to a
communist regime, destabilizing neighboring non-communist
nations, which already had tense relations between their majority populations and Chinese minorities, and infiltration of espionage agents into other countries. As the human wave continued to flow out of Vietnam, foreign governments eventually began to ask whether the later migrants were expellees or economic refugees seeking a better life elsewhere, particularly in California. Martin Barber, who was involved with United Nations refugee programs, argued that certain U.S. State Department bureaucrats quietly encouraged the exodus because it was a bad advertisement for the communist regimes of Indochina.

In any case, whether the refugees were pushed or pulled out of Vietnam, what one Congressman called "compassion fatigue" developed in the receiving countries. Thailand began denying immediate resettlement and then refused admission to some Vietnamese, while Malaysia for a time refused to permit refugee boats to land. Meanwhile, by mid-1988, the United States had already accepted 800,000 Vietnamese in the 13 years since the fall of Saigon.

**Yugoslavia.** Yugoslavs fear that their historic nightmare, ethnic civil war, could become a reality in explosive Kosovo, a self-governing province of Serbia, where ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs have clashed repeatedly. Thousands of the minority Serbs -- about 2,000 in 1986 alone -- have fled the area, charging that the majority Albanians want to create an ethnically pure province by driving out resident Serbs. Serbian groups have staged demonstrations, accompanied by radical demands that Serbian authority, exercised from Belgrade, be fully restored in the region.

The country's leaders are concerned that the unrest in Serbia, the largest constituent republic, could encourage nationalist sentiments in other republics, as well as touch off serious violence in Kosovo. Ethnic allegiances have always been the greatest internal threat to Yugoslavia, a country in which six major nationality groups and several ethnic minorities live under a federal government. For that reason and others, a seemingly logical solution -- making Kosovo a separate republic, as demanded by Albanian nationalists -- is unthinkable to other groups. One fear is that an Albanian-dominated Kosovo might try to join neighboring Albania. Furthermore, because Kosovo is regarded as the birthplace of Serbia, the once dominant Serbs would undoubtedly strongly resist detaching it from the rest of the province.

**Zimbabwe.** Racial friction continued in Zimbabwe after white-ruled Rhodesia turned over power to a black-dominated government. Prime Minister Robert Mugabe threatened in 1987 to abolish the 20 seats reserved in Parliament for whites, blasting as racist the guaranteed white representation clause in the agreement that ended white rule in Rhodesia. Also ongoing was ethnic violence between black groups. The government of Mugabe, whose power base is in the Shona tribe, continued to fight Ndebele guerrillas who support Joshua Nkomo. Since 1980, more than 1,500 have died in the conflict.
Part III: Ethnicity in the United States

Is the “American century” --the period in which the United States dominated world events -- nearing an end, on calendars and possibly also in international political, economic and military affairs? Many observers here and abroad suspect that future historians will write about only an American half-century, an interval between the decline of the British Empire and the rise of new contenders for world dominance.

America’s “decline” relative to the rest of the world “cannot be reversed” and must lead to greater European military unity and a European-led NATO, declares David P. Calleo, director of European Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.1 Noted nuclear physicist Edward Teller comments: “I have a real question whether in the year 2000 the United States and the Free World will still exist.” In a 1985 Washington Post column, George Will asks if history might not look back on the 1980s as the time when the Cold War was finally lost.

Others, including Jean-Francois Revel and Karl Dietrich Bracher, have wondered whether democracy might prove to be but a brief parenthesis in history. Revel suggests that our international position erodes while our attention is diverted by the political pressures of elections.2 Governor Richard Lamm of Colorado lectures on “The Rise and Fall of the American Civilization.” Walter Russell Mead believes that America’s “golden years” culminated in the mid-1960s, followed by a period of “continuing decline.”3 Significantly, the title of his book, Mortal Splendor, was taken from a poem by Robinson Jeffers, “Shine, Perishing Republic.”

Although America’s apparent decline obviously has multiple causation, a factor of overriding importance is that its ethnically-mixed population no longer rallies around common values to the extent necessary for successful attacks on internal and external problems. Brainpower, energy and funds needed to maintain economic and political leadership are increasingly devoted to internal conflict, often related to ethnic issues either directly or indirectly through discordant, ethnically-defined value systems. Everywhere one sees the symptoms of “anomie,” a term sociologists use to describe an undesirable societal condition in which individuals are confused, depressed and demoralized by normlessness, conflicting values or a lack of respect for traditional values.

Only a few decades into the “American century,” a bitter clash of values led to the first loss of a war in U.S. history. Whatever the merits of various views, the Vietnam experience damaged American credibility abroad and created lasting bitterness at home. A more muted disunity in the following years made it difficult for the country to maintain continuity of policy in international relations. An obvious example was the repetitious wrangling over our dealings with Nicaragua. By the late 1980s, countries ranging from Spain to the Philippines talked about asking the U.S. to withdraw from bases on their soil. Earlier, only Britain among our European allies had agreed to allow U.S. planes to fly from its soil to attack Libya. The closer cooperation among European countries appeared to some as a partial rejection of American leadership.
Approaching the twentieth century’s last decade, the United States was wracked internally by problems usually more visible in third-rate countries than in a dominant power. In a startling and unsettling role reversal, our country became the world’s largest debtor nation, pushing ahead of Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. Political gridlock made it difficult for Congress to attack the related government deficits with weapons stronger than “smoke and mirrors.” Pre-election paralysis appeared to set in earlier in each successive biennium. High and intractable trade deficits reflected America’s declining economic power and inability to shake its new image as a producer of shoddy, overpriced goods. Increasingly, fortunes were made in financial or political manipulation rather than in productive innovations. Corporate takeovers and leveraged buyouts loaded many companies with dangerously high debt burdens, while insider trading and front-running on Wall Street also fueled public distrust of financial markets. A pervasive cynicism was likewise directed toward the federal government and the major news media. Increasing numbers of federal and state officials were being charged with crimes or serious breaches of ethics.

A litigation explosion jammed the courts and required business and professional personnel to make decisions defensively, in anticipation of possible liability claims which could bankrupt a company or an individual. Other legal and bureaucratic struggles often centered around “civil rights,” while policies intended to “mainstream” minorities eroded some of the traditional rights of individuals to manage their own assets and affairs. Affirmative action and minority contractor policies, in effect, often discriminated against those not officially recognized as minorities, particularly white males.

For most individuals, life had become more dangerous and unpredictable. The American standard of living remained almost stagnant for decades, even though wives -- including mothers of small children -- normally worked outside the home and contributed to family income. Double-digit inflation, followed by disinflation, eroded the savings and fixed incomes of many. Partly in response to inflationary psychology, as well as to financial pressures, individuals and families mimicked corporate and bureaucratic America in such a debt binge that their savings rate dropped to a level insufficient to fund the government deficit. With much of the debt held by foreigners, often Japanese, the United States lost considerable control over its own financial affairs. No longer could we rationalize the government debt by saying, “We owe it to ourselves.”

The highest crime rate in the Western world made Americans feel unsafe in their own homes, not to mention on public streets after dark. Many of the affluent protected themselves with modern electronic equivalents of medieval fortresses. The less affluent resented a poorly functioning judicial system where plea bargaining, legal technicalities, lenient judges and overflowing prisons seemed to combine to punish many clearly guilty defendants with little more than a rap on the knuckles. A type of criminal activity especially worrying to many parents was the drug trade, which appeared largely untouched by occasional loudly-trumpeted seizures of large amounts of
marijuana, cocaine or heroin. Periodic reports of official or police involvement with drug dealers fueled public suspicion that more remained unexposed. Drug importers clearly benefited from official unwillingness to suggest sterner measures to protect America's virtually open borders.

Drug abuse was only one symptom of a general deterioration of traditional American moral and ethical standards. The divorce rate reportedly stood at 50 percent; illegitimacy soared, exceeding 50 percent in the black population. Sexual promiscuity and deviance were widespread, contributing to the AIDS threat, which was compounded by the timidity and tardiness of official actions. Pornographic literature, photographs and videos were widely available, and their themes were reflected in the lyrics of some rock music. Gambling was rampant, with state-sponsored lotteries numerous and growing.

The U.S. education system was the target of several verbal barrages, which generally agreed that students receive a somewhat haphazard smattering of facts on diverse subjects but little understanding of most. A widely-recognized lowering of academic standards, intended partly to accommodate ill-prepared enrollees, meant that many students fail to retain much of the smorgasbord of facts presented to them. Allan Bloom's best seller, *The Closing of the American Mind,* charged that liberal education is in disarray because no definition of the term "educated" exists, and education, therefore, becomes either vocational or trivial. Such criticisms usually lamented the failure of education to deal with values.

Education's failure to examine or impart values, however, reflected the lack of consensus among the U.S. population. Whose values would be taught? The ongoing clash of social values first became clear to many in the 1960s era of Vietnam protests, flower children, civil rights marches and urban riots. Some assumed traditional American values would reassert themselves once the Vietnam war ended and civil rights laws were enacted. Others hoped a new liberal ethic would emerge as the old one quietly expired. Neither wish could be easily and speedily realized because the citizenry was now too diverse for quick acceptance of a single value system.

A British writer neatly summarizes the situation. In England, he comments, unassimilated immigrants and their descendants are so few as to constitute little more than an exotic countertheme to the dominant culture. In the United States, however, he points out, divergent ethnic groups have reached such a critical mass that "they are the culture." Since each group clings to much of its own distinctive culture, the result must be clashing attitudes and values on almost any subject.

No one cause of American institutional disarray is more important than ethnic conflict, whether over cultural dominance or over political and economic power. The frequently unsuccessful social and welfare programs that bloat the federal budget cannot be readily abandoned, partly because many benefit non-whites disproportionately. Even the failure of such programs is usually not openly admitted, partly because of minority sensibilities. Educational standards can not be easily restored because less lenient ones would weigh disproportionately on minorities. In so far as crime, welfare de-
pendency, drug abuse and illegitimacy disproportionately involve minorities, remedial action is blocked partly by an ingrained habit of exempting such groups from expectations of responsible behavior. Charles Murray elaborates on this theme in his widely-discussed book, *Losing Ground.* This subtle form of racism intensified following the declaration of the “War on Poverty,” which was designed partly to restore internal peace by placating the black marchers and rioters of the 1960s.

Many American problems testified to the declining influence of the early American virtues of hard work, frugality and abstinence. By making capital expensive or unavailable, the low saving rate contributed to the uncompetitiveness of American industry, as did affirmative action policies, which sometimes led to the hiring of relatively unqualified persons and made it difficult to discharge incapable or unwilling workers drawn from favored groups.

American foreign policy was made less coherent by ethnic pressure groups pushing for the interests of various foreign countries. American Jews decisively influenced our Middle Eastern policies, while Hispanics reacted strongly to Latin American issues, such as those related to Nicaragua. Others, including Greek-Americans and Soviet exile groups, lobbied from time to time on questions relevant to their special interests. The desires of such “hyphenated” Americans were not necessarily compatible with the needs of the broader society.

**GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ETHNIC RELATIONS APPLY TO THE U.S.**

A cross-cultural overview of ethnic conflict reveals many common patterns and tendencies that may appear repetitiously in societies widely separated in time and space. Many of those identified in Part I will be related to the United States in the following paragraphs. Although details are unique here, as in other countries, broad patterns seen elsewhere can often be discerned in America’s past and present.

**Ethnicity persists indefinitely.** Our earlier “melting pot” ideology worked moderately well only as long as the ingredients in the ethnic stew consisted largely of the biologically and culturally similar peoples from Western Europe. Our oldest minorities -- black and American Indian -- have thus far remained unmeltable. This reality does not encourage optimism about the likelihood of either biological or cultural assimilation of a mind-boggling aggregation of new immigrant groups, many of which are “visible minorities” with little cultural or biological relationship to the early population of the United States.

**Conflict is the rule wherever two or more well-defined ethnic groups inhabit the same territory.** The U.S. has been bedeviled and often bloodied by ethnic conflict since early colonial days. Ethnic conflict is, in fact, as American as apple pie! Hostilities between white settlers and American Indians raged across the continent for two and a half centuries. Furthermore, contrary to the currently popular stereotype of the “noble savage,” most Indian tribes limited their view of
humanity to their own tribal members and frequently enslaved or inflicted appalling tortures even on other Indians captured in battle.

Many other ethnic conflicts involving varying degrees of violence followed through the centuries of American history. Significant events included the Mexican-American War and the struggle for Texas, both with underlying themes of ethnic baffling for territorial dominance: the Civil War (discussed further below): Reconstruction in the South and the eventual institutionalization of a caste system, both traumatic phenomena involving drastic changes in black-white relations; during the last century, sporadic but sometimes intense friction centering around newer immigrant groups and public agitation for more restrictive immigration policies: lynchings and race riots; the internment of residents of Japanese descent at the outset of World War II; the use of military forces to round up and deport illegal aliens during the Eisenhower administration; and, during the last several decades, widespread black rioting and the emergence of the civil rights movement, which inspired a redefinition of black-white relations but led to a relatively uneasy coexistence marked by intense political pressure and endless judicial wrangling.

Ethnic affiliations are powerful, pervasive, passionate and pervasive. In recent decades, Donald L. Horowitz’ vivid string of adjectives became more descriptive rather than less so for the United States. The “black power” movement and the book and film about black “Roots” rather perversely helped to arouse increasing ethnic consciousness in practically all groups, including WASPs. Who can forget the “Polish power” bumper stickers with the upside-down “P?” On college campuses, courses in “Black studies” led quickly to Chicano studies and Holocaust studies. A number of cities began to hold annual ethnic festivals celebrating the ancestral culture of one or more locally well-represented groups. Equal opportunity and affirmative action policies resulted not in the color-blind society often advocated, but in greater rather than less racial and ethnic awareness because they forced the ethnic labeling and counting of individuals. Meanwhile, white Americans of North European descent began to show distinct signs of the early phases of a cultural revival broadly similar to those often launched elsewhere by groups that felt themselves threatened with demographic and/or cultural submergence. Among the indicators are a remarkable growth of interest in genealogy and local or regional history, as well as in many aspects of Western European history and culture. The latter has contributed, for example, to a proliferation of “medieval” banquets and pageants and to a greater preoccupation with Nordic and Celtic early history and pre-history, along with such specific topics as the Vikings, Stonehenge and King Arthur.

Demands made by one ethnic group spur demands by others. “Black power” demands apparently encouraged, for example, claims for monetary compensation by Indian tribes, which charged violation of their historic land rights, and by Japanese ethnics who were interned as a security measure during World War II. Equal opportunity and affirmative action policies constitute a “textbook example” of this principle.
Such policies were rationalized largely as compensatory actions intended to assist blacks in overcoming the handicaps resulting from slavery and its aftermath. However, benefits were quickly extended to a bewildering variety of other groups, for which it would seem much more difficult to establish widespread past injuries justifying special privileges. Ethnic outrages also spurred often successful “copycat” demands from non-ethnic special interest groups, including feminists and homosexuals.

**Ethnic identity permeates formally unrelated areas.**
Among the many disturbing manifestations of this principle are growing tendencies for groups to favor their own kind in such things as jury decisions and public reactions to crime and alleged crimes. If continued, this trend could do much to undermine the fairness of police and judicial procedures in the United States. Two highly-respected financial publications reported that ethnic biases apparently entered into the staggering multi-billion-dollar judgment a Texas jury awarded Pennzoil Co. in its lawsuit against Texaco Inc. Jurors reportedly identified more with the “good old boys” representing Pennzoil than with cosmopolitan Jewish attorneys representing Texaco. The case pushed Texaco into bankruptcy, although many lawyers and laymen alike regarded Pennzoil’s claim as relatively insubstantial.

Many examples could be cited of alleged crimes which became emotionally-charged racial issues, but probably no recent incident better illustrates the point than the Bernhard Goetz case. Decrying the ensuing controversy, columnist Charley Reese comments: “a frightened man . . . shooting four would-be muggers becomes not a crime issue but a race issue though there was never a shred of evidence to suggest that Goetz would have reacted any differently had the four youths been white.” A jury’s verdict that Goetz was not guilty on all counts but gun possession again brought forth cries of racism, although the black jurors voted in exactly the same way as the white ones. Other recent cases in which racial issues overshadowed the criminal ones included the trials of Howard Beach, NY, youths charged with attacking black outsiders in their community. These trials inspired black protest marches and prayers for convictions.

**Major goals of ethnic groups include cultural and institutional dominance.** Governmental control is especially coveted because modern big governments can award valuable economic and social perquisites to a favored group and withhold or wrest them from a disfavored group. In relatively democratic countries, minorities often magnify their political influence by bloc voting -- sometimes virtually unanimously-- for specific parties, candidates or issues.

Bloc voting by racial and religious minorities has been a feature of the American political scene since the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, but in earlier decades their numbers were not large enough to control without a coalition embracing other groups, often white Southerners with an emotional attachment to the Democratic party. This situation is gradually changing as Third World people become an ever-growing element in the electorate. Jesse Jackson’s call for a “rainbow coalition” of black, brown and other minorities in 1984 was
too early to have a major national impact, but was a portent of the future.

Increasing numbers of elections below the federal level amount to ethnic censuses. Black mayors took power in many large cities, including Chicago, Philadelphia, Atlanta and Detroit, as blacks approached or became numerical majorities. Similarly, Hispanic mayors assumed office in such cities as Miami and San Antonio. Nationally, the division of political parties along ethnic lines is far from complete but the direction seems clear -- minorities tend to support Democratic candidates, while the hard core of Republican support consists of whites of Western European descent.

Although seldom openly acknowledged as such, ethnic-related issues have been major focuses of attention at all levels of government in recent decades. Major thrusts of federal policy have been redistributive taxes and programs which take from the more affluent, largely white population and give to the less affluent, disproportionately nonwhite population. The controversy continues in Washington with debate about new social programs providing or forcing employers to provide free or low-cost housing, medical insurance and child care, all of which would disproportionately benefit minorities.

This trend goes on partly because the white majority is less ethnically conscious than minorities and is more likely to divide its vote on the basis of other issues, thus often relinquishing the balance of power to minority voting blocs which may then receive their rewards in the form of laws and programs, translating into sometimes substantial economic and social gains. Sizeable numbers of whites, of course, identify emotionally with the relatively deprived and deliberately vote against their own pocketbook interests. Other whites actually benefit from redistributive policies and programs in their roles as well-paid workers in what have been called the "poverty industry" and the "civil rights industry," comprised of government agencies and their satellites at universities, foundations, research groups and nonprofit corporations. Other beneficiaries include many medical and legal practitioners.

Federal legislation and judicial decisions have also created numerous changes giving minorities benefits that are probably more psychic and social than economic. Under this heading fall massive busing in pursuit of school integration, desegregated public accommodations and attempts to integrate private facilities and organizations of various types.

Ethnic conflict also rages in economic, social and cultural spheres free or relatively free of direct federal control. In the economic area, labor unions have frequently pitted ethnic workers against majority owners and managers. Another weapon utilized particularly by blacks has been a boycott of stores or company products, intended to force greater employment of minorities and, recently in campaigns orchestrated by Jesse Jackson, to force large companies to award distributorships, franchises or comparable economic prizes to minorities.

An undercurrent on the American intellectual scene for at least half a century has been cultural warfare directed toward the history, traditions and values of the WASP founders of the country. Contributions and achievements of minority individuals and groups have often been exaggerated while major-
ity history has often been distorted and majority heroes deni-
grated. Traditional values are labelled derogatorily as “middle
class morality” with an implication that they are ridiculously
outdated. These attacks, often led by minorities in academia
and the mass communications media, have succeeded remark-
ably well in disarming the majority, creating anomie, confu-
sion and mass guilt feelings about the past (frequently in
whites whose ancestors did not arrive in the U.S. until after the
reviled behavior had occurred and almost always among
whites whose ancestors were not personally responsible).

One recent controversy broadened the attack on American
values to include Western civilization as a whole. Student
activists at Stanford University vociferously labelled a core
course about Western culture as racist, sexist, elitist and im-
perialistic and successfully demanded its restructuring to in-
clude books “by women and persons of color,” as well as to
give greater emphasis to non-European contributions to West-
ern culture. While the university was in the midst of serious
consideration of the problem, a junior “rainbow coalition” of
students led by Jesse Jackson marched on the Faculty Senate
chanting again and again, “Hey, hey, ho, ho, Western Culture
has got to go.” A similar spirit of ethnic chauvinism ap-
peared to motivate another recent demand -- that the Alamo be
removed from the control of the Daughters of the Texas
Republic and given to the League of United Latin American
Citizens.9

A new phase of cultural conflict appears on the horizon as
more and more Third World peoples with divergent cultures
arrive in North America. In both California and Canada,
outraged comment has already surfaced about alleged mis-
treatment of animals by Asians who are accustomed to eating
dogs and horses and whose reported methods of handling and
slaughter offend those accustomed to treating pets almost as
family members. Similar complaints can be expected to center
around the “amusement” of cockfighting, enjoyed by certain
immigrant groups, and the practice of animal sacrifice, a part
of the religious cults of other new ethnic groups. More seri-
ously, particularly in California, police and courts have been
confronted by Asians whose accepted customs include wife-
beating and the kidnapping of prospective brides.

Unranked ethnic groups produce more conflict than
ranked ones. Ignorant about ethnic relations distant in time or
space, many Americans have assumed that ethnic conflict
grows out of the clear subordination of one or more groups and
will largely disappear with movement toward an unranked
system. This comforting belief is disproved by historical ex-
perience elsewhere, as well as by our own experience in recent
decades. Moving from a ranked situation arouses in the lower-
status groups higher expectations that cannot be quickly satis-
fied, while the lessening of former constraints gives them
freedom to engage in previously tabooed types of conflict on
many fronts.

Long-term ethnic peace is almost unattainable in an
unranked system because perquisites are measured rela-
tively rather than in absolute terms. Therefore, conflict is a
zero sum game where one group can gain only at the expense
of another. For example, if equal opportunity does not bring
equality of outcome, “affirmative action” (in reality often positive discrimination) is demanded. When equality of outcome still does not follow, cries for quotas are heard and these often appear in various guises. (A recent Supreme Court ruling sanctioned the hiring of less qualified members of favored groups over better qualified candidates from less favored groups.)

Omnipresent ethnic friction creates a widespread “walking on eggs” syndrome. Almost any problem, phenomenon or remark can suddenly “turn ethnic.” As Jonathan Yardley remarks, the capacity of our unmelted ethnics “to take umbrage at imagined insults is refined to a fare-thee-well.” Recent examples are numerous. Former Governor Evan Mecham of Arizona was accused of racism for, among other things, a wisecrack about the eyes of a Japanese audience “turning round” when he mentioned the number of golf courses in his state. Decrying racism, CBS fired sports commentator Jimmy “the Greek” Snyder because of his unguarded remarks about the scarcity of black managers in professional sports, during which he suggested that blacks are better athletes than whites, a hypothesis made plausible by the fact that blacks comprise little more than 10 percent of the population but from three to eight times that percentage in major sports.

Ethnic hypersensitivity can not only blight the careers of individuals and damage businesses, but may also create a climate of caution that interferes with decision-making by government, business and school administrators who fear that justifiable actions may be interpreted as racist. Likewise, the possibility of minority overreaction has undoubtedly made it difficult for even social scientists to discuss problems disproportionately affecting minorities. Many regard it as racist even for academicians to make honest statements about majority-minority differences in, for example, illegitimacy, criminal convictions and particularly I.Q.

As is not unusual in a country beset by ethnic cultural warfare, practically the only group unprotected from public ethnic slurs and admitted discrimination is the traditional majority; in this case, the WASP. Writers and speakers who would never dream of using such terms as “Jap” or “Hymie” sometimes refer unhesitatingly to “rednecks,” “hillbillies” and “good old boys,” all of which can be translated as white Protestants, usually with Southern roots. Similarly, popular actor John Ritter told an interviewer with apparent pride that as a college fraternity member he began to vote against acceptance of all blond, blue-eyed prospective brothers.”11 Such a remark made about almost any other ethnically-related physical characteristics probably would have brought career-wrecking wrath down on Ritter’s head.

Long-continued ethnic friction often brings demands for drastic solutions. American history has not been entirely lacking in proponents of even such relatively drastic solutions to ethnic conflict as separatism and population expulsions, although neither has occurred on a monumental scale. Two types of actual expulsions -- the removal of Indian tribes to the West and mass deportation of illegal aliens -- were referred to earlier. Another example was the shipment in 1821 of a boat-
load of former slaves from the U.S. to what is now Liberia. This beginning of an experimental effort to resettle American blacks in the home of their ancestors was supported by the U.S. government and the American Colonization Society, a charitable group whose members included President James Monroe and Francis Scott Key.

A more startling expulsion plan has been almost forgotten, probably in part because it violates the “Great Emancipator” image of Abraham Lincoln. In both his first and second annual messages to Congress, President Lincoln recommended that American blacks be colonized elsewhere, possibly in Haiti, Liberia or the Isthmus of Panama. On the day before he issued the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln signed a contract for the resettlement of 5,000 free blacks on an island near Haiti. The contractor turned out to be a swindler who rounded up several hundred ex-slaves and dumped them on the uninhabited island where most died of thirst. Nevertheless, Lincoln was still urging removal of the entire black population a month before his assassination.

The most influential black advocate of separatism was Marcus Garvey, whose followers numbered in the millions during the 1920s. However, his vision of large-scale colonization of Liberia was thwarted by that country’s government. Since Garvey’s heyday, campaigns for black separatism in the U.S. have waxed and waned. Proposals have often urged the ceding of a sizeable chunk of the Deep South for a black republic. In the 1960s, the Black Muslims called for separatism on a much more limited scale.

Disregarding the slavery issue, the controversies leading to the Civil War, our bloodiest separatist crisis, often contained elements akin to ethnic conflict. The Northern and Southern states had developed differently, with the South remaining primarily Anglo-Saxon and agrarian while the North became increasingly urbanized, industrialized and populated by a mixture of old Americans and various European immigrant groups. One prominent sociologist insists that white Southerners still constitute a distinct ethnic group.

A possible future separatist crisis can already be seen in dim outline in the American Southwest, an area claimed by Mexico in the nineteenth century and virtually reclaimed in the twentieth by the quiet invasion of millions of legal and illegal aliens who, in numerous areas, greatly outnumber Anglos. Some Hispanic groups regularly indulge in separatist rhetoric, and their Mexican homeland frequently attempts to influence American policy with respect to its citizens and former citizens within our borders.

Two other types of separatism deserve brief mention. Many American Indians remain voluntarily isolated on reservations, in part because of a desire to retain their own cultures. And Puerto Rico is home to a relatively small but hardy independence movement which sometimes erupts into terrorist acts on the mainland.

**FUTURE ETHNIC RELATIONS IN THE U.S.**

It is proverbial that those who peer into crystal balls must acquire a taste for broken glass. Obviously, an unflawed history of coming decades cannot be written now. Neverthe-
less, students of ethnic dynamics can reasonably hypothesize that certain possible developments are more likely than others to occur in the United States.

Some broad predictions can be made with a high degree of certainty, at least for the remaining years of the twentieth century. These result largely from projecting recent American trends in the directions most compatible with typical patterns of ethnic relations as seen in other countries around the world. They assume that at least moderately liberal immigration policies will prevail. Tight restrictions on immigration would somewhat moderate or slow the anticipated developments, while highly permissive immigration policies could accelerate or exacerbate them. Longer-term predictions with a time span into the next century can, of course, be made with less assurance because intervening factors become progressively more difficult to anticipate. Some of our later attempts to suggest future tendencies should be regarded as speculations about probabilities or possibilities rather than as prophecies.

Major predictions, most of which will be amplified below, are: (1) Ethnic conflict in the United States will intensify rather than diminish. (2) Non-Hispanic whites will begin to show less sympathy for minority demands. (3) Americans of North European descent will gradually become a self-conscious ethnic group, increasingly aware of and concerned about its own cultural heritage. (4) Ethnic conflict will increasingly permeate formally unrelated areas. (5) Inflamed ethnic sensibilities will create a more widespread "walking on eggs" syndrome which will interfere with rational discussion of ethnic-related issues. (6) Anomie, alienation and individual selfishness will remain much in evidence because no consistent and accepted value system will emerge to replace the now eroded traditional American ethos. (7) The ethnic factor will be ever more pervasive in politics. (8) Ethnically-based value conflicts and lack of unity will continue to contribute to governmental gridlock, economic stagnation and cultural incoherence. (9) Separatist movements will attract more adherents, although their eventual impact is still unclear. (10) White flight will continue from areas with sizeable minority populations, increasing the visibility of ethnic enclaves locally and nationally. (11) Too preoccupied with internal conflict to follow principled and consistent foreign policies, the United States will face further deterioration of its once secure position of world political and economic dominance. (12) The United States will slowly take on more and more of the typical characteristics of a Third World country.

Several important factors will contribute to the intensification of ethnic conflict. Of major importance is the growing size and diversity of the ethnic mosaic. During the decades of focusing attention on the demands of its largest minority, the blacks, the United States created or increased the size of other numerous ethnic groups, most of them relatively unassimilable Third World peoples markedly different from earlier Americans both racially and culturally. Rather than melting, most of these will remain lumps in the ethnic stew. However, it is predictable that the new minorities will follow the trail blazed by the "black power" movement as soon as they attain sufficient size and sophistication to utilize protests, politics or
other pressure tactics in pursuit of economic, educational and other gains. This development is already evident among Hispanics at both the local and national levels.

A surprise for many people will be the emergence of what might be called “equal opportunity” ethnic conflict, in which any group can show hostility toward any other. The tendency of minorities to compete against each other as well as against the dominant group virtually insures that, in a democratic society, conflict will increase in proportion to the number and size of unassimilated ethnic groups. Although minorities will often cooperate with each other in struggles against whites, it will be an uneasy coexistence frequently marred by fights over who gets what share of the benefits expected to result from their mutual endeavors.

Black Americans will at some point react negatively to the realization that they will shortly be replaced by Hispanics as America’s largest minority, with a consequent dilution of their political and economic clout. An unwelcome perception will be that the future leader of a successful rainbow coalition is more likely to be brown than black. Blacks may well feel that white Americans unfairly violated their implicit “social contract” by welcoming other large ethnic groups before resolving the problems of the oldest minorities, the blacks and Indians. It probably is not coincidental that the most numerous and violent criminal gangs of black youths have surfaced in Los Angeles, where they are hardest pressed by Asians and Hispanics in the competition for jobs, housing and other good things. Future inter-ethnic conflict is already foreshadowed by the political wrangling of Asians and Hispanics in various areas of California and in the sniping between blacks and Jews, who were closely allied during the civil rights movement.

But the biggest shocker will be the emergence of the recently rather passive whites as combatants in the country’s ethnic battles. Although opinion polls have for years found virtually no public support for liberal immigration policies, most white Americans still do not fully comprehend the probable consequences. As understanding increases, tolerance will decrease.

A degree of “compassion fatigue” is also likely to set in relative to black Americans as whites see that vast expenditures of money and good will have not brought most blacks into the mainstream and that many types of social pathology have in fact become more widespread in the black community. Charles Murray, the author of *Losing Ground*, predicts that racism will reappear in coming years as middle-class whites shed the 1960s image of blacks as victims. Racism will be most obvious in the workplace, Murray believes, because whites may perceive black co-workers as recipients of affirmative action benefits unrelated to individual background or merit.

An *Esquire* article by Pete Hamill (March, 1988) reflects even white liberal disenchantment with present welfare and social programs and a feeling that blacks must do more to solve their own problems, possibly with active assistance from the black middle class. Those who cannot visualize a leakage in the reservoir of white good will should remember the post-
Civil War Reconstruction, in which government, church and other officials tried diligently to elevate the status of blacks, particularly in the South. Many types of efforts were more or less abandoned in the 1870s, after which the related issues remained largely dormant for more than half a century.

A significant portent of greater white participation in future ethnic conflicts is seen on college campuses, where the next generation of middle-class Americans is being educated. Walter E. Massey says racial conflict is increasing to the point where “it is almost impossible to pick up a newspaper today without encountering an article about a racial incident on a college campus.” Furthermore, he notes, today’s conflicts are often disturbingly different from those of 20 years ago, when most involved black students protesting institutional policies. Now “such incidents usually involve students of one race harassing or attacking students of another.” Harvard professor Glenn Loury argues that when black students receive “preferential treatment” (real or perceived) and then fail to perform as well academically as whites, white students and faculty are resentful. That resentment creates anger and defensiveness in black students and the seeds of racial conflict are sown.

White students have been embroiled in a number of well-publicized campus conflicts. Three who were suspended by Dartmouth College for a “vexatious oral exchange” with a black music professor were threatening in mid-1988 to take their cases to court, and received offers of “pro bono” legal services from three law firms. The problem arose after the Dartmouth Review, for which the students were staffers, published an article sharply critical of a class taught by the black professor, who allegedly talked about such issues as racism, sexism and poverty in an “academically deficient” course and also called white students “honkies.” In a subsequent tape-recorded encounter, the professor reportedly “lost his temper, broke the photographer’s camera flash, and challenged one student to fight.”

Other white collegiate journalists found themselves in hot water after a University of California newspaper published a cartoon showing a rooster who attributed his acceptance as a UC student to affirmative action. Berkeley administrators revised admissions standards so that in 1987 and afterward, only 40 percent of entering freshmen would be selected on academic grounds alone. The purpose of the new policy was to increase the representation of minorities who could not compete on a purely academic basis. In 1984, under a somewhat more academically-oriented policy, about 700 white applicants were redirected elsewhere to make room for minorities, after which several white parents threatened to sue the university. Many recent less well-publicized campus incidents have involved interracial fighting or verbal harassment. In one with a different focus, pro-PLO protestors disrupted a 1988 speech at Columbia University by Israel’s judge advocate general.

White activists have not confined their efforts to academia. In California, where minorities may constitute a numerical majority by the end of this century, municipalities are passing zoning ordinances that tend to exclude Asians. In Monterey
Park, for example, bitter baffles are waged over English-only signs, condominiums (favored by Asian families), and mini-malls (ideal for new Asian-owned businesses), writes Nicholas Lemann in *The Atlantic* (January, 1988). The language issue, the subject of continuing controversy in such countries as Canada and Belgium, is heating up around the United States as opponents of bilingualism struggle against proponents, usually Hispanic. A number of states have passed laws declaring English their official language, and two national organizations advocate official English policies. Interestingly, one is headed by S.I. Hayakawa, a former California senator of Japanese descent. Some minority spokesmen and, of course, bilingual educators, charge that such efforts encourage ethnic divisiveness and prejudice rather than national unity.

Ethnic conflict in the political arena will become ever more pervasive as the size and variety of ethnic minorities increase. The exact form will be strongly influenced by the number and ethnic identity of future immigrants. But minority strength is already sufficient to insure that ethnic politics will be a permanent part of the American scene. Local elections will more and more amount to censuses of ethnic groups. Local and state offices will increasingly go to members of the largest ethnic group or coalition.

In our political future, much will depend upon which ethnic groups align with each other, and this in turn will depend somewhat upon the level and ethnic identity of future immigrants. Jesse Jackson has dreamed of a "rainbow coalition" comprising all major nonwhite groups, which would be a powerful political force at present and possibly a dominant one in the future if the levels of nonwhite births and immigrants remain high. Such groups are sufficiently disparate that a dominant coalition would probably be an uneasy one, conducive to the governmental instability so often the lot of ethnically-mixed countries. Before a rainbow coalition reaches majority status, it could well be powerful enough to prevent effective government by any other group or coalition, as seen in Poland between the two world wars.

The eventual response to a rainbow coalition will very likely be a rival "Viking coalition" of descendants of North Europeans, embracing most major groups of Nordic and Celtic peoples, including the English, Scots, Germans, Scandinavians, Belgians, Dutch, Austrians and Swiss. Two very important but less predictable groups are the Celtic Irish and the Poles, who probably would finally opt for their racial rather than religious kin, but could be swayed by Hispanic Catholicism. Hispanics, who will soon constitute a majority of the world's Catholics, are of great concern to the Polish pope and he will undoubtedly continue to speak for their interests. Because of their demonstrated political skills, as well as sizeable numbers, the Irish would be especially valuable allies in any coalition.

If unable to achieve political dominance, major ethnic groups or coalitions will try for veto power over legislation and political appointments of special interest. A recent example was what reportedly amounted to a black veto of the Supreme Court nomination of Judge Robert Bork. Eventually, most major laws and appointments may have to hurdle a sizeable
array of ethnic obstacles. One result may be more of what the country has faced in recent decades -- governmental gridlock and indecisive, tardy action on major problems, such as illegal immigration.

Economic rivalry will continue with relatively poor, mostly minority, groups pressing not for equality of opportunity but for equality of outcome. These efforts will perpetuate the status of litigation as one of our major growth industries, but will interfere with economic efficiency. A relatively equal outcome for all ethnic groups would share not the wealth but the poverty, because the necessarily high levels of both redistributive taxes and government intervention would disrupt the economic system and demoralize the most potentially productive citizens.

Bruising political and economic competition with minority groups and loudly-proclaimed non-white coalitions probably will ultimately transform non-Hispanic whites into a genuine ethnic group. This will be facilitated by the fact that most Western European nationalities are biologically and culturally related peoples stemming from early Germanic tribes. Many American whites remain unaware of their common origins and still regard various European peoples as distinct entities. This could change as the clamor of competing minorities inspires more old Americans to seek their own ethnic identity. The pre-medieval European past is rapidly becoming more accessible, with the mingled roots of American whites being exposed in greater depth by, among other things, new archaeological findings in England, Scandinavia and elsewhere. And a fascinating history it will be to new generations of Americans, complete with Viking adventurers, castles, great land migrations and higher levels of economic, architectural, political, artistic and technological development than many had previously believed.

Some may see as fanciful the notion that American whites will come to regard themselves as an ethnic group partly on the basis of cultural and biological kinship traceable back through the centuries to another continent. Such doubters might contemplate the emotional identification of American blacks with African blacks, from whom they have been separated by an ocean, centuries of time and often by major language and cultural differences. Or consider the Jews, one of the world’s most tightly-knit ethnic groups, who for almost two millennia after their dispersion had no common land and, in time, no common language. Moreover, in addition to their European roots, many American whites have an emotional bond in common memories of their ancestors’ roles in the taming of a continent and creation of the richest country in the history of the world. These memories are now finding expression as well as nourishment in genealogical research, publications and organizations, which are growing at an astonishing rate.

The level of intergroup conflict in the United States -- and the accuracy of our more pessimistic predictions -- may well depend upon whether the likely self-conscious white coalition develops in the relatively near future or in the distant future. White ethnicity may be slowed by the hostility of the establishment-oriented press, pulpits and politicians. Ethnic revivals elsewhere have often required half a century or more. How-
ever, many, such as those of the Finns and Bohemians, were carried out by peoples under oppressive foreign domination. It remains to be seen if the process will be significantly speeded by the greater freedoms of the United States, as well as by the high educational level of American whites. A quickly-unified majority could apply irresistible pressure to politicians more concerned about the often decisive votes of minority blocs than about the long-term national interest.

One nebulous factor in the equation is exactly how far back one can trace the snail-like beginnings of the white ethnic revival currently underway, although 15 to 20 years might be a reasonable guess. Among the indicators of a greater white concern about ethnic issues are several national organizations advocating immigration control and several national publications which discuss ethnic conflict and majority interests with increasing openness and often with undeniable intellectual sophistication. Another aspect of white ethnicity is country music, which was recently described by one of its popular young stars as “an American ethnic art form” that some people call “white man’s blues.”

As whites increasingly see themselves as an ethnic group threatened with cultural and/or biological submergence, they will contribute to the already pervasive “walking on eggs” syndrome, reacting much as other groups do to ethnic slurs. Many will object not only to such ethnic labels as “redneck,” “honky” and “gringo,” but also to unflattering and historically inaccurate depictions of their collective ancestors here and abroad. Historians and writers will not go unchallenged if, for example, they continue to label pre-medieval North Europeans incorrectly as barbaric savages and to report as facts discredited or debatable stories about such American heroes as Thomas Jefferson.

An ethnic revival in its early phases is largely cultural rather than political and should be clearly distinguished from a separatist movement which can, however, emerge in later phases. One writer says 200 white supremacist groups, some advocating a white separatist nation, are currently active in the United States. Since most have escaped national attention, it seems safe to assume that if the figure attributed to “watchdog organizations” is correct, most are small and significant largely as predictors of what may develop in the future. Experience elsewhere does suggest that an intensively-promoted nonwhite dominance movement -- the rainbow coalition, for example -- will eventually find echoes in the white population.

Possibly the most ominous portent of civil strife in our future is the budding separatism in the minds of some Hispanics in the Southwest. Hispanic demands for control of the American Southwest appear already in such publications as the Chicano Manifesto, which calls for an independent mestizo nation on the “Bronze Continent.” Aztlán refers to the mythical northwestern home of the Aztec Indians who controlled a Mexican empire prior to its conquest by Cortez in 1519. This claim is supported by revisionist historians such as Rodolfo Acuna, who compares the Mexican-American War with Hitler’s invasion of Poland and describes the Anglo-Texans’ treatment of Mexicans as violent and inhumane.
Religious leaders and activists in both Mexico and the United States often reflect similar attitudes. “The march of Latin Americans to the United States shouldn’t be understood as a wave of anger or revolutionary passion, but more as a peaceful conquest,” said Father Florencio M. Rigoni, assistant secretary for migration for the Mexican bishops’ conference. An American, Father Paul B. Marx, told a Buffalo congregation: “I tell the Mexicans when I am down in Mexico to keep on having children, and then to take back what we took from them: California, Texas, Arizona, and then to take the rest of the country as well.”

Hispanic claims to the American Southwest might be as ephemeral as earlier black demands for a homeland in the Deep South except for two critical factors. One is that Mexican claims are rooted in ancestral memories of actual control of the American Southwest. Another is that Hispanics are expected in the reasonably near future to become a numerical majority in all or large parts of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California. If this occurs, it is predictable that separatist sentiment will thrive, as it has among the French-speaking majority of Quebec. But the situation in the Southwest is vastly more complex in that, unlike the Canadians, many Chicanos have close relatives in their homeland and have lived there or visited frequently. Furthermore, Hispanics in the Southwest are across a river rather than across an ocean from Mexico. This proximity would make it easy for the new Hispanic majorities to swell in numbers, to reinvigorate their roots by travel between the two countries and to become the targets of agitators and demagogues on both sides of the border, as well as the focal points of strained relations between the U.S. and Latin America.

Such circumstances might well encourage a separatism more militant than Quebec’s. At the least, majority population status for Southwestern Hispanics would insure a considerable degree of cultural autonomy and demands for greater political autonomy within several American states. But demands could also intensify for either reunion with Mexico or the establishment of an independent Hispanic country in the Southwest. The complacent who assume no ethnic group could ever really want to leave the United States should be told that historical experience elsewhere shows that separatist demands often fly in the face of rational considerations of economic self-interest. A widespread Hispanic demand for either independence or reunification could create a challenge comparable to the Southern secession crisis that led to the Civil War.

Whether or not a serious Hispanic separatist movement achieved its goal, it would quickly encourage comparable ambitions in other dissatisfied groups. The exact identity of such new activists is impossible to predict decades in advance, but it is possible to speculate about areas which presently have favorable demographic characteristics. Separatism is most likely where a population is relatively homogeneous ethnically and culturally and has considerable concentration in a specific geographical area, not necessarily conforming to the present boundaries of American political subdivisions.

For example, South Florida might wish to become a second
Hispanic nation. Montana and one or both Dakotas, possibly with some contiguous areas, might consider either independence or union with adjacent and culturally similar parts of Canada, where separatist rhetoric has already been heard. The overwhelmingly old American people of parts of Southern Appalachia might unify across the borders of up to five states, perhaps using as rallying points the historical existence of the Lost State of Franklin (1784-1789), which unsuccessfully requested admission into the Union, and/or the Watauga Association (1772-1776), the first independent constitutional democracy in the Americas. Despite demographic characteristics currently less conducive to separatism in much of the South, loud agitation elsewhere could hardly fail to arouse dreams of “rising again” in some areas with strong ancestral memories of the Confederacy. Other candidates are Hawaii which reportedly is largely owned and occupied by Orientals; California, where white non-Hispanics are expected to be a numerical minority by the turn of the century; and Puerto Rico, where members of one separatist group have been indicted on bombing charges and intelligence officials are said to maintain a 74,000-person “subversives list.”

If one break in the Union actually occurred, Balkanization might well follow. As mind-boggling as the idea might be when first encountered, Balkanization of the U.S. is not even the “worst case” scenario in regard to the possible results of uncontrolled immigration. A worse horror, which might precede dissolution, would be a more or less permanent state of strife marked by terrorist acts which might escalate into sporadic guerrilla warfare. The United States might eventually find an unwanted place in world headlines alongside other ethnically-divided areas such as Lebanon, Sri Lanka, India, Northern Ireland and Israel’s occupied territories.

If serious separatist sentiments should threaten the U.S. in the next century, dissolution of the Union probably would be a less likely outcome than the development of some form of regional autonomy, as seen in many other countries. The result could be a Swiss-like confederation in which all states largely control their own affairs -- a situation not unlike that envisioned earlier by many advocates of states’ rights. Another possibility would be the granting of partial or almost complete autonomy only to the area or areas in which separatism had become an inflamed issue.

The common ethnic goal of a homogeneous population within its own territory can lead in directions other than formal political separatism. Voluntary individual or group migrations inspired by a desire for ethnic separation often occur on a scale large enough to alter the ethnic balance. A horrifying example was the violence-ridden movement of 12 million people across the India-Pakistan border after the British partitioned the subcontinent into Hindu and Moslem nations. A more scattered and longer-term but similarly motivated population movement has been the well-publicized phenomenon of “white flight” in the United States.

In 1988, officials in both New York City and Chicago were proposing unorthodox methods of preventing white flight from leading to almost total racial segregation. Quotas limiting black enrollment to 50 percent in certain New York
schools led to fierce arguments over what constitutes the “tipping point,” the level at which an influx of minorities will cause whites to flee the system. Such efforts were inspired by fears that the city is moving toward a segregated dual system of education. Earlier, a federal judge struck down a 65 percent quota for white families in a Brooklyn subsidized-housing complex. It, too, had been intended to encourage whites to remain.

Whites do not flee only from blacks. The Miami Herald has repeatedly documented white flight from parts of South Florida where Hispanics have become the largest population group. Since 1960, non-Hispanic whites have declined from 80 percent to 37 percent of the population of Dade County (Miami). Eighty-four of every 100 voters who moved out of Dade in 1984 were non-Hispanic whites. “Birds of a feather flock together,” commented Juan Clark, professor of sociology at Miami-Dade Community College.

If present demographic trends persist, such patterns will be seen in most areas where ethnic groups are heavily concentrated. Such population movements may eventually increase the number of areas homogeneous enough for separatist sentiments to emerge. It should be noted that ethnic concentration could increase in many areas even without white flight. In a geographically mobile society, if whites simply avoid moving to an area with sizeable ethnic groups, immigration and the typically high birth rates of new immigrant groups will in due time lead to greater ethnic concentration.

If U.S. borders remain virtually open, the country will almost certainly begin eventually to see an unexpected two-way traffic, with Third World immigrants coming in and older Americans departing. This different but similarly-motivated type of white flight probably would head mostly toward ancestral homelands in Europe. Such emigrants, generally with above average levels of intelligence, education and affluence, would constitute a “brain drain” for the U.S. and a “brain gain” for Europe.

Is there no way to bypass the problems that appear to loom in our future? Unfortunately, the existing ethnic composition of the United States already makes ameliorative actions so politically unpalatable that few politicians wish even to acknowledge the problems, much less suggest solutions. Bold proposals are, however, coming from intellectuals who do not have to face the voters every few years. Can these conceivably be acted upon before an unwelcome future overtakes us? Only if politicians have reason to fear a newly-burgeoning majority wrath more than the familiar minority clout.

A number of proposals embody variations on similar elements, including a moratorium or near-moratorium on immigration and the closing of the borders by the use of military forces, brought home from bases around the world, if necessary. Two Yale-based intellectuals have also brought up the question of whether babies born in the United States to non-citizens should be granted automatic citizenship. Such new citizens account for up to 60 percent of the births in some American hospitals, particularly near the Mexican border. A constitutional change probably would be necessary to make our practice more like that of many other countries, which do
not confer citizenship on newborns unless at least one and sometimes both parents are citizens.

One of the most unabashed appeals for an end to mass immigration comes from environmentalist Edward Abbey. He writes, "... it might be wise for us as American citizens to consider calling a halt to the mass influx of even more millions of hungry, ignorant, unskilled, and culturally-morally-genetically-impoverished people ... Especially when these uninvited millions bring with them an alien mode of life which -- let us be honest about this -- is not appealing to the majority of Americans. Why not?" Because we prefer a democratic, open, beautiful and uncrowded society, Abbey answers. He adds: "The alternative, in the squalor, cruelty, and corruption of Latin America, is plain for all to see. ... How many of us, truthfully, would prefer to be submerged in the Caribbean-Latin version of civilization? ... Harsh words: but somebody has to say them."

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Part III
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Percent Distribution of the Total U.S. Population, 1980-2080, by Annual Level of Net Immigration and Race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2040</th>
<th>2080</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>White non-Hispanic</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
<td>59.0%</td>
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<td>18.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asian &amp; Other</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Does not always sum to 100 percent due to rounding.

Immigrants Admitted to the U.S. by Region of Birth, 1820-1979

1820-1860
- Asia: 91%
- Latin America: 2%
- Northern America: 2%
- Northern and Western Europe: 1%
- Southern and Eastern Europe: 3%
- Other: 3%

1861-1900
- Asia: 68%
- Latin America: 7%
- Northern America: 22%
- Northern and Western Europe: 1%
- Southern and Eastern Europe: 2%
- Other: 1%

1901-1930
- Asia: 58%
- Latin America: 11%
- Northern America: 23%
- Northern and Western Europe: 3%
- Southern and Eastern Europe: 5%
- Other: 3%

1931-1960
- Asia: 41%
- Latin America: 39%
- Northern America: 15%
- Northern and Western Europe: 17%
- Southern and Eastern Europe: 13%
- Other: 3%

1961-1970
- Asia: 41%
- Latin America: 17%
- Northern America: 16%
- Northern and Western Europe: 12%
- Southern and Eastern Europe: 11%
- Other: 3%

1971-1976
- Asia: 41%
- Latin America: 7%
- Northern America: 3%
- Northern and Western Europe: 13%
- Southern and Eastern Europe: 3%
- Other: 4%

1977-1979
- Asia: 42%
- Latin America: 5%
- Northern America: 3%
- Northern and Western Europe: 13%
- Southern and Eastern Europe: 8%
- Other: 3%

Source: