

## The Coming Triumph of Mexican Irredentism

By B. A. Nelson, Ph.D

Several observers of social and political trends in the United States have in recent years predicted that the nation will one day be confronted with a problem of inter-group relations that may prove invalid the national premise of *e pluribus unum*. In each instance, they have seen in the growth of the Spanish-speaking population in the Southwest the potential for a separatist movement which would be analogous to that among the French-speaking population of Canada. Victor Ferkiss, a noted historian of American politics, wrote in August 1980 that "Current American legal doctrine and ethnic political pressures have created a situation where all of the political and cultural problems of bilingualism that have riven Canada are beginning to arise in the United States, especially in the Southwest."<sup>1</sup> Richard D. Lamm, the governor of Colorado, noted in December 1982 the economic as well as the linguistic aspect of the problem: "The Hispanic American people have been sorely hurt, not only by competition in the labor force from millions of Hispanic legal and illegal immigrants, but also by the fears that have been aroused that Hispanic Americans were creating a 'Hispanic Quebec' in the American Southwest."<sup>2</sup> George Fredrickson, possibly the nation's most perceptive historian of race relations,<sup>3</sup> offered the following observations at a colloquium in 1982: "I think what's likely to be the most difficult problem in 30 or 40 years is the question of the relation between Mexican-Americans or Chicanos and whites. Remember that we stole the Southwest from Mexico once. There are two ways you can gain territory from another country. One is by conquest. That's essentially the way we took California from Mexico and, in a sense, Texas as well, . . . But what's going on now may end up being a kind of recolonization of the Southwest, because the other way you can regain territory is by population infiltration and demographic dominance. . . . The United States will be faced with the problem that Canada has been faced with . . . and which our system is not prepared to accommodate."<sup>4</sup>

Ferkiss, Lamm, Fredrickson and others have overlooked the one variable which complicates the rather simple analogy which they have drawn between a potential Chicano separatism in the Southwest and the actual Francophone separatism in Quebec; that is, the fact that Chicanos live in immediate proximity to their erstwhile homeland while the Quebecois are separated by thousands of miles of ocean and centuries of historical development from theirs. The rise of Chicano separatism will, therefore, introduce to Americans a problem new to the Western Hemisphere, but one that has been long known to Europe, the problem of irredentism, a term which, in the definition of Max H. Boehm, "is derived from the Italian *irredenta* (unredeemed). The concept originated in the nineteenth century in connection with the Italian movement which after the unification of Italy aimed at the annexation of Italian-speaking regions still under Austrian or Swiss rule, such as Trent, Dalmatia, Istria, Trieste and Fiume. The concept, however, has become detached from its concrete and specific connotation and has come to denote any movement which aims to unite politically with its co-national mother state a region under foreign rule."<sup>6</sup>

The "classic" irredentist situation involves an area of a multi-ethnic state, adjacent or in proximity to another nation-state, which was formerly owned by the latter and has among its inhabitants a majority of people sharing the same ethnic identity with the population of that nation-state,

one which is usually comprised of but one ethnic group. The demographic factor is the *sine qua non* of irredentism, but no less essential is the conviction, generally held by the citizens of at least one of the two nation-states, that the frontiers of nationality and of polity should coincide, that all nation-states should recognize ‘ethnicity’ as the basis of citizenship even if that involves rectifying historic “injustices” of decades or centuries past. Thus, when Fredrickson and others state, usually with little further analysis, that the U.S. “stole” the Southwest from Mexico, the moral and historical claims of the latter, as essential to the rise of an enduring and determined irredentist movement as is the demographic predominance of the aggrieved ethnic remnant within the claimed territory, are at once admitted. Any number of such admissions of the claims of Chicano separatists would not, however, have an impact beyond revisionist historical scholarship were it not that the prospect of a future demographic predominance of Chicanos in the Southwest has in recent years been transformed from one of extreme improbability to something approaching the inexorable.

Chicano separatism, considered from a perspective south of the Rio Grande, is Mexican irredentism. Given a continuation of present demographic trends, it is as certain as any projection of the future can be that by the year 2080 the United States will have begun a process of geopolitical dissolution initiated by the proximate triumph of Mexican irredentism. In that event, Alexander von Humboldt’s mordant prophecy that the U.S. would absorb Mexico and then collapse will have been vindicated. The triumph of Mexican irredentism, like the triumph of a number of irredentisms in the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the years following World War I, will reveal that the U.S. was for long, like the Habsburgs’ realm, a multi-national state, an unstable agglomeration of several nationalities, not in itself a true nation. It may be conjectured whether the Mexican irredentists’ triumph will be wholly peaceful or the outcome of sustained civil disorder, but it is beyond reasonable doubt that such will be the outcome of practically inexorable demographic and political trends operant in the U.S. at least as early as 1970 or even 1960. It may be subject to speculation whether the U.S. will officially recognize a new nation of Aztlan, formed from the old states of the Southwest, or whether it will simply cede those states back to Mexico, but it is beyond denial that, given already long-established demographic trends, such a geopolitical rout of the U.S. will occur and that it will precipitate a further legal or *de facto* Balkanization of the remnant nation.

Demographic factors alone may suffice to account for the geopolitical revolution that, soon after if not before 2080, will have transformed the Southwest into either an independent, Spanish-speaking republic of Aztlan or at least a new Mexican state of Alta California. According to the rather conservative estimates of demographers Leon F. Bouvier and Cary B. Davis in their *Immigration and the Future Racial Composition of the United States*, Hispanics, over half of whom are or will be Chicanos, will comprise 34.1 percent of the total population of the U.S. in 2080 even if the U.S. limits itself to a possibly unrealistically low level of two million immigrants each year from all areas of the world while birthrates of Hispanics converge with those of non-Hispanics, another possibly unrealistic assumption.<sup>7</sup> Though 34.1 percent is much less than a majority of the total population of the U.S., its impact will be overwhelming in the Southwest where Hispanics, based on the estimate of two million immigrants a year, will constitute a majority of the population in several states.<sup>8</sup> Bouvier and Davis provide estimates of the Hispanic percentages of the populations of California and Texas based on an almost certainly

unrealistically low estimate of one million immigrants annually which nonetheless reveal that Hispanics, at 41.1 percent of California's population and 53.5 percent of Texas's, will constitute either a plurality or a majority of those states' populations.<sup>9</sup> Hispanic voting blocs of 40 to 50 percent of the electorate, which in accord with these most conservative demographic estimates may be expected to arise by 2080 in these states, would alone be sufficiently large to control an electoral process in which the remainder of the electorate would be divided among at least two to three major ethnic blocs.

It should be noted that Bouvier and Davis are obliged as scientists to give all possible weight to all variables, such as the convergence of the birthrates of all racial groups, that militate against their thesis that even low levels of immigration, given the fact that the majority of immigrants to the U.S. now come from Third World nations, will radically transform the racial composition of the nation's population. Their estimates, therefore, represent, if anything, conservative understatements of the extent of such a transformation.

Those who are skeptical that Mexican irredentism could ever prevail in the U.S. can, admittedly, cite numerous situations in which displaced nationalities, nationality groups kindred to those of neighboring nationstates but outnumbered in the nation-states which they inhabit, have been prevented for centuries from achieving reunion with their homelands. Although the Germans, for example, have long been in the majority in France's provinces of Alsace and Lorraine and Italy's South Tyrol, they have been prevented from achieving self-determination by French and Italian majorities in the rest of those nations.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, Slovenians are predominant in the Austrian province of Carinthia, which borders on their homeland of Yugoslavia, but the German-speaking majority in Austria has long prevented their secession.<sup>11</sup> Other examples of the failure of irredentist movements in Europe are those of the Albanians of Yugoslavia's Kosovo province<sup>12</sup> and the Greeks of Cyprus.<sup>13</sup> It can be argued, therefore, that there is no reason to believe that the U.S. will be an exception to the general rule that nation-states having ethnic and linguistic minorities endure more often than they disintegrate. Why, it may be asked, should the U.S. not be equally successful in containing its Spanish-speaking minority within its political boundaries?

A closer examination of those nation-states compounded of more than one nationality will reveal, however, that, in most instances, citizens of one culture, language or nationality are overwhelmingly dominant in either their numbers or their ability to employ the force of law. Thus, although the Germans are more numerous than any other nationality in Alsace-Lorraine or South Tyrol, they are themselves minuscule minorities within France or Italy considered as a whole. The Slovenians in Carinthia, also, are overwhelmingly outnumbered within the whole of Austria by their German-speaking fellow citizens. Even if the Yugoslav masses did not wish to retain control over the Albanians of Kosovo, their government is willing to resort to the force needed to suppress any Albanian dissidents. Similarly, Turkey met Greece's call for *enosis* with the overwhelmingly Greek population of Cyprus by threatening to wage war against Greece.<sup>14</sup>

It would moreover, be a serious error to denigrate the significance of irredentist movements simply because they often are unsuccessful. Even a minuscule national minority within a larger nation-state has often, when unable to win either its independence or reunion with its homeland, demonstrated a potential for generating chronic civil disorder and political extremism. Two of the most infamous movements of this century had

their origins in frustrated irredentism. Mussolini's Fascism was largely inspired by the style and exploits of the most flamboyant of the Italian irredentists, Gabriele d'Annunzio, who sought to reconquer Fiume by mobilizing a black-shirted private army.<sup>15</sup> The first party of Germans to call itself National Socialist was founded several years before Hitler's National Socialist German Workers' Party by Germans living in the predominantly German Sudetenland, which was then part of the multinational Austro-Hungarian Empire.<sup>16</sup>

Decades before National Socialists emerged in the Sudetenland under that name, Germans in the Austro-Hungarian Empire founded movements that were also immediate precursors to Hitlerism.<sup>17</sup> These movements had their origins in German irredentist agitation, pan-Germanism, which spread to the Austrian half of the empire by way of the *Burschenschaften*, pan-German social fraternities founded by students at the universities of Vienna and Graz.<sup>18</sup> Anti-Semitic and opposed to liberalism and laissez-faire capitalism, the Austrian *Burschenschaften* demanded the union of all Germans in a greater German Reich led by Prussia. According to the historian Bruce F. Pauley, "They worshiped force, had contempt for humanitarian law and justice and criticized parliamentary government and capitalism as selfish, 'individualistic,' and antinational. In keeping with the idolization of all things 'German,' the pan-German students also sought to purify university life by eliminating all 'foreign influences,' which in practice often meant the expulsion of religious and ethnic Jews, as well as Slavs, from their nationalistic societies."<sup>19</sup>

After 1876 the *Burschenschaften* found a leader in Georg Ritter von Schoenerer, "at that time a left-wing Liberal deputy in the Austrian parliament," who "taught them the importance of the social question for the political struggle."<sup>20</sup> In 1881 Schoenerer founded the German People's Party which united his socialist concerns with the nationalist zeal of the *Burschenschaften*. In 1882 Schoenerer drafted the Linz Program which advocated, in effect, a plan to dismantle the Habsburg empire so that "the German-speaking Austrians would be raised from a 35 percent minority to an absolute majority in the greatly reduced Austrian Empire."<sup>21</sup> Schoenerer, who used the title *Führer* and has been called "the 'father,' or at least the 'grandfather,' of National Socialism," advocated the dissolution of the legal "nation" to which he belonged, a multinational state having no one nationality in the majority,<sup>22</sup> because he believed that the Austrian section of it was merely an eastern extension of the one real nation of Germany. Having a leader who did not recognize the legitimacy of the nation-state in which they lived, "The Austrian pan-Germans, in fact, became one of the first movements in Europe to break with existing laws and normal social behavior and to resort to direct action. Force and even terrorism became a way both to attract attention and to intimidate enemies."<sup>23</sup>

German irredentists in the Sudetenland called themselves National Socialists as early as 1910, used the slogan *Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz* (later adopted by Hitler's National Socialists), and published in 1918 Rudolf Jung's *Der nationale Sozialismus* (anticipating by seven years Hitler's *Mein Kampf*).<sup>24</sup> This irredentist agitation prepared the way for Germany's annexation of the Sudetenland for, according to the historian Jan Havranek, ". . . the development of German Nazism was easier in Czechoslovakia than in Germany in the 1920s and certainly the *Hakenkreuzflagge* was seen much more often in Czechoslovakia's German districts than in Germany itself."<sup>25</sup> While it would be unjustified to find in German irredentism the cause of World War II, irredentist agitation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its successor states certainly provided

much of the impetus towards it by having long before 1938 contributed to the rise of National Socialism.<sup>26</sup>

Foremost among apparent exceptions to the rule that multi-national states are torn by internal conflict is Switzerland, where three nationalities have lived in amity and parliamentary democracy since 1648. This feat of ethnic balance is, nonetheless, more one of show than of substance. German, spoken in 1983 by 4.1 million of Switzerland's citizens, is the dominant language in 19 of the nation's 25 cantons, while French, spoken by 1.13 million, prevails in five, and Italian, spoken by 744,000, in only one. (The remaining 50,400 of the Swiss speak Romansch, a linguistic hybrid of German and Italian.)<sup>27</sup> Even with the predominance of one nationality, the Germans, Switzerland has maintained its political unity only by extending to its minorities "rights" or "entitlements" out of proportion to their percentages of the population.<sup>28</sup> After citing Switzerland as an example of those multi-national states in which unity is maintained through this strategic surrender of the majority's right to rule to a minority's demand for compensatory perquisites, Hans Kohn, the eminent historian of nationalism, concludes that "Fundamental for the solution of problems of duo- or polyethnic states is not primarily the attitude of the minority or minorities but that of the majority. The weaker groups in the population must receive a greater consideration than would be proportional to their numerical strength. They must have a greater share in the benefits of the state than is their 'due.' Then they will know that the state is their homeland, too, and the natural privilege inherent in greater numbers or greater wealth will be compensated by 'favors' extended to 'the minority.'"<sup>29</sup>

As admirable as the peaceful and progressive land of the Swiss may be, one must yet ask if the compromises of majority rule that they have accepted to sustain an appearance of national unity are not such an attenuation of the powers usually considered to inhere in a nation-state's sovereignty as to render doubtful the value of that superficial unity.<sup>30</sup> The synthetic nation of Switzerland, compounded as it is of the *irredenta* of three neighboring nations, has probably endured only through the indifference of those neighbors rather than through any inner cohesiveness. Certainly, this supposition is as justified as a more optimistic one, considering the fact that Switzerland since 1515 has not been invaded by any nation having a populace co-national with a fraction of its own.

Some evidence suggests that Switzerland has avoided internal conflict more than have other multi-national states for a reason other than the accommodation to minority interests cited by Kohn. The political scientist Arend Lijphart believes that "One important factor in the explanation of political stability in religiously and linguistically heterogeneous Switzerland is that many of the cantons, where much of the country's decentralized politics take place, are quite homogeneous."<sup>31</sup> In indirect corroboration of Lijphart's thesis it may be noted that political instability in recent years has emerged in one canton, Bern, in which a Frenchspeaking, Catholic minority found its interests threatened by a Germanspeaking, Protestant majority. The *Rassemblement Jurassien* was formed by the Francophone minority, agitated more or less violently, and finally succeeded in bringing about the establishment, on January 1, 1979, of a new, wholly French canton of Jura.<sup>32</sup>

Another synthetic nation -- one that has not even known the peace of Switzerland -- is Belgium, which consists of *irredenta* of the Netherlands and France, having, in 1981, a total population of ten million of whom approximately 56 percent were Dutch-speaking Flemings and 44 percent French-speaking Walloons.<sup>33</sup> Ethnic animosities were exacerbated from

the nation's founding in 1830 because its capital, Brussels, was and is a French-speaking enclave in its Dutch-speaking northern half. Bias against the Flemings in education and government arose because, according to the political scientist Anthony Mughan, "Belgian elites, regardless of their region of origin or residence, had long embraced the French language and culture with the result that Flemish had become the language of the largely rural poor and powerless."<sup>34</sup> Belgium proved no exception to the truism that socio-economic differences that are accepted among occupational groups become insufferable when they are associated with ethnic groups. Chronic civil strife and political extremism was the result.<sup>35</sup>

Attempts to resolve this conflict have followed a route of accommodation that, if followed further as seems likely, will ultimately lead to the abolition of the nation-state of Belgium. In 1962 a linguistic frontier was drawn between the nation's Flemish north and Wallonian south. As conflict continued, the legal separation was accentuated with amendments to the Belgian Constitution in 1970 and 1971 which established three regions and two cultural councils, followed by the enactment in 1974 of legislation on "preparatory regionalization."<sup>36</sup> Devolution, the nearest approach yet to the actual division of Belgium into two separate nations, was implemented in 1980. According to a description of the enabling legislation which appeared in *The Economist*, it "aims to devolve power from the central government in Brussels to the two warring provinces -- though it looks like creating a five-tier government and a vastly complicated new bureaucracy in the process."<sup>37</sup> The five tiers comprise the following: (1) King, Parliament, and the already existing central bureaucracy; (2) a new Senate of 236 members to supplement the already existing Chamber of Deputies; (3) a Flemish regional council, having 118 members; a Brussels regional council, having 48 members; a Walloon regional council, having 70 members; (4) a Dutch council, having the 118 members of the Flemish regional council; a French council, having the 70 Walloon regional council members and all Brussels regional council members who are French; (5) finally, a new legal institution (and one doubtless much needed in the new dispensation!), the Arbitration Court, having six Dutch and six French members.

<sup>38</sup>

The irony of Belgium is that while productive of spokesmen for European unity, it is itself approaching geopolitical dissolution. According to the political scientists Alain Genot and David Lowe, more Belgians each year have come to favor "a total separation between Flanders and Wallonia. In this perspective, even the 'economic and monetary union' which politicians strive for in the European Community would be abandoned in Belgium. A customs union, it is argued, would be sufficient as any closer link would inevitably be at the expense of the Flemish community."

<sup>39</sup>

Boehm notes three "counter-remedies for irredentist difficulties . . . the rectification of frontiers, assimilation and accord of interests."<sup>40</sup> The Austro-Hungarian Empire, through the violence of World War I, had imposed on itself the first of these, rectification of frontiers, which in most instances is against the will of one of the nations involved. Switzerland and Belgium, nations which have purchased a precarious existence for themselves only through a preoccupation with the entitlements and demands of their irreconcilably diverse ethnic groups, have chosen the superficially attractive remedy of attempting an accord of interests. The Habsburg monarchs, as authoritarians, responded to irredentist challenges with the demand, sustained by the force of the state, that all subjects must accept their Majesty's transnational sovereignty. The governing

strata in Switzerland and Belgium, as liberal democrats, have responded by seeing themselves as embattled mediators who might one day have no more problems to contend with when everyone has been educated to an appreciation of world citizenship.

Americans may well ask why they should think of the potential problem of Mexican irredentism in terms of the more or less disconcerting examples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at one extreme and Switzerland and Belgium at the other. Is it not the American way to choose the middle-of-the-road remedy of assimilation?

What was once a rhetorical question, really a reproach to anyone who was not awash in ebullient optimism, has become in recent years a gravely disputed question demanding a deliberate answer. Milton M. Gordon, a sociologist perhaps best known for his *Assimilation in American Life*,<sup>41</sup> has provided a significant contribution to such an answer in his essay "Models of Pluralism: The New American Dilemma."<sup>42</sup> The new American dilemma, as fateful as the one once addressed by Gunnar Myrdal, is the nation's impending choice between its traditional "liberal pluralism," in which "government gives no formal recognition to categories of people based on race or ethnicity," and an ascendant "corporate pluralism," which "envisages a nation where its racial and ethnic entities are formally recognized as such -- are given formal standing as groups in the national polity -- and where patterns of political power and economic reward are based on a distributive formula which postulates group rights and which defines group membership as an important factor in the outcome for individuals."<sup>43</sup>

Corporate pluralism is, Gordon believes, a growing reality, not simply a possible alternative, because "recently introduced measures such as government-mandated affirmative action procedures in employment, education, and stipulated public programs, and court-ordered busing of school children across neighborhood district lines to effect racial integration, constitute steps toward the corporate pluralist idea."<sup>44</sup> Since corporate pluralism replaces "individual meritocracy" with "group rewards," it strongly discourages assimilation because "if a significant portion of one's rational interests are likely to be satisfied by emphasis on one's ethnicity, then one might as well stay within ethnic boundaries and at the same time enjoy the social comforts of being among 'people of one's own kind,' . . . Moving across ethnic boundaries to engage in significant inter-ethnic social relationships is likely to lead to social marginality in a society where ethnicity and ethnic identity are such salient features. Thus the logic of corporate pluralism is to emphasize structural separation."<sup>45</sup>

It is widely known that a shift in the public philosophy regarding assimilation has been in process in the nation's governing stratum for at least two decades. Assimilation, the ideal of liberal pluralism, usually described in terms of "the melting pot," has been under attack by partisans of corporate pluralism, sometimes describing themselves as "unmeltable ethnics,"<sup>46</sup> at least since the late 1960s. The "ethnic revival" found a typical spokesman in Congressman Roman Pucinski of Chicago, who introduced the Ethnic Heritage Studies Program Act in 1970 and declared then that "I find the whole doctrine of the melting pot frankly very repugnant. I don't want to be melted down to a monolith."<sup>47</sup> Others, such as an Italo-American caucus at a Catholic conference, inveighed more vigorously against "the melting pot" as "a myth which has been perpetuated by the elite-dominated American educational system to commit cultural genocide on our people."<sup>48</sup>

It is less widely known, however, that assimilation, either as an ideal

or a reality, has been under attack at least since the middle of the last century. Carl Schurz believed that the German American should be as aware of his *Deutschtum* as of his Americanism.<sup>49</sup> Carl Ruemelin, a Cincinnati German leader, declared in 1869 that “We did not wish to establish here a mere New Germany, nor, on the other hand did we wish simply to disappear into America.”<sup>50</sup> In 1910 a Polish-American priest told the sociologist Emily Greene Balch that “There is no such thing as an American nation. Poles form a nation, but the United States is a country, under one government, inhabited by representatives of different nations. . . .

I do not think that there will be amalgamation, one race composed of many. The Poles, Bohemians, and so forth, remain such, generation after generation. Switzerland has been a republic for centuries, but never has brought her people to use one language.”<sup>51</sup> In 1915 Rudolph Bourne, whose antecedents included New England Puritans, equated assimilation with stagnation in his essay “Trans-National America.” Bourne believed that “As long as we thought of Americanism in terms of the ‘melting pot,’ our American cultural tradition lay in the past. It was something to which the new Americans were to be moulded.”<sup>52</sup> Bourne advocated for Americans “dual citizenship”<sup>53</sup> in “a cosmopolitan federation of national colonies,”<sup>54</sup> because “America is coming to be, not a nationality but a trans-nationality.”<sup>55</sup>

In 1924, in his *Culture and Democracy in the United States*<sup>56</sup>, the social philosopher Horace M. Kallen took the philosophical concept of pluralism from his mentor, William James, and applied it to American society. Believing that America’s cultural pluralism would persist, Kallen asked, “What is the cultural outcome likely to be, under these conditions? Surely not the melting pot. Rather something that becomes more and more distinct in the changing state and city life of the last two decades, and which is most articulate and apparent among just those peoples whom the sociologists and Americanizers are most accustomed to praise -- the Scandinavians, the Germans, the Irish, the Jews.”<sup>57</sup> Kallen noted that each of these nationalities predominated in the population of a different area of the U.S. -- Scandinavians in Minnesota, Germans in the Midwest, Irish in Massachusetts, Jews in a large section of New York City -- and concluded that these areas should be developed as nations within the nation, taking Switzerland as a model. As did earlier spokesmen for ethnicity, he rejected the possibility of assimilation because “In historic times . . . no new ethnic types have originated, and there comes no assurances that the old types will disappear in favor of the new.”<sup>58</sup>

These partisans of ethnicity, whose denial of the possibility and desirability of assimilation was once largely dismissed as dissident pessimism, have increasingly come to be vindicated in recent years as public policy has moved from monolingualism to bilingualism.<sup>59</sup> In 1968 Title VII, which mandated the now-growing bilingual education program, was added to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1962.<sup>60</sup> In 1975 the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was amended to require bilingual elections in areas where a linguistic minority group comprises five percent or more of the population.<sup>61</sup> In the private sector, when the National Association of Spanish Broadcasters was founded in 1979, there were ninety Spanish language radio stations in the U.S.<sup>62</sup> The adjacency of Mexico to the U.S., if no other reason, would account for the fact that Spanish-language communications are a burgeoning industry. Attempts, such as that of Senator S. I. Hayakawa<sup>63</sup> to reverse the drift to bilingualism, seem foredoomed because of the exceptional status of Spanish, already recognized as a legal language in one state, New Mexico, and in one potential

state, Puerto Rico.

Assimilation in the U.S. or any other nation must slow down, cease, or give way to a retrograde wave of “affirmative ethnicity,” if and when those who are to be assimilated in many areas outnumber those who are to bring about the assimilation. Only a subconscious ethnocentrism can account for the belief that an ethnic minority, which the “Anglos” will eventually be in most areas of the Southwest, may in a liberal democracy determine the language, culture and values of an ethnic majority. Such attempts have invariably been undertaken by means of coercive state power justified by an ideology of elitism or racism, ideologies now consciously repudiated by the nation’s governing stratum.

As this awareness becomes more extensive among the general population of the nation, the conviction that the frontiers of nationality and of polity should coincide will encourage even non-Hispanic whites to accept Mexican demands for a revision of the border. While liberal pluralism, according to Gordon, allows “no racial or ethnic group . . . to lay legal claim to a particular piece of territory within the nation,” corporate pluralism is “more tolerant” of “area exclusivism . . . as a possible variant arrangement in the domain of racial and ethnic relations.”<sup>64</sup> In his “Balkanizing America,” Nathan Perlmutter, executive director of the Jewish Community Council of Metropolitan Boston, states more trenchantly the possibility that the new ethnicity may lead to territorial claims: “If the Mormon call for statehood in the 19th century or the more recent one by Black Muslims sounded far-fetched in their time, they seem quite plausible today as ethnic ‘leaders’ demand a total overhaul of the premises on which American society is based. The American Indian writer Vine Deloria, Jr., for example, has called for a restructuring of our national unity, with groups rather than individuals comprising the basic elements of the nation.”<sup>65</sup>

Their conviction that the frontiers of nationality and of polity should coincide is already being articulated by a growing number of Chicano spokesmen. It finds a somewhat militant expression in “The Spiritual Plan of Aztlan,” of which the following are typical passages: “In the spirit of a new people that is conscious not only of its proud heritage, but also of the brutal ‘gringo’ invasion of our territories, we, the Chicano, inhabitants and civilizers of the northern land of Aztlan . . . declare that the call of our blood is . . . our inevitable destiny. Aztlan belongs to those that plant the seeds, water the fields, and gather the crops, and not to the foreign Europeans. We do not recognize capricious frontiers on the Bronze Continent. . . . We declare the independence of our mestizo Nation. . . . Before the world, before all of North America . . . we are a Nation. We are Aztlan.”<sup>66</sup> Partisans of Aztlan are finding support for their demands in revisionist histories such as Rodolfo Acuna’s *Occupied America: The Chicano’s Struggle Toward Liberation*, which defends the thesis that “The Mexican-American War was not only an unjust war, but . . . it was just as brutal as the repression perpetuated by other colonial regimes. The Anglo-Texans’ treatment of the Mexican was violent and often inhumane. The Anglo-American invasion of Mexico was as vicious as that of Hitler’s invasion of Poland and other Central European nations, or, for that matter, U.S. involvement in Vietnam.”<sup>67</sup>

As the immigrant influx continues, it reinforces the constituency supporting the new pluralism and rejecting the old. The new pluralism, however, appears to be much like that advocated by Boume and Kallen more than half a century ago. Their foresight arose from their realization that a nationality is a several-faceted phenomenon, that it is not simply an artifact of legal paper, that the legal nation may not be the real nation.

Eugen Lemberg, a prominent analyst of nationalism, has enumerated the following five integrators of nations: language, genetic background, cultural community, concept of history, and citizenship.<sup>68</sup> Other scholars may find that the factors creating a true nation are three in number, or seven, or twelve. The salient point is that all agree that a sense of nationality is not simply derived from birth within a certain geographical area or the obtaining of papers of naturalization permitting one to live for a lifetime in that area.

What can integrate the peoples of the U.S. in 2080, given a continuation of trends of the past two decades, save a common citizenship? Yet, this must be a citizenship that can be only a hollow, un compelling, ghostly, legal fiction, unanimated by any commonalty of language, descent, culture, history. By 2080 or soon thereafter, therefore, the U.S. will undergo a process of geopolitical dissolution in which political divisions, manifestations of the conflicting interests among several ethnic groups having as many territorial strongholds, will be translated into geographical divisions. The United States will certainly endure as an Anglophone remnant, but, having been moved by a resurgent Mexico from the center to the periphery of the North American continent, it will be but one among several contending powers in the Western Hemisphere.

#### NOTES

1. "The Future of North America," *The Futurist*, Aug. 1980, p. 22.
2. "Why the U.S. Closed Its Borders," *The Futurist*, Dec. 1982, p. 6. Lamm's article was, of course, written in the optative mood favored by many contributors to *The Futurist*. As of this writing (Oct. 1983), no one has been able to deny the obvious truth of the widely reported confession of William French Smith, the U.S. Attorney General, that "We have lost control of our borders."
3. See his *White Supremacy: A Comparative Study of American and South African History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
4. "Race in America," in *Tocqueville's America 1982* (Washington, D.C.: LTV Corp., 1982), p. 91.
5. These include, representing opposing political viewpoints, Eric Sevareid (in his address at Harding University, Searcy, Arkansas, in April 1980) and William F. Buckley (in his syndicated newspaper column in Oct. 1983).
6. "Irredentism," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1st ed. (1937; rpt. New York: Macmillan, 1950), VIII, 325.
7. (Alexandria, Va.: The Center for Immigration Research and Education, 1982), p. 17.
8. Cf. Fredrickson, p. 91.
9. Bouvier and Davis, pp. 21-22. Subsequent to the writing of this essay, population projections for California and Texas, based on immigration levels of 1 million, 1.5 million and 2 million per year, were prepared by demographer Davis. See Appendix.
10. See Harm J. DeBliz, *Systematic Political Geography*, 2nd ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1973), P. 407. DeBliz also considers (pp. 407-412) irredentist movements in the Third World (e.g., those of the Ewe in Togoland, the Somalis in Ethiopia, the BaKongo in Zaire), and it might be argued that Mexican irredentism, as a movement on behalf of a developing nation, should be considered as a species of Third World (rather than European) irredentism. Only European examples are considered here, however, because they more closely approximate the situation in the U.S., in which the irredentist challenge

will be met by a multi-party, representative political system.

11. Frederick Scheu, "Slovene Minority in South Poses Problem for Austria," *The Washington Post*, 6 Nov. 1976, Sec. A., p. 13.

12. David Binder, "Albanians Rekindle Ancient Claims," *New York Times*, 12 July 1982, Sec. A., p. 8. The map of "a greater Albania" that has been published and disseminated by that nation's ruling Communist Party "encompasses an area more than twice the size of contemporary Albania."

13. The problem of Cyprus, because of its frequent eruption in violence, has received almost as much attention as the perennial conflict in Northern Ireland. For a survey of the situation, see M.L. Evriades, "Problem of Cyprus," *Current History*, Jan. 1976, pp. 18-21.

The Catholic Irish of Northern Ireland will be involved in a classically irredentist struggle when they finally become a majority of the population of the northern counties. The violence initiated by the Irish Republican Army may be, therefore, an attempt to expedite the attainment of such a majority by encouraging the emigration of the Scotch-Irish Protestants as well as the withdrawal of the British troops of occupation. Similarly, the Ulster Unionists' economic discrimination against the Catholic Irish may be an attempt to encourage their emigration to the Republic of Ireland.

14. See J.C. Campbell, "Mediterranean Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, 53 (1975), 605-624.

15. Tommaso Antongini, *D'Annunzio* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1938), pp. 370-392, 520-536. See also Lucien Radel, *Roots of Totalitarianism: The Ideological Sources of Fascism, National Socialism, and Communism* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975), pp. 80-81.

16. P.G.J. Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria* (New York: John Wiley, 1964), pp. 210, 323.

17. See Francis L. Carsten, *Fascist Movements in Austria: From Schoenerer to Hitler* (London; Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977); Bruce F. Pauley, *Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis: A History of Austrian National Socialism* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1981); Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, new ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), pp. 237-240.

18. Pauley, p. 18.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. The ethnic composition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in which no one nationality had a majority of subjects or voters, is analyzed in Carsten, p. 10; A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948), Pp. 262-269; and Robert A. Kahn, *The Multi-National Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1848-1918*, 2 vols., (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), passim.

23. Pauley, p. 21. Cf. Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 296: "More radical than any other European party of that time -- at least from certain aspects -- were Georg von Schoenerer's Pan-Germans. For they attacked not only certain institutions but the state as such."

24. Pauley, p. 28.

25. "Fascism in Czechoslovakia," in *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918-1945*, ed. Peter F. Sugar. (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC Clio, 1971), p. 53.

26. In Hungary Ferenc Szalasi's Arrow Cross Party-Hungarist Movement

contributed to that nation's collaboration with National Socialist Germany. Szalasi's movement was wholly irredentist since its reason for being was recovery of territories in Rumania and Czechoslovakia inhabited by the over three million Hungarians who were left outside the boundaries of the Hungarian state created in 1919. See Francis L. Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1969), pp. 171-180.

27. "Swiss Protest Diversity of Language," *The Arkansas Gazette*, 14 Jan. 1983, Sec. A, p. 14.

28. *Ibid.*

29. "Nationalism," in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, ed. Philip P. Wiener. (New York: Scribner's, 1973), III, 329.

30. Switzerland's complex apparatus for "conflict resolution" is described in Juerg Steiner, *Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1974). As of 1971, the Swiss required nine parties to represent their interests in their National Council. See Armin Gretler and Pierre-Emeric Mandl, *Values, Trends and Alternatives in Swiss Society* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 8.

31. Steiner, p. 256.

32. Kohn, III, 338. For the background of the Jura separatist movement, see Johnathan Steinberg, *Why Switzerland?* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 66-67.

33. *The Statesman's Yearbook 1983-1984*, 120th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 196, 204.

34. "Modernization and Ethnic Conflict in Belgium," *Political Studies*, March 1979, p. 23.

35. Two fascist irredentist movements during the 1930s sought reunion of the Flemings with the Netherlands, the *Verbond van Dietsche Nationaalsolidaristen* and the *Vlaamsch National Verbond*. See Otto-Ernst Schueddekopf, *Fascism* (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 69, 73.

36. *The Statesman's Yearbook 1983-1984*, p. 204.

37. "Count to Five and Devolve," *The Economist*, 22 July, 1978, p. 39.

38. *Ibid.* See also "Limited Autonomy is Given to Regions in Belgium," *New York Times*, 8 Aug. 1980, Sec. A., p. 9; "First Walloon Assembly is Installed by Belgians," *New York Times*, 16 Oct. 1980, Sec. A, p. 10; *Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society*, ed. Arend Lijphart. (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1981).

39. "Belgium: A State Divided," *The World Today*, 36(1980), 223.

40. Boehm, VII, 326.

41. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964). Gordon's book has received the Anisfield-Woif Award in Race Relations.

42. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 454 (March 1981), 178-188.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.*, p. 185. See also Robert Pear, "Aliens Who Stay in Clusters Are Said to Do Better," *New York Times*, 11 March 1982, Sec. A, p. 2, which reports on the findings of Alejandro Portes, a leading scholar in immigration studies, who found in his study of all groups of Hispanics in the U.S. that "Immigrant enclaves tend to promote self-employment . . . Self-employed immigrants and others working within an ethnic enclave seem to do better than those in wage labor on the outside."

46. See, for example, Michael Novak, *Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (New York: Macmillan, 1972).
47. Arthur Mann, *The One and the Many: Reflections on the American Identity* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 37.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
50. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life*, p. 135.
51. Mann, p. 140.
52. *The Radical Will: Selected Writings 1911-1918* (New York: Urizen Books, 1977), p. 256.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 258.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 262.
56. (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1924), p. 108.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
59. See Gordon, "Models of Pluralism: The New American Dilemma," Pp. 186-187, on the significance of the abandonment of insistence on use of one language.
60. Tom Bethel, "Against Bilingual Education," *Harper's*, Feb. 1979, p. 30. Alan Pifer's *Bilingual Education and the Hispanic Challenge: 1979 Annual Report* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1979) is a sympathetic account of bilingual education for Hispanics. Pifer notes that "Bilingual education is no longer regarded strictly as an educational measure but also as a strategy for realizing the social, political and economic aspirations of the Hispanic peoples" (p. 5).
61. "'75 Voting Act--Help for Those Who Don't Read English," *U.S. News & World Report*, II Aug. 1975, p. 28.
62. "The Spanish Word Goes Over More and More Stations," *Television/Radio Age*, Dec. 1980, p. A-3.
63. William F. Buckley, "Hayakawa Amendment," *National Review*, 26 June 1981, p. 740.
64. "Models of Pluralism: The New American Dilemma," p. 186.
65. *Commentary*, Sept. 1980, p. 65.
66. In *Chicano Manifesto*, ed. Armando B. Renden. (New York: Collier Books, 1971), p. 336.
67. (San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1972), p. 7.
68. *Nationalismus*, 2 vols. (Hamburg: Rowohlt's deutsche Enzyklopaedie, 1964), II, 34-50.